16 MAY 1998, Page 10

POLITICS

It is time that Mr Blunkett gave Mr Cook some homework guidelines

BRUCE ANDERSON

The debating skills which have often served Robin Cook well came to his rescue on Tuesday. He was also fortunate, in that the Tories are still unable to mount a prop- er parliamentary attack; there is too much baggage from the past. Michael Howard always offers his opponents some easy debating points, and was not on top form.

But Mr Cook has won a respite, not an acquittal. He himself appeared uneasy, though nothing like as uncomfortable as Tony Lloyd, the other Foreign Office min- ister whose career is in jeopardy. Mr Lloyd, a decent if limited individual, knows that his ministerial career is effectively over; he would be much happier if he could just resign. On Tuesday afternoon, he looked and sounded wretched. But there is a dif- ference between Tony Lloyd and Robin Cook. Mr Lloyd has a sense of shame.

There is nothing to be ashamed about in either the British government's involve- ment in Sierra Leone, or Sandline's. Sand- line should take particular credit. Its opera- tions have been efficiently and humanely run, on the principle of maximum effect for minimum casualties. One of the only recent encouraging developments in Africa has been the involvement of unofficial British special forces. There is going to be a great need for them over the next century, or the next millennium.

The intervention in Sierra Leone has been one of the few undoubted successes in British foreign policy since last May, but it raises two major problems. First, it was almost certainly in breach of a UN resolu- tion, which is an embarrassment, albeit a containable one. The second is less con- tainable; the whole action was probably illegal. The Order in Council banning arms exports to Sierra Leone is unequivocal; its prohibitions cannot be reconciled with what has actually happened. But there is no question of a prosecution. The government machine not only knew what Sandline was up to; it gave its full approval, in advance and in detail. This was not a matter of a nod and a wink from a freebooting minis- ter, as Matrix-Churchill received from Alan Clark, glorying in his defiance of the offi- cial machine. If that firm believed him to be the voice of government, it was believing what it found convenient to believe. But the authorisation of Sandline's activities went well beyond nods and winks; Colonel Spicer was entitled to believe that he was effectively acting as a government agent.

It was still illegal, however; ministers and officials are not entitled to dispense with a law, merely because they find it inconve- nient. That helps to explain Robin Cook's initial reaction: 'deep concern', and a sug- gestion that FO officials might seek the help of criminal lawyers. In part, this was the adolescent leftist in him coming to the fore — it is never far in the background with an instinctive distrust of British diplo- mats and the British military; a belief that neither of them should be allowed to sully the moral purity of Africa. But it was also a recognition that the government was in serious trouble, from which he wanted to distance himself as rapidly as possible. That is not an option open to any foreign secre- tary in such circumstances. Mr Cook will eventually have to answer the Nixonian questions: what did he know, and when did he know it?

Thus far, the answer has been that he knew nothing, because his officials did not inform him. That is utterly implausible; it is not how the British system of government works. If anything, the Foreign Office is now hypersensitive about the need for min- isterial clearance, as a result of Scott and Iraq. It is also inconceivable that the FO's Permanent Secretary, Sir John Kerr, would have tolerated any laxity. John Kerr is relentlessly energetic and politically astute. Not for nothing did John Major nickname him 'Machiavelli'. John Kerr would not have been directly involved in Sierra Leone, but the details would have reached his red box, and his first question would have been: 'Ministers happy?' Someone must have had reasons for believing that the answer to that question was 'Yes.'

In a television programme on the For- eign Office, Robin Cook gave us an insight into his methods of, as it were, work. To be a good foreign secretary, he said, you just need to concentrate on the big picture; it is not necessary to finish all the paperwork. To judge by some reports from the FO, for `finish' one could often substitute 'start'. David Blunkett recently issued homework guidelines for schoolchildren; perhaps he should now devise one for the Foreign Sec- retary.

Mr Cook is not only uninterested in large areas of his responsibilities; he has succeed- ed in poisoning his relationships with many officials, so that the normal nexus of trust and confidence which a wise minister will nurture does not exist. It is not always pos- sible for his officials to know when he has not done his work.

Mr Cook is now resisting calls for an inquiry, insisting that the Customs and Excise investigation will have to be com- pleted first. That is a blatant procrastina- tion. There could be no question of prose- cuting Sandline; any such case would col- lapse even more abjectly than the Matrix- Churchill one did. So the investigation is a waste of time and money. Mr Cook is happy to waste time.

He may believe that he can stave off res- ignation by claiming that he could not have known what was going on because he had not finished the paperwork. If so, it will be further proof that he has no understanding of the dignity of his office, or of its respon- sibilities. From the outset, he has neither looked like a foreign secretary nor acted like one. His belief that it would be in order to turn his mistress into his diary secretary was not an aberration; it was characteristic of his whole approach. His trips to the sub- continent and to Israel demonstrate that he is not fit to represent this country abroad. As Hamlet said of Polonius, 'Let the doors be shut upon him, that he may play the fool nowhere but in's own house.'

For the present, however, he will survive; he has Mr Blair's protection. The PM says he cannot see what all the hoo-ha is about; our boys were helping the good guys, so why all this fuss? At the level of realpolitik, Mr Blair has a good point, but there are two problems. His gloss on Sierra Leone contradicts the Foreign Secretary's previ- ous line, and there is still the question of the law.

Mr Blair also explained the deeper rea- soning behind his decision to rescue Robin Cook. The public are not interested in Sier- ra Leone, he tells us; it is not what they are talking about in the Dog and Duck. The people's Prime Minister seems to have a pretty poor opinion of the people's atten- tion span. Nor can Mr Cook take unlimited comfort from his boss's response. The For- eign Secretary has survived, because he has passed the opinion poll test. But if his per- formance does start damaging the govern- ment's standing, Mr Blair would have no reason to go on protecting him. Robin Cook had better keep an anxious ear out in the Dog and Duck.