A Democratic Europe

By ANTHONY HARTLEY

DERHAPS a journey around Western Europe was hardly needed to show how uninformed much comment in Britain on European issues is. Even excluding horror comics like Tribune, it is none too common to find in newspaper reports or the utterances of politicians what Europeans themselves think of our demand to enter the Common Market and of the negotiations at present in progress in Brussels. We tend to have a cut and dried picture, in which the only nuances concern the susceptibility of the five to French influence or the degree to which Dr. Adenauer or Dr. Schroder is the true voice of German foreign policy. That is, we see European opinion as it impinges immediately on us and not as a whole, not as Europeans themselves think their own future. Moreover, here the political problem of Europe is never raised—for excellent reasons; there it is primary.

A part of the truth can be perceived from Brussels where Mr. Heath and his colleagues are negotiating hard in the surprisingly hideous new building of the Belgian Foreign Office. (In passing, let me record my opinion that they are doing as well as can teasonably be expected. It seems to me nonsense to say that better terms could have been obtained so far, and the fierce disputes over what are called 'les fameux East India Kips' bear witness to our negotiators' determination. In these discussions it has con- stantly been the policy of the French delegation to insist on a strict acceptance of the Treaty of Rome by ourselves, and one result of this has been apparent agreement between the 'Europeans' of the Common Market Commission and Gaullist diplomacy which is anything but 'Euro- pean,' one of whose chief representatives at Brussels, M. Andre Wurmser, was violently opposed to the European Defence Community and which meets with harsh criticism from a 'European' opposition in France itself. France in Brussels today is not 'European' but talks the same language as those who are, thereby salving the conscience of some of its own representatives, creating confusion in the minds of those who, like some Germans, wish to be confused, and establishing an unassailable negotiating position for the extraction of concessions to purely French interests from other countries. There is more than a smack of Tartufferie about the way in which the exertion of blackmail on Germany as regards the common agricultural fund is justified by French officials in terms of the purest European orthodoxy and with not even the faintest suspicion of a wink. Whether this is altogether wise is another matter. 'French diplomacy has never been so brilliant, said a diplomat from one of France's partners in the Community to me. 'but it has never been so hated.'

That the French negotiators have most frequently been able to secure the support of the Commission, which negotiates, but does not vote, during the Brussels talks and that many Europeans in private conversation voice mild irritation at Great Britain wishing to negotiate at all—why not just accept the Treaty of Rome?—

would seem to indicate that there are still more doubts of Britaie's sincerity among partisans of a united Europe than is generally realised in this country. It is, of course, highly irritating to be asked continually whether one's country has Tesprit co/nlnuflan(aire'----a cant phrase which may be roughly translated as 'faith'—but we should appreciate the background of suspicion which it indicates.

In part, this is justified. Britain has a bad record as far as the European idea is concerned. Our refusal to play our part in the EDC (which might have saved that plan from defeat), our blowing hot and cold with regard to various forms of economic integration (while Sir David Maxwell Fyfe was announcing in Strasbourg that Britain's possible association with EDC might lead to 'complete and unqualified partner- shim' Mr. Eden was turning his thumbs down on the idea in Rome) and the bungled Maudling negotiation—all this recent history—not to mention a great deal of very ancient history, is held against us. Now at last we are taking Europe seriously, but in the past we did not, and we cannot be surprised if the change between then and now is more apparent to ourselves than it is to others.

In part, too, however, these remnants of old prejudices are due to ignorance. In talks with officials of the Commission in Brussels I registered a very strong impression that they were not well informed either about the political situation in Brita,n (and, therefore, about the difficulties a British government wishing to enter the Community has to face) or about the surpris- ing evolution which has taken place in British public opinion since the talks began. A year ago, for instance, opposition to this move within the Coriservative Party seemed formidable. Today it is a mere twittering of ghosts, but, despite Llandudno, the progress made has not been observed by European officials. Nor is there any reason why it should be. The Commission is not a foreign office, it has no embassies nor any machinery for the digestion of political information. Its officials are technicians and administrators, and its chief, Professor Hall- stein, though a man of stature, would not seem to be at his best in the handling of purely political issues—that is, if he can be judged by his effect on the tenets of West German foreign policy. Some of the more immediate political effects of European integration are not always appreciated by those most in favour of it. Thus the proposal, which was put to me by a German European, that there should be a pause after Britain's entry and that Norway, Denmark and Ireland should only be admitted when they were 'ready' (i.e., when there had been a comparable spiritual up- heaval, in the European sense, to that we are now undergoing) seems to ignore totally the likely effect of such a measure on the membership of NATO. No doubt, digestion of so many different countries poses a difficult problem for the new Europe, but it often appears to be posed by European enthusiasts in terms which would have done credit to dignitaries of the Byzantine church discussing whether or not Bulgars could be Christian and still wear trousers.

The Commission of the Common Market in Brussels necessarily has to play a political role— its very presence at the negotiating table in the Rue des Laines would indicate that—but it has to do so without proper political machinery and also without politicians. Of the two the latter is the more serious gap. Europe now appears to be suffering from the fact that its institutions—and those institutions are really supra-national. however much President de Gaulle may dislike it—are not exposed to the healthy influence of a political debate in which European public opinion can make itself felt. Despite the powers of the European Assembly, it cannot provide that politicising of the European idea which is needed if the realities of power and relations with the outside world are to be con- sidered on the same technical level as, say, the lowering of tariffs or the building of atomic reactors. At the moment the 'Europeans' are often professionals in economics, but amateurs in politics, and, given the fact that the present negotiations in Brussels will have political reper. cussions of outstanding importance whether they succeed or fail, this is not a happy situation.

From the other side of the Channel the arguments for providing Europe with some real political institutions with genuine powers of democratic control seem overwhelming. Since the EEC, Euratom and ECSC are, in effect, supra-national (i.e., possess powers not subject to control by national Parliaments) and seem bound to become more so, we are faced with the alternative either of giving some really political European body (one directly elected) powers of control over them or else of resigning ourselves to a future in which such bodies exercise an increasing political and economic sway without any control at all—except for meetings of foreign ministers and the European Assembly, both of which seem to be insufficient. Doubtless, many constitutional variants can be worked out, but I must confess the more I look at Europe the more I believe that only federalism offers a real alternative to the abandonment of more power to officials and technicians than any democratic community should surrender.

During the course of the Brussels negotiations the British Government has had to play down the political aspects of entry into the Common Market, but anyone who travels in Europe will find that it is very much 'in the mind of those people in all countries who desire Britain's entry into the Community. On the one hand, it is feared that a break-down in the negotiations in Brussels could in some way abort the future development of the Six themselves. Of course, there would be no question of the Community breaking up, but it might, so it is said, fail to arrive at the future democratic development of its institutions, which seems so necessary to many Europeans, particularly to those of the non-Communist left. The real political reper- cussions of a break-down in Brussels and the more intangible legacy of suspicion and fear that these would leave behind would certainly be damaging to a process of integration which requires above all things the presence of mutual trust, More positively, it is hoped and believed

that Great Britain, once into the Community, would take the lead in helping to found Euro-

pean political institutions, spurred on by its natural regard for parliamentary government and an instinctive dislike for administration un- regulated by close political control. Talking to

leaders of liberal opinion in the countries of the Six, one secs more clearly than ever what a great opportunity the British Labour Party has throw a away. In the absence of a lead from Mr. Gaitskell towards a European apertura a sinistra one from Mr. Macmillan will do, and the representatives of the democratic left in Europe speak with horror of the Gaitskell line—to them so familiar as the 011enhauer line at the time of the forma- tion of the Community. The present European political conjuncture gives these reproaches a special strength. If I have used the phrase apertura a sinistra, it is because it is in Rome that the necessity for European political institutions and the Part Britain can play in forming them is particularlY emphasised by the Fanfani Government and because the kind of shift which Signor Fanfani has carried out in Italian politics seems to me to be the probable and desirable evolution in the orientation of other members of the European Community. In fact, despite the waking night- mares of the left wing of the Labour Party, it is

quite clear that the reign of the de GaulleAdenauer axis within Europe is drawing to an

end—if, indeed, it ever existed. Politics in France are not in a good state, because the President has created no political institutions to follow his reign, and, now that his position has been shaken by last month's referendum, the question of the succession is becoming one of urgency. Politics in Germany are stagnant and beginning to smell slightly because it is never a good thing to wait too long for the death of anyone. Dr. Adenauer's obstinate durability has undone much of the good he did to nascent German democracy (though, pace Lord BoothbY, the Spiegel affair has shown that it has reserves of strength). many of his policies arc now ill ruins, and nothing new can emerge until he IS gone and his successor decided upon. Both France and Germany badly need the v‘ider horizon of European political action, but 010 will not get it if a spirit of egotistical exclusive- ness prevails within the Community. A combination of the British demand for entry into the Common Market and the approaching end of the de Gaulle-Adenauer era have combined to create a crisis in Europe. But' so far from this being an argument for our hold- ing aloof, it is one of the most compelling reasons for our participation in the CommunitY and for placing our not inconsiderable political experience at its disposal when it collies to search for the political institutions appropriate

to its increasing economic unity. The grow th of an integrated Europe on our doorstep could

never fail to affect us politically as well as economically, and our only chance of seeing it built according to our wishes is to help in the building. We must not go into Europe to stoP its political development, but to aid it, to ensure th3t it is democratic and that it provides the 11137d- mum of light and air for political systems which' at the moment, seem somewhat wanting in those necessary commodities.