LAW REFORMS AND ABUSES, NO. I.

ADDRESSED TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE ROBERT PEEL.

SIR,—As a member of the legal profession, whose opportunities of personal experience and means of information enable them to afford the most correct suggestions on the subject of a practical reform of our law; I entreat your attention to the following striking, but by no means singular cases. I address myself to you, Sir, as you have already displayed both the power and the-in- clination to undertake the task of legal reform ; and may be said to have been among the first to rouse the public mind from its great and unaccountable apathy on these matters.

The matter to which I now claim your attention is extremely simple ; it is bottomed in fact, and can be understood by those who should best under- stand it—the public.

A is indebted to B, C, and D, in the respective sums of 5001., 3001., and 2001. and for which he has given mortgage securities on his estate. Being unable to discharge his debt to B, the first mortgagee, B enters, receives the rents and profits, until A considers he is paid off. B, disputing this, A is forced to file his bill in Chancery, for an account of the sums which B has received ; and, according to the rules of Equity, is compelled to make C, and D, against whom he has no complaint, likewise defendants. The suit begins. In the second or third year from its commencement, the first defendant dies ; the proceedings have then to be revived against his representatives ; the same mishap happens to one of the other parties ; this got over, a commission issues to take the examination of witnesses on some most trivial fact ; and at last the parties arrive at a hearing, seven years having intervened from the

filing of the bill, between two and three years of which time the cause is in . . the paper for hearing. : '

The hearing of the cauie occupies a few minutes, there being a dispute that the plaintiff is entitled to redeem if B has received the amount Of his principal and interest; but that inquiry tan only be made in one place—the Master's Office—where the actual business of the suit begins. In the Master's Office the parties are occupied one year. The Clerk (I put him first, as on him devolve the principal duties of the office) or the Master makes some mistake, and then exceptions to. his report follow, which, if allowed, you are sent back again to the Master's Office, and If disallowed, the delay is still suffered.

But supposing no mistake made, the cause must still receive its final hear. ing, or what is called "further directions "—and this, although there be no exceptions by either party. The suit, after the second hearing, is remitted to the Master, to do what ought to have been done in the first instance. When this step is accomplished, the cause is set down for judgment ; and many other proceedings, too tedious for you to pay attention to, have still to take place before the party against whom the decree of the Court is, can be attached by the process of the Court for the non .performance of its order. The decree orders payment of the incumbrances and the costs of the three defendants ; the estate to be sold for that purpose The account stands thus : X X x Value of the estate when mortgaged 1250 Deduct expenses of sale 50 1200 Amount of rents received by the officer of the Court since the filing of the bill, and put to the credit of the cause, 10 years at 75/. a year 750 Interest, or rather dividends on this sum, as it is yearly paid in, will amount to somewhere about 150 Amount of purchase-money and interest

Deduction in respect only of the above rents Salary (at 5 per cent.) of Receiver, (an officer of the Court,)

and his Solicitor's costs in passing account every year, at the rate of 51. per annum for ten years, forms a total of The costs of B, first defendant, and which his solicitor is en- titled to yearly on the passing of the Receiver's accounts.. The late costs of C, second defendant Ditto D, third defendant Ditto Plaintiff's solicitor Here therefore is an outlay of 3001. to take care of 9001. by investing it in the public funds Add surplus of rents and profits to the amount of the pur- chase-money To the credit of the cause Then the costs are to be paid. Costs of Defendant B. 175 Ditto - C. 150 Ditto D. 150 Costs of plaintiff's own solicitor, who has a lien on the fund 325 Deduct

Left to pay principal Monies • • • •

SOO 41000 — 900 100 50 50 50 50 300 600 1800 On taking the account, it is found B has been paid off all but 1001., and which is found due to him with 10 years' interest, making C has to receive the whole of his principal and 10 years' interest D likewise his 2001. andlen years' interest ..... • •

A has to receive 44 Je 15o.

450 300 900 100 £1000 His loss it thus : Costs 111100

Difference on sale. 4 4 . 250 Difference in interest between what he paid and

what he received by the investment of his rents 150 £1500 The proceedings in the case I have mentioned were conformable to the every-day practice of Courts of Equity in England. I shall presently show the difference that would be occasioned in the time and etpense if the suit had been determined in the Court of King's Bench. The simple remedy I have to propose, is to give the Common Law Courts jurisdiction in such matters. The increase of business to the Law Courts would be, comparatively speaking, small, whilst to the suitors in such causes the advantage would be immense. To give such additional power to the Common Law Courts would create but little or no innovation. When the old action of account was.. in vogue, matters which are now entertained in the Court of Chancery were summarily disposed of by the other Courts. I have heard Lord WYNFORD, when Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, express his approbation of the action of ac- count ; and I have little doubt he would have revived that proceeding if he had continued on the Bench.

Matters of debtor and creditor account are often disposed of, in the Corn- mon Law Courts, in cases of dispute between attornies and their clients ; the jurisdiction, in these cases, arising from the attornies being officers of the Court.

An attorney, by the statute, is compelled to deliver his bill a month be-. fore he can commence an action ; in which time the client can cause the attorney's demand to be referred to one of the taxing officers (who, besides their general professional knowledge, are excellent accountants,) for him to investigate, and, finally, decide on the amount of the creditor's claim. The attorney, (the plaintiff in the action) besides his bill of costs, has also a de- mand against his debtor in respect of mortgage transactions, and various other sums of money received or paid by him during a long period of time, and which is likewise referred to the officer of the Court. This inquiry is begun in the Master's Office in the Court of King's Bench—not after a lapse of six years, but in less than six days after the delivery of the bill and ac- count ; and instead of the expense of 3001.* incurred in the Court of Chancery, a sum under 20s. is scarcely expended in bringing the account before the Master for investigation. And even if the debtor neglects to apply within the month, and the action is commenced, the expense is increased only by a few pounds. The same question and the same difficulties arise in the present, as in the case before the Court of Chancery; but as the Masters of the Court of King's Bench are men of business, the points are settled in as many minutes, or at the utmost with a delay of a few days, and at a trivial expense, where months would intervene in the Master'a Office in the Court of Chancery, and a serious expense be occasioned. The Masters In the Court Of King'sBench.dischaege-their functions in the presence of the parties; mid commonly, on the last meeting, are prepared to sign what is equivalent to a report in the Fourt of Chancery, inasmuch as tne document which he signs states the- aniount which he finds due to the party; whereas in the Court of Chancery, the report is not obtained in a completed state until, in many instances, from. six to twelve 'months after the investigation is ended. A delay then from one to three years takes place before the final order of the Court can touch the defendant. In the Master's Office of the King's Bench; unless the demand is paid immediately after the Master has signed his decision, the Court enforces that decision by a writ of attachment, which, I need not inform you, seizes the body of the defendant ; and there seems to be no reason why the Court should not be empowered to seize the goods as well as the body of the defendant. Takine° the extreme case, the expense would not amount to 501. In the Court of Chancery, we have shown, it did amount to 11001. I have known proceedings of this na- ture commenced; and finally terminated, within a week or ten days, the ex- pense being less than 51. Justice too is never defeated, nor wrong done by this speed ; as the Master will, on reasonable cause for doubt being shown by either party, defer signing his decision, until the party against whom the de- cision has been given has the opportunity of moving the Court ; who will hear both parties within four days after the decision of the Master,—or, if there was no pretext for the application, will refuse it in the first instance, and within twenty-four hours from such decision. If the Court be not sitting, a judge at chambers exercises the same powers.

However startling any of the facts I have adduced may appear, there is none, the accuracy of which I cannot vouch for, and would not maintain by distinct proof, if called upon to do so. I consider it the bounden duty of every professional person, to aid your praiseworthy exertions ; and in that spirit have I ventured to offer the foregoing observations. It is a narrow no- tion of self-interest that now chokes all efforts for improvement ; but I hope the day will come when the lawyers will co-operate with yourself and the public to work out a salutary reform.

With great respect, I beg to subscribe myself, Sir, Your obedient humble servant,

• In the case cited, 6001. was actually Incurred up to this stage of the business.