CORRESPONDENCE.

THE ADMIRALTY,

ITO TIM EDITOR Of VIZ "SPRCTATOR.1

SIII,—The question uppermost in all men's minds at this 'foment is that of the right organisation of the Admiralty.

I happen to be one of those who hold very strongly that its Present organisation is defective, in that it does not make Proper provision for securing to the Government the advice

of a Competent strategist, and that therefore it gives no guarantee that either the distribution of fleets or the instructions given to their commanders will be suitable to the l'„equirements of war. I was surprised to read in one of the service papers the other day a passage which I wrote a long

time ago quoted in support of the arrangements now existing.

I have of course written to the editor of that paper to correct the mistaken impression which the quotation and his inter- • Protation of it might give to his readers. The subject is of general interest, and the use made of the views which I long ago expressed shows how easily the views held by the school to which I belong may be misunderstood. Perhaps, therefore, ?-ori would permit me to set forth as briefly as I can for the

benefit of the readers of the Spectator two forms of the view Which ,1 believe to be sound.

In 1894, in a pamphlet entitled "The Command of the Sea," I wrote great commander is a man who has thought long and hard ,,r,Itt war, the war of his own time, with all its improvements, has thought it out until his mind is perfectly clear. As soon Nelson has the command of a squadron he begins to coach his re;Ptd,ains in his own particular way of fighting. He has it quite tho having worked on it in his mind all his life. He has light out to transparent clearness and conviction, and he ',Ponds his time in instilling his idea into his subordinates. Accordingly his battles are all fought on a system intelli- tn_lY applied, and they are all decisive victories. Every war .Z.74 to be thought out in advance. Not that a programme can r„.,eProarranged or a plan drawn out as it is in an architect's "La. e• But the way in which now weapons of all sorts are to be used and the modifications that inventions and the general progress of society bring with them into war must be &seer- taMed, and in accordance with the results of this inquiry the character of a coming war must be foreseen.. With this view of the future war in his mind a great naval commander would wish to create a navy as an instrument appropriate to the work to be done with it. Ho would try to regulate the design, the arma- ment, and the number of his ships according to the needs of the fighting which he could foresee, and, above all, to regulate by these needs the training of his officers and men. But modern war is so complicated that he would need assistance in watching and studying his possible war. He would pick special men to help him ; to keep pace, one with shipbuilding, another with engines, a third with artillery, a fourth with torpedo construction; another group would follow naval tactics in communication with their own and in observation of foreign navies ; the chief himself and his best assistants would keep their attention for the war,— that is, they would be ever picking the brains of all the rest for anything that could throw light upon their great design of victory over the enemy or the enemies. If such a man were in authority over a. navy, and were backed up by his Government, he would be ready when the moment for action came. Of course without all the assistance needed in his own office, and without authority to see that the preparation (that is, the navy) was kept level with the requirements of the war foreseen in his mind, the best man would be comparatively helpless. Such a man with his set of assistants or staff is the first requisite for victory. It matters nothing what you call him. The essential thing is to put. knowledge in authority. Knowledge means a man, not a committee, and the knowledge wanted is of war."

I adhere to every word here quoted. The editor of the Army and Navy Gazette ends his quotation of the passage with the words: "The essential thing is to put knowledge in authority," and adds as his own comment: "as every one knows, we have got such a man in authority." I think it must be clear that the knowledge to which I wished to see authority given was primarily strategical, and I have entirely failed to see in any of the distributions or redistributions of fleets which have been made under the authority of the present First Sea Lord any trace of strategical knowledge.

I thought in 1894, and still think, that if it were possible to secure a great commander, it would be wise not only to give him full authority to control the strategy of the Navy—that is, to put into his hands entirely the distribution and move- ments of ships—but also to regard him as the principal offiCer of the Navy. I attach little importance to names; in the passage above quoted I spoke of a naval "commander" because the direction of the movements of forces in war is in all men's minds inseparably associated with command.

The officers of the Navy are, however, attached to the tradition by which the office that once existed of Lord High Admiral has been placed in commission and been entrusted to the Board of Admiralty, of which the general direction is given to a Cabinet Minister, the First Lord, while particular duties are assigned to his colleagues, the four Sea Lords and the Civil Lord. This arrangement the officers of the Navy do not wish to disturb, and I have always thought it possible to respect their wishes while realising the substance of the ideal above described. This would be effected by a proper distribution of business among the four Sea Lords, giving the First Sea Lord the distribution and movements of ships ; the Second Sea Lord manning, discipline, and mobilisation; the Third Sea Lord materiel ; and the Fourth supplies and transport. This arrangement would make it clear that the First Sea Lord was responsible for strategy and tactics and for nothing else, except, of course, the strategical and tactical education of officers, and would bring with it the selection to that post of an officer specially qualified 1 y strategical capacity. That is in my judgment the vital and imperatively needed reform.

The present distribution of business was appended to the Order in Council of October 20th, 1904. It assigns to the First Sea Lord :-

"1. Preparation for War; All large Questions of Naval Policy and Maritime Warfare—to advise.

2. The Fighting and Sea-going Efficiency of the Fleet, its Organisation and Mobilisation; the Distribution and Movements of all Ships in Commission or in Fleet Reserve. 3. The Control of the Intelligence, Hydrographical, and Naval Ordnance Departments.'

It will be seen that the duties here enumerated are so comprehensive as to make the First Sea Lord a general adviser responsible for every part of the business of the Admiralty. The First Sea Lord by these responsibilities is made a Jack-of-all-trades rather than, a strategist.—I am,