THREE BOOKS ON THE WAR.*
PART of the truth about the war is to be found in the personal narratives, written by intelligent men, who have not modified their actual impressions so as to bring them into accord with the official despatches or with the newspaper correspondents' tales. One of the raciest books of this class that we have seen is the diary of a Member of Parliament, who was at Mona as a French interpreter, and -at Gallipoli and before Kut as an Intelligence Officer skilled in Turkish, Arabic, and many other tongues.' It would be easy to guess at his identity, in any case, but, as the open secret has been revealed in print, we may say that Colonel Aubrey Herbert is the author. He has not pub- lished all that he wrote at the time or soon after, but he does not seem to have retouched the remainder. Thus his diary gives a most animated account of the episodes in which he took part. The first section illustrates the fog of war during the retreat from Mons. The author and his colleagues did not know what was happening as they plodded ever southwards with the First Division. In one of the rearguard skirmishes he was wounded and captured, only to be released a few days later by the French advancing from the Marne. But the whole story is as inconsequent as a bad dream. When the author had recovered, he was sent to Egypt, and then to Gallipoli, where he landed at Anzac a few hours after the Australians and New Zealanders had made good their footing. What that heroic corps endured as they clung to the edge of the cliffs and the narrow beach under incessant fire is perhaps more clearly shown in this diary than in formal narratives. The daily losses from heavy shells and from snipers would have taken the heart out of any but the best troops, and the ravages of disease were still harder to bear. Colonel Herbert had to harangue the enemy in Turkish or Greek from the front trenches or to arrange temporary truces. The enemy resented his efforts. " When I returned two days later to make another effort at exhortation, I heard a groan go up from the trench, ' Oh Lord, here he comes again. Now for the belly bombs.' " In one of his excursions into the Turkish lines he saw for himself appalling evidence of the enemy's heavy losses. The flower of the Turkish Army perished at Gallipoli. The author was invalided after Suvla, and then went to the Tigris, arriving a short time before the fall of Kut. He was employed to negotiate with the Turks regarding the wounded and prisoners, and found Khalil Pasha friendly and plausible, though he did not keep his promises. Colonel Herbert, who is an ardent Turcophile, repeatedly declares that Indian troops should not have been used in Mesopotamia. His argument is rather spoiled by the fact that the Indians fought most loyally. The truth is, of course, that Western Turcophiles exaggerate the unity of the Moslem world. Colonel Herbert places on record the general conviction of the Tigris troops that the Indian Government's miserable parsimony was the real cause of the reverses, and that Sir William Meyer, the late Financial Member, bore the chief responsibility. This is a clever and witty book.
In an excellent account of the work of General Headquarters at Montreuil-sur-Mer, a Staff Officer who had served with dis- tinction in the fighting-line surveys the war from Olympian heights.' The contrast with Colonel Herbert's book is striking, yet part of the truth lies here also. The war could not have been carried on for a week had not three hundred experts at Montreuil and almost as many at offices elsewhere laboured unceasingly to plan the operations and to develop the enormous supply and transport services. " G. S. 0." writes from full knowledge of these matters, and makes the layman understand the extent
and complexity of the work. There was no eight-hours day at Montreuil. The normal day ran to thirteen or fourteen hours, for seven days a week. One used to think of Montreuil as the sleepiest town in the North of France, but it was transformed when it became the power-house of the British Army. The author revels in illustrative details. Thus he tells us that the " B.E.F." once used 23,706 tons of munitions in a single day. It was September 29th, 1918, when our troops broke through the main Hindenburg Line. On the day of Vimy Ridge, April 9th, 1917, the Army used a thousand tons more. Such totals cannot be grasped ; a cynic might add that the effect of high explosives is evidently exaggerated. In the course of an interesting chapter on labour the author describes the diffi- culties attendant on the use of Chinese coolies. They could • (1) Mons, Anzac, and Nut. By an M.P. London : Edward Arnold. net.]—(2) (Montreuil-sur-Mer). By " U. S. 0." London : Philip Allan. [209. net.)—(3) Our Oradea Battle. By Frederick Palmer. London : Murray. [12s. net.) " make the most finished British exponent of ca' canny go green with envy." When a Chinaman fell sick, another member of his secret society had to accompany him to the hospital. If he died, he must have a wooden coffin and the grave must bo chosen with care ; according to the official minute, " the ideal site to secure repose and drive away evil spirits is on sloping ground with a stream below, or gully down which water always or occasionally passes," and the grave must not face any of the four points of the compass. " G. S. 0." devotes his last six chapters to the critical year 1918. He says that the French had decided, in the event of the.enemy advance continuing beyond Ypres and Amiens, to lay waste the Pas de Calais by inundations and to wreck the harbours of Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. Marshal Foch on April 12th, 1918, issued orders for partial inundations, which the Governor of Dunkirk began to effect on the following day. The author defends " G.H.Q." for its action in regard to the enemy offensive, which it foresaw but could not check with the means at its disposal. If the reserves then at home had been in France, the whole situation might have been changed. " G. S. 0." declares that the Higher Command did not expect to end the war in 1918, but had made every arrangement for finishing it in 1919.
A third book of exceptional quality is Mr. Frederick Palmer's detailed narrative of the American fighting in the Argonne and the Meuse Valley from September 26th, 1918, to the Armistice.2 The general effect of this desperate battle was to thrust back the enemy's left into the Ardennes beyond Sedan, and to expose his main line of communications by Thionville to an attack which the Armistice alone averted. The American effort, coupled with the Allies' work further north, made Ludendorff's position hopeless. It is obvious from Mr. Palmer's valuable book that we heard little of the American battle after the first day, when Montfaucon was taken, because the fighting could not, for military reasons, be accurately recorded by the corre- spondents. To understand this offensive one would need to know the district and to have the best possible maps. Mr. Palmer's sketch-maps are helpful but inadequate, and his topographical notes are too brief. The fact is that. the enemy had very strong positions in a country that lends itself to defence, and that was at the time almost impassable owing to the wet weather. The American command was hampered for lack of trained officers and men. It had vast numbers of strong young Americans whose courage was beyond praise. But for dealing with German veterans entrenched on the hills and in the woods the American command needed many more experienced soldiers than it had. In order to finish off the war quickly, General Pershing was obliged to use the half-trained divisions, and to rely on their valour and determination rather than on their military adroitness. The American losses were therefore high for six weeks, but by shortening the war by many months they actually saved life. The operations resolved themselves into desperate frontal attacks for the most part, in which the Americans proved themselves more stubborn and resolute than the enemy. Throughout October, 1918, the fighting was indecisive. The final push began on November 1st, 1918, against the crest of the highest ridge in the " Kriemhilde " system and proved irresistible. If General Pershing had had more troops fit for the fighting- line, he would doubtless have begun by attacking on a wider front east as well as west of the Meuse. But the offensive was planned and carried out in haste. It was a magnificent im- promptu by amateurs rather than an elaborate concerto by professionals, and it must be judged by its results. Inasmuch as the battle helped to convince General Ludendorff that the war was lost, the American armies fulfilled their task, though at a heavy price. Mr. Palmer's stirring narrative does justice to the superb fighting spirit of the many divisions engaged, and explains the difficulties which the Americans had to overcome in winning their greatest victory.
Previous page
