TOPICS OF THE DAY.
CLEARING THE AIR.
UNFORTUNATE, and dangerous-looking for a time, though the misunderstanding between ourselves and the French was, it has, we think, cleared the air. As we ventured to hope last week, there may be better result 3 than would have been obtained by better means. When we wrote then the Government had not made their rather' startling communication to the Press, and though we knew only too well that there had been a breakdown in under- standing between the Allies, we did not know exactly with whom the blame lay. The communication to the Press made it plain that the British Government had expressed their disapproval of independent action being taken by the French in the neutral Rhine zone, and that nevertheless the French had taken the bit between their teeth and had acted independently. That was a serious matter which we devoutly hope and believe will not happen again, for though we fully recognize that the French acted honestly from their point of view, no Alliance will bear the strain put upon it if any one of the Allies breaks away. France, Italy, and ourselves—we hope that ultimately we may be able to add America to the list—are the Cabinet of the world, and like every other competent Cabinet it must speak with one voice.
Mr. Bonar Law's explanation of the communication to the Press in which the Government gave France a good talking-to was that the British people had run away with an entirely wrong opinion owing to the support given to France in the newspapers, and that as Parliament was not sitting it was necessary to correct public opinion by a Press communication. However that may be, we cannot pretend to any admiration for the plan of using the Press as an instrument of diplomacy. When President Wilson talked about "open Covenants openly arrived at," we understood his phrase to mean that the different nations should under- stand in general what was being done in their name, and in particular that there should in future be no such things as secret Treaties. With all that we can agree ; but to treat the public as though they were spectators at a League football match is another matter altogether. If this kind of thing goes on, we shall soon have the referee set upon while the game is in progress. Diplomacy "openly arrived at " would come to mean arrived at with every kind of frenzy, clamour, and bitterness. Everybody knows in ordinary life that if a friend or acquaintance has done you a wrong. the best way is to take him to task in private. If he is a right-thinking man, he will admit the wrong and will not commit it again. The most likely way, on the other hand, to turn a right-thinking man to discreditable courses is to provoke resentment in him by denouncing him in public and shaming him before the neighbours. As things have turned out, however, we need not take a serious view of our recent misunderstanding with France. The air is cleared, and two points are gained. The first is that the French, having had a heart-to-heart talk with our representatives in Paris, and being under promise to have another heart-to-heart talk at San Remo, are not likely to disturb the unity of the Allies again. The second point is that it is admitted on all hands that Germany did break the Treaty, even though she may have broken it out of weakness rather than through malice, and it is agreed that in future she must either be prevented if necessary by compulsion from breaking it again, or be helped so that she will not feel herself driven to break it through further accessions of internal weakness.
The ability of Germany in this respect depends a good deal upon how she is constrained or helped. It milt be admitted that some divergence of view had developed recently between the French and ourselves. In general it may be said that France has so vivid a recollection of her burden of anxiety during the past forty years and more that she cannot even think with equanimity of the revival of Germany. She regards Germany as an incurably bad neighbour. It is for this reason that she wants to interpose between Germany and herself the most secure military frontier that can be obtained. French military experts say that the only safe frontier is the Rhine. But this view surely obscures two factors. One is-that the revival of Germany, if ever it should take the shape of territorial aggression, would almost certainly be exerted eastwards and not westwards ; and the other is that to deprive Germany of more territory now would be to present her with almost exactly the same grievance as that which France cherished for more than forty years. To us (though we confess that we do not suffer from the nightmare of the propinquity of Germany which naturally haunts the French) the likeli- hood that if Germany should again become aggressive she would challenge not the West but the East seems pretty strong, as the result of our experience in the war. The war established the fact that the military frontier of Great Britain lies on the other side of the Channel. In other words, France and Great Britain are essential to one another. France cannot adequately be protected without the help of Great Britain, and Great Britain would always have to keep Germany at arm's-length by fighting in France. During the war the failures of Germany in the West were as remarkable as her successes in the East. The East is for her by far the easiest line of country. We hope therefore that what may be called a Chauvinistio frontier for France may be allowed gradually to fade out of practical politics. British opinion on this subject is honestly framed in the interests of France, though in all the circumstances we can quite understand French doubts. But there are several other matters in which France and Great Britain have not been able to see eye to eye. We are basing our remarks, be it understood, entirely upon what we have read in French newspapers. There are a great many Frenchmen who complain that Great Britain has got a great deal out of the war and that France has got very little. They complain that while the German Navy has been destroyed, and the position of Great Britain is therefora secure, France is left face to face with a German Army which, though reduced, is still fairly formidable. We have not space to go into the historical question of naval power, but no Englishman will be prepared to dispute our statement that but for the British Navy the war could not have been won. Frenchmen, who have never been under quite the same necessity as we have been under to guard the seas, may be excused for not putting the same value upon sea- power as we do. The British view is justified, in our opinion, that our first contribution to the war was our work at sea, and that even if that service had stood alone or almost alone we should have done as much as we undertook to do in the days before the war. If in those days any sensible English- man, even among those who unreservedly recognized the need to rally to the side of France in the event of a European war, had been asked what the contribution of Great Britain to that war must be, he would have answered that over and above keeping the seas we ought to send 300,000 or 400,033 men to form a left wing to the French Army. He would have regarded anything more than that as " an extra "- something for which we ought to get very distinct credit. But think of how very much more was actually done ! Millions of British troops were raised instead of hundreds of thousands. If Englishmen do not get the commendation which privately they think is their due, it is perhaps because Frenchmen take a little too literally our inveterate habit of disparaging our own performances. Frenchmen appraise themselves more or less justly. We never even attempt to do so ; we laugh at ourselves, and we must not be surprised if others sometimes join in the laughter.
Again, the French complain that whereas we have acquired East Africa, South-West Africa, and Mesopotamia, they are rewarded with only a dangerous foothold in Syria. If only Frenchmen could understand our real feelings on this subject ! British troops conquered Syria, and there was never from first to last a thought of doing anything but leaving the field clear for the French when the time came. If the French difficulties in Syria are great, they are not of our making. And as for the mandates which we are apparently to receive in Mesopotamia, German East Africa, and elsewhere, we suppose that ninety-nine Englishmen out of a hundred would gladly be quit of them if we could reasonably be so. We foresee a good deal of expense iri these new lands—certainly in Mesopotamia—and we are extremely doubtful whether we have enough competent civil administrators to go round. Yet again, France has grievances in both the price of coal and the fall of the-franc. We agree that there should be no interruption in the flow of cheap coal from the German coalfields to France, for this coal is owed to her as a reparation ; and the fact that it is owed is one of the urgent reasons why we are determined that Germany shall not be allowed to brzak the Treaty if we can prevent it. France, however, says that we have not backed her up in keeping Germany to her word, while we have charged her enormous prices for the British coal which we exported to her. The answer to this ought to come from British miners more than from anybody else. It was they- who created the situation in which the British mining indus- try faced ruin unless high profits were made on exported coal.. Nevertheless we are sure the Government would act wisely in lowering the price of coal sent to France and Italy at the first possible moment. As for the unfavourable. French_ exchange, we have often feared that France would reach this position unless she made up her mind to tax herself heavily by means of direct taxation. In this country, though we have not, of course, latterly anything like paid our way as we went along, we at all events kept the ideal of paying our way always in view. We are gradually if slowly approaching the ideal. We are determined to reach it, and within a few years we shall do so. But this cannot be done, so far as we can see, except by means of heavy direct taxation—a thing which is hateful to most Continental nations, but particularly to the French.
The chief point which France and Great Britain should keep in mind, as it seems to us, when we are dealing with Germany is that the German militarists, who are evidently still powerful, should never be strengthened by unnecessary foreign intervention. We should never unite Germans in defiance by giving them cause to cry out that the sacred soil of Germany has been violated. We must not repeat our unhappy adventure in Russia. If ever as a last resort we have to invade Germany, though invasion was neither foreseen nor provided for in the Peace Treaty, we must do it strictly in conjunction with our Allies. If we are firm in observing this principle, we can make it, if not easy, at all events as nearly as possible easy for the German Govern- ment to withstand the militarists. At present Herr Muller is being beset by both militarists and Spartacists, and it is impossible to say from one day to another in which direction he is being pulled. On the whole, it is pretty clear that most Germans are sick of the militarists. It would be wanton on our part, therefore, to give the German Government an excuse for saying that they cannot resist the militarists. Our true aim is to make life possible for the existing German Government. We cannot reasonably deprive them of all power in their own household, and then tall them that they are not disbanding their Army as they promised to do in the Treaty. We hope that within a very short time both the French troops and the German Imperial troops will be withdrawn. from the neutral zone. We are not in the least blind to the character or intention of the Reichswehr. The old Prussian arrogance has appeared in the treatment of English newspaper correspondents, ene of whom was beaten by a Prussian officer because he 1-ad dared to stand in the cfficer's presence with his hands in his pockets. If England once went to war because of Jenkins's ear—which Jenkins may or may not have lost at Spanish hands—and again nearly went to war because a Gibraltar Jew who was a British citizen suffered the loss of some property in an Athenian riot, we ought not to be less regardful to-day of the sanctity of British citizens now that we know all that the war taught us about Germany. But the Allies will never deal rightly with Germany unless they do it all together. British sympathy with France is deep and real, but the future of our co-operation depends above all on candour between us. A good many British newspapers have played a reckless part during the past fortnight in giving Frenchmen an excuse for saying that Albion is precisely what she is not—perfide.
Previous page
