AIRCRAFT IN BATTLE By STFtATEGICUS would be insincere to pretend
that any explanation of the sinking of the cruisers Dorsetshire ' and ' Cornwall ' and the -carrier 'Hermes' has yet appeared which will satisfy one's gs. The incident bears too close a likeness to the sinking
battleship Prince of Wales' and the battle-cruiser ' not to make one wonder whether we have yet taken easure of a menace that begins to look entirely new. All of Valuable ships appear to have been sunk within a few minutes' range of fighter aircraft ; and yet four months have passed that conjunction of conditions was first encountered so disas-
At the outset it must be recognised that the sinkings off bo took place under circumstances not gravely different from which naval vessels in the Mediterranean have experienced the same disastrous results. The Luftwaffe can hardly be ed of any excessive delicacy towards our warships ; and yet Sicilian Channel they did not convince naval men that the which first saw the light in the days of the Abyssinian trouble much more substantial than a bogy.
first question that arises is whether the Japanese are using new technique or striking with added vigour. It appears to established that the dive-bombing which sent the ships to the off Ceylon was no more than a slight adaptation to the given stances of a familiar practice. The Japanese seem to show unusual contempt for peril ; but, if that suggestion is to be ted as adequate, it merely serves to emphasise the real danger aft when used against warships. This conclusion would, of , be welcomed by one school of naval thinkers ; but it must mined that to accept it would entail the wrapping up of naval Is in cotton wool, since the Japanese have shown no tendency to engage their ships. While they Can destroy ours with air- why should they?
a power is the foundation upon which the Allied hope of rests. Indeed our very existence depends upon it ; and, ed already by the loss of bases, it now appears to be placed in it-jacket by the aeroplane. A strong Japanese naval squadron
established in the Indian Ocean. The Allies in Burma are tally being driven away from the Indian frontier. What are immediate designs of the Japanese command now we can only ; but it appears that we must include the possibility of an ck on Ceylon with or without an assault on India. Since the tomander-in-chief has taken the risk of moving scr strong a battle- aadron so far from the Japanese islands he must be taken to have try intention of using it. The risk may prove ill-judged, since American fleet will certainly seize any opportunity of attack ; t that must be left for the future to disclose.
that is of fundamental importance to us is to recognise that the 1Y way by which the Indian Ocean can be cleared, the only way which Ceylon can be safeguarded and the communications with sca kept open, is naval action. This, as we have , unfortunately covered, entails the risk of meeting not so much the Japanese !tips as their aircraft. The squadron in the Indian Ocean has aircraft-carriers ; and it can hardly be doubted that the sub- mat losses their aircraft have suffered will be promptly made d. They can be trusted to have solved the problem of mobility ; I they seem to be able to assimilate the casualties which we have far. been able to inflict upon them. We know that the British 3. Is not particularly rich in aircraft-carriers. There has always a a difference among 'Military students as to their use ; and we Id midway between the Italians, who hold them in contempt, the Japanese who have built many, both large and small. 441. y people will agree that this seems to have been an entirely We development ; but it has to be recognised that this reflection not help us. There are others who tend to trace the whole ible to the failure to provide a Combined General Staff ; but if would provide many advantages, at the expense of an elabora- Ithat might produce confusion, it would still not entirely meet case. Lord Swinton, in suggesting that "the Great General Staff It be the Chiefs of Staff in their corporate capacity," appears to disagree with the proposal.put forward by Sir Edward Grigg in The Times. But there are aspects of operations which they could only cover if they -had other members added to their committee or had the power to co-opt members for specific questions. Some such scheme might very well be turned into a practicable organisation which would be of real assistance in the future.
But to suggest that it would have protected us against the defeats of Greece, Crete and Malaya, or even the sinkings off Colombo, seems mere wishful thinking. I cannot see how the conclusion can be avoided that the use and limits of aircraft have not as yet been assimilated. The independent strategic use of aircraft is one matter and the use in battle a wholly different question ; but on neither is there any body of doctrine which is entirely reliable and would be accepted by expert opinion. Take for instance the simple question of General Douhet's plan to put an opponent out of action. Although it was well known to everyone interested in military affairs it was tried at Pearl Harbour with great success. That may seem suffi- ciently odd ; but now it is learned that it was successfully carried out in Luzon, and if one can understand some slackness at the distance of Pearl Harbour it is difficult indeed to explain the case of Luzon, which is on Japan's doorstep.
Merely to raise the question of the dive-bomber is normally to stir men to fury. In this country it is held that men on organised positions need not fear the dive-bomber. Indeed, most airmen argue it away to their entire satisfaction ; and it has to be admitted that steady troops can usually cope with it. A number of people who give it a higher value are found to be justifying it by arguments that in the end reduce it to a threat to morale. Let it be admitted that this is a vexed question. What cannot be ignored is the plain fact that battles on land or sea are no longer conceivable without the use of aircraft ; but, if the military student cannot ignore this conclusion, the practical application is certainly in abeyance. How would a Combined General Staff change that situation? It is incredible that the Chiefs of Staff do not recognise the situation. The mere fact that the Army and Navy periodically wish to apply Solomon's judge- ment to the Royal Air Force proves beyond a doubt that they are fully aware of the essential importance of aircraft in battle. If the Chiefs of Staff have not been able to change the conditions in Malaya, in Burma and off Ceylon either they were beyond control or the evil lies deeper.
There is in existence a body designed to secure co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the Army. That it can on occasion work admirably has been demonstrated in Libya ; but perfect co- operation has obtained only there. It seems that the difficulty lies nOt in the ease and perfection of co-operation so much as in the fact that none of the services is yet really " air-minded "—to use a hackneyed but indispensable term. The airmen generally appear to restrict their views of aircraft to strategic, independent use and make for it claims that hardly appear to be borne out by the facts. They do not recognise the moral effect in battle at all ; and they have given little thought to the completely vital part it may play in close and direct support. This aspect of its use has not been completely -thought out ; and the war will probably be over before there is any developed doctrine about it.
But there is sufficient general agreement to make the Army and Navy anxious te secure more control of the aircraft they use, though it is possible to doubt whether the Navy have taken the foundling to their hearts sufficiently to develop their own types with vision. But if the question is fairly faced its real difficulties begin to emerge. In actual operations overseas there have been commanding-in-chief a general, an admiral and an air-marshal, all distinguished men ; and under all three the lack of air support has arisen. If this were merely a matter of a shortage of aircraft such that it was impossible to allocate the necessary number to each sector, we might then discuss the question of whether the distribution was wrong. It may have been in some cases and to some extent in all cases ; but ij is still no adequate explanation of the actual facts.
Have we never lost aeroplanes on the ground? Have we given
sufficient thought to the siting and protection of aerodromes? Neither of these questions can be answered satisfactorily ; and they appear to throw one back to the conclusion that aircraft have not yet secured the place they deserve in the outlook of all fighting men. There is one other matter that may derive from the same defect of from some deeper seated attitude. How can one explain the fact that Admiral Phillips was inshore off Malaya when he was sighted by enemy aeroplanes and yet no one thought to despatch fighters to his assistance? The earlier information that he could not have air support applied to the Gulf of Siam ; but he was apparently moving away from the Kuantan district when he was spotted by the Japanese. There seems to be some tough bulkhead between the services that only. a deep appreciation of the critical nature of our position will remove. The Commando spirit should permeate the armed forces from top to bottom.
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