INDIA: LOSS AND GAIN
By SIR STANLEY REED, M.P.
N an experience of nearly half a century I have not known the British people so intensely interested in the affairs of India. On I sides, and from all classes, I have been besieged by requests rinformation, for some guidance as to the possibility of harnessing the great Indian contribution of men and material to the crusade C moral support of the leading political parties. This did not eing from Sir Stafford Cripps' journey, though intensified by it ; arose from appreciation of the gallantry of the Indian troops in e field and a sincere desire to see India a full and contented ruler in the Commonwealth. Hopes ranged high when Sir Stafford eepted his courageous task ; the reaction may be disproportionate w he is on his way home without achieving success. It is essential maintain a balance and see what has been accomplished, what undone.
What were thte cardinal features of the plan. offered to India? In ale respects they were not new ; it has for nearly two years been de crystal clear to us, though not perhaps to India, that the goal °ur Policy is full and equal partnership in the Commonwealth. ie draft declaration made that plain beyond the possibility of ubt. In language reminiscent of the sonorous terms of the Statute Westminster, it set forth that "The object is the creation of a Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated .11 the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common liance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no Y subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs." c'st who study the declaration carefully will remark two fresh and statesmanlike features. The great Act of 1935 emb• odied the federal idea—the association of the Provinces and the Indian States
under their hereditary rulers in a single federation. The Declaration used the term "Union," which is something more than a word ; it - connotes the- raising of these Provinces to the dignity of States, which in effect, with their separate languages and social and economic
conditions, they are. Then it provided the means by which—failing the emergence of an acceptable alternative plan devised by Indians themselves—the Union might be constituted. The constituent body was to consist of an electoral college, chosen by the Provincial Legislative Councils on a system of proportional representation, after a new election following immediately on the termination of the war. This embraced two advantages ; it furnished the means of framing the new constitution without delay, from a primary electorate already constituted, through a secondary electorate—the members of the Councils—with a considerable experience of the working of repre- sentative institutions.
Why was a plan so fair, embodying, as any dispassionate survey must admit, ninety per cent, of what political India has asked, not accepted? We may note in passing some of the undercurrents. With a strong desire for unity, it was natural that many looked with unease at the option to accede to the Union or secede, and the possibility of establishing a second Union or Confederation of dis- sentient States. I think those fears were illusory ; the advantages of Union, under a workable constitution, must be so great that any Province would fear isolation. There was the maintenance of the India Office ; as soon as the Indian Dominion comes into being the India Office necessarily goes, such functions as it would discharge being transferred to the Dominions Secretary. The rock on which the discussions superficially split were defence and the shape of the Executive Body in India in the interim period. We can be frank on both.
It is right and proper that Indians should ask now, with Japan knocking at her gates, for a share in the defence of their own country. The difficulty in giving practical expression to it is of our own making ; we have treated defence as our peculiar preserve. If, when the military organisation was re-shaped after Lord Curzon's con- troversy with Lord Kitchener, we had appointed a civilian Military Member of Council his functions as distinct from the Commander-in- Chief's would have been ready for transfer to Indian hands. Although the scheme suggested by Sir Stafford looks cumbersome, it would have worked—if there had been the "will to work it. Far deeper was the eleventh-hour demand that the executilie authority should be forthwith transferred to a Cabinet of Indian leaders, untrammelled by any control of the Viceroy or the British Cabinet. Sir Stafford's analysis of that proposal is conclusive ; it would vest sole authority in a nominated non-responsible, irrelhovable body, dominant over the minorities, and free to keep or break the pledges to which the British Government stands irrevocably committed.
Were these the basic reasons for the rejection of the Declaration? I suggest not. Behind this facade lie deep-rooted forces—on the one hand the refusal of the Congress to compromise on any solution which does not leave it in entire command of the destinies of India, without qualification or reserve ; on the other, with the minorities, the tremendous but intangible influence of fear. The great body of Moslems, with the Scheduled Castes, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikhs, fear that their political, social and economic, rights will be insecure under a government entirely dominated by Congress, or, in other words, caste Hindus. When we speak of minorities let us be clear what we mean. During the Second Round Table Conference figures were produced, and not challenged, !towing that the " minorities " represent fifty-two per cent. of the Indian people. Until there is some abatement of Congress pretensions, and a genuine appeasement of minority fears, no final settlement is possible.
What of the future, immediate and long term? No wise man prognosticates in Indian affairs. My own belief is that the suspension of these discussions will not affect the war situation. India has raised a volunteer army of a Million and a half of men, and recruits are offering at the rate of fifty thousand a month. This is a larger number than can be effectively officered and equipped. Indian factories are producing a vast volume of war material, supplemented and enlarged under the programme of the Allied Commission. This
has been done, and is being done, without the help of the political organisations ; it will be continued. The vibrant mind of political Hinduism was expressed in the clearest terms by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru when he said the duty of -every Indian is to serve and defend India to the uttermost ; the Moslems and the Indian Princes have given their reply in great service to the war effort. Moreover, we must always remember that the administrative authority in India now vests in an Executive Council, with its strong statutory position, on which there is a majority of Indians drawn from the ablest men in public life. We are disappointed. We hoped for more. Dis- appointment should not blind us to gains. A British Minister, charged with full responsibility by the Cabinet, has freely discussed with Indian politicians and publicists the problems which beset her, without heat, often with understanding. I believe we have laid the foundations of the plan on which any durable structure must be reared. Above all, in relation to India, we have put ourselves right, right, particularly, with the American people. For the moment we can only ponder the path at our feet and look straight on.
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