BOOKS ON WAR.
Now that Paris has been saved for the second—and, we hope and believe, the last—time from grave danger, it is profoundly interesting to read in Cormnent fut sauve Paris, by M. P. H. Courriere (Paris: Perrin; 3 fr. 50 o.), a detailed account of the desperate battle on the Ourcq which saved Paris in September, 1914. The author declares that the late General Gallidni, who heard on September 3rd that General von Klack had turned south-east to fall upon our -Army, prevailed next day upon Marshal Joffre to suspend his retreat and to allow the Sixth Army from Paris to attack the enemy in flank. The German commander, like the Crown Prince on the Marne last month, committed the fatal error of underrating his adversary and leaving his right flank exposed. A German Stag officer, who was with General von Klaok, has admitted as much in 4 book on the battle which was published in Germany but afterwards suppressed. General Maunoury's flank attack, lasting from Septem- ber 5th to September 9th, compelled General von Stuck to transfer more and more of his forces from the south to the north of the Marne, thus weakening the line that Lord French and General Franchet d'EspOrey to his right were attacking until it gave way. M. Courriere helps us to realize, as comparatively few people do even yet, the extremely critical nature of the action. General lelawioury had in all seven divisions, mainly reserves, and almost all wearied by a month of hard fighting and long marches, whereas the enemy had nine of his best divisions, and was incomparably superior in heavy artillery, machine-guns, and aeroplanes. It is pathetic to read of the superb but unavailing gallantry of the French officers, who refused to take cover, and of their men, who would not for several days protect themselves by the simplest field-works. The French " seventy-fives " performed miracles, and on the 6th saved the left flank from envelopment by a furious barrage at short range. But all the help they had in the air came from one airman who volunteered for the unfamiliar
task. On the fifth day of the battle the French were almost at the end of their endurance ; they fell back very slowly under violent pressure from a fresh German corps and prepared to die where they stood. But when the next day dawned, the enemy had gone. The final day's resistance on his right had made the position of General von Kluck's left wing untenable, and when that gave way the whole German host, shattered in the centre by Marshal Foch, was forced to retreat. It is a remarkable instance of the value of a seemingly hofeless fight on one part of a long battle-line in contributing to the general victory. We may add that, according to the author, the French Government retired to Bordeaux at the urgent request of Marshal Joffre, and that the President and most of the Ministers were reluctant to leave the capital.
With the Austrian Army in Galicia, by M. Octavian C. Taslautinu (Skeffington, es. net), is a remarkable book describing Austria's disastrous campaign of 1914, and illustrating the violent racial hatreds that perplex the Dual Monarchy. The author, a Rumanian of Transylvania, was an officer in a Territorial battalion. He and his fellow-countrymen promptly obeyed the decree of mobilization, apparently to the surprise and relief of the Hungarian Government. His battalion of middle-aged men was sent to the front and, with the other Rumanian battalions, was purposely assigned the most dangerous tasks. The author took part in the first retreat from Bukowina and in the battles on the San, followed by a retreat over the Carpathians. When he went on sick leave after three months his regiment, over three thousand five hundred strong, was reduced to one hundred and seventy men. In his own company there remained only five men besides himself. The inefficiency of the Austro-Hungarian Staff and regimental officers, as he describes it, almost passes belief. He accuses the Magyars of cowardice. He quotes an Army Order, boasting of victory on all fronts, which was issued on the very eve of the Austrians' disorderly flight from Galicia. It is evident that if the Russians had been better supplied with munitions and food, they could have made a promenade to Budapest in the first winter. The author's descriptions of the brutality shown by the Magyar officers to Rumanian soldiers should help British readers to understand the real nature of the Hungarian despotism. It is significant that when he and his men were in Galicia the Poles would have nothing to do with them -until they found that the battalion was Rumanian and not Magyar. He does not complain so much of the Austrian Germans. A pathetic feature of the conflict was that Rumanians from Russian Bessarabia were fighting their fellow-Rumanians under Magyar rule. The most astonishing episode in the book occurred high up in the forest-clad Carpathians. Both armies were starving because their commissariats had broken down. A crowd of Russians entered the Austrian lines and fought the occupants for their scanty store of bread. When each man had got a crust., the Russians cheerfully surrendered. After this the two sides began to fraternize and to suggest a mutual surrender, so that in the end the Rumanians took ninety prisoners and the Russians thirty. The author, on regaining his health, deserted and took refuge in Rumania. It is clear that he did not mind fighting the Russians, but he resented the savage and stupid intolerance shown by the Magyars to their Rumanian subjects. As a contrast to this picture of the Austrian: Army, we may commend the admirable account of the Russian Army in Mr. R. Scotland Liddell's Actions and Reactions in Russia (Chapman. and Hall, 10s. 6d. net). The Russian Army in 1915 and 1916 was terribly short of munitions, through the corruption and incompetence of the War Office, but its moral was magnificent. The men of all the nationalities in the Empire fought willingly and well, though they had to depend mainly on their bayonets, and had few machine- guns and very inadequate artillery support. Mr. Liddell held a Russian commission, and thus came to know the Russian soldier very intimately. His account of the Revolution is of great interest. He makes it clear that the average peasant soldier was honest and patriotic, but so densely ignorant and careless that he could be easily swayed by the Bolshevik and pro-German agitators who were hard at work. The late Tsar's Government, Mr. Liddell thinks, would have betrayed the Allies by making a separate peace, but the Revolution, rightly managed, might have continued the war and brought us all a speedier victory. Incidentally Mr. Liddell devotes some amusing pages to the British armoured-car detach- ment, whose adventures in the Caucasus and in Western RULSSitt deserve to be recorded in full some' day.
The splendid service rendered by our Indian Army in France, in the critical months after the battle of the Manic while our new armies were being trained, is described in careful detail by Colonel Merewether and Sir F. E. Smith in their book on The Indian Corps in France (J. Murray, 10s. 6d. net). Here will be found the fullest accounts yet published of the desperate actions at Festubart and GiVenchy, as well as a description of the part played by the Indian Corps at Neuve Chapelle, the second battle of Ypres, and Loos. The nature of the fighting may be judged from the fact that in less than eight months the Corps of twenty-four thousand men had te call on India for thirty thousand more to replace casualties. The chief difficulty confronting the Corps was not so much the climate or the enemy as the lack of officers with Indian experience, since
the Indian soldier, the author thinks, is more dependent on his officer,- whom he knows and trusts, than any other soldier in the world. The casualties among the officers were very heavy indeed— the enemy saw to that—and it was hard to replace them. The book, with its full narratives and its maps and plans, is a con- tribution of permanent value to the history of the first year's campaign in Flanders.
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