TOPICS OF THE DAY.
110W NOT TO DO IT.
SIR. R. LLOYD GEORGE is as anxious to win the war as any man in the kingdom. He is also willing to make every kind of personal sacrifice to do so. About these two propositions there can be no sort of doubt. Again, we feel quite sure of his intense desire in the abstract to destroy Prussian militarism, and to reduce the possibility of a new war to zero. Yet, for all our assurance on these points, we cannot help noticing a certain levity of tone, a diffuseness of thought, and want of hardness and precision of purpose in the Prime Minister's public utterances in regard to Peace, which cause us a very great deal of uneasiness. We want Peace, and if it is the right kind of Peace we want it quickly. Unless, however, it is the right kind, we would rather fight on for another three or four years.
To get the right kind of Peace, and to get it quickly, it is essential to produce a clear and definite effect on the mind of the German rulers and the German people ; the latter, though they are of far less importance than the former, have a certain influence when it comes to the supreme question. The Ger- mans, like everybody else in the world, in the last resort would rather cut a loss than struggle on to the point where there is nothing left to lose. At the same time they have always before their eyes in war the example of Frederick the Great. By refusing to own that he was beaten, he snatched victory from the hands of Fate, and averted defeat and ruin. It is the possibility of doing as he did which holds Germany up now, though we see signs that her neurotics optimism is beginning to be crossed by the dreadful thought that perhaps the charm may not work twice. "What if after all we are not able to do what Frederick did ? If we cannot, we are indeed of all men the most miserable." Some of the things said by recently captured officers show vivid indications of this mood. One of them after his capture is reported to have at first broken down utterly, and to have wept with that crude emotionalism which is so often shown by brutal races and brutal men. He recovered himself, however, by repeating the old stale piece of conventional psychology— But we shall win in the end because we must win." psychology—" must win," that is the thought with which every German ultimately consoles himself. He does not really know what the phrase means. He is indeed like the child who was so unhappy when somebody explained to her the meaning of a sonorous word. Now she knew the real meaning she could not put herself to sleep with it, as she had been accustomed to do Alongside this feeling. that they will win because they must, and because they know that they are going to win, is another belief, one to which the Germans very naturally dins. It is specially entertained in regard to this country, and the more involved in difficulties is the situation the more the Germans find consolation in it-. It can best be expressed in the words of the optimistic clay pot in Omar's poem. " Tush, He's a good fellow, and 'twill all be well." The Germans firmly believe that the bulk of the population here are foolishly good-natured, and can be bamboozled as easily as were the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk. If the worst conies to the worst, they can always retrieve the position by the power of subtle negotiation on which they pride them- selves—a power which they feel sure is never to be found with us. This belief in their ability to get the better of us somehow has distinctly increased their unwillingness to cut a loss and make the best Peace terms they can. In a word, they are inclined to gamble on a combination of weari- ness, muddle-headedness, and kind-heartedness, which they think marks the psychology of the British race. Two things are thus tending to prolong the war. The first is the hypnotic influence—we can hardly call it anything else—exercised by the Germans' belief in their maxim that they will win because they must win. The second is their belief in their power in the last resort to turn defeat into victory by clever diplomacy.
If this view of the mental attitude of the average German is sound, as we believe it will be admitted to be by those who understand the Teutonic spirit, the best way of meeting it is to keep steadily before the eyes of the Germans the parable and the policy of the Sibylline Books, a policy which, we note with satisfaction, is evidently gaining possession of the stern but cautious mind of President Wilson. But the policy of the Sibylline Books involves above all things, making the "other side" feel, not only that we are incapable of being cajoled, but that we are steady and determined, and that the threat of raising the price is not an empty threat, but an accomplished fact, as illustrated by the' burning of the -Books. The operative thought behind the story of the Sibylline Books is the terrifying and depressing sense of inevitableness. The Sibyl carried her point because she made the Roman King feel that she really meant "Now or never ! " Most unfortunately this is exactly what Mr. Lloyd George does not make our enemies feel. At times no doubt he can make a superexcellent speech or write a wholly admirable appeal like the "Hold Fast ! " message. But, alas ! such speeches are sandwiched between ineptitudes of word and thought which must have a wholly different effect upon the attentive ear of the Germans. Remember, the German with his over-subtlety is always extracting deductions out of public utterances which we with our national carelessness put aside as "only the babble of the political auction-room." Take as a recent example Mr. Lloyd George's amazing declaration in regard to Vengeance. Possibly, nay, probably, all that Mr. Lloyd George meant was that we ought not to be vin- dictive in the bad sense of the word, that we ought not to use power mercilessly or pitilessly to further our own selfish ends. When, however, the holders of great power and great office speak publicly in times of war it is imperative that they should consider the kind of effect their words will have upon the nation's enemies. The German believes most thoroughly in Vengeance. It is, he holds, one of the essential attributes and instruments of that "Will to Power" which he worships. Thus, when he finds the other side saying that there is to be no Vengeance, he at once pricks up his ears and says to himself : "Ha, ha I I was quite right. The stupid English are obsessed by the good-nature fallacy, and all will be well. Clearly Great Britain, like the silly, temporizing, and moderate via media State she always has been, is not going to push things to extremes. Therefore all will not be lost even if things get worse instead of better. We shall have plenty of ground to manceuvre in."
Mr. Lloyd George had far better have kept complete silence on this point ; but if he must talk about Vengeance what he should have said is something of this kind. He should have insisted that though we did not desire to be vindictive, we could not, do what we would, protect the Germans from the inevitable vengeance of circumstances. By prolonging the war it is as inevitable as that the sun will rise to-morrow that their position will grow worse, and their sufferings greater. "To avoid the sword of Vengeance now hanging over them, they should have the wisdom, even at the last moment, to make expiation for their crimes, and so to save something from the wreck. Vengeance, no doubt, is beyond the reach of any earthly power. But that does not make the appalling danger of those who incur it less but infinitely greater." In a word, Mr. Lloyd George should have made the Germans feel as the Roman Governor felt. "As [Paul] reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled." But the Felix of Potsdam is not going to tremble when he hears Mr. Lloyd George talk vaguely and airily about there being no Vengeance. What it is good for the Germans to hear now is something much sterner. It is that all human acts have their consequences, that none can be relieved of those consequences, and that when the acts are of the nature of Germany's recent acts, and are persisted in, not in a gust of passion but out of de- liberate policy, awful, even if long in coming, must be the Vengeance of the Lord. But if Mr. Lloyd George was unwise in using words which will make the Germans hug themselves with the belief, " He's• a good fellow, and 'twill all be well," almost as inept was his allusion to the "good intentions" of Count Hertling and Herr von Kalmann at Brest-Litovsk. One of the most cherished instruments employed by the Germans in the process of forcing the wretched Bolsheviks to accept the most shameful and desperate Treaties of Peace ever concluded was what we may call the "good intentions" instrument of the civilian negotiators. Whilethe Russian Army was melting into nothing, and the Germans were in fact though not in name making great military progress, the display of good intentions by the civilians was a most precious asset. Then suddenly the music changed. The Germans, like Mr. Spenlow, suddenly discovered that they had a partner, "Mr. Jorkitur." Count Hertling and Herr von Kiihrmann were obliged to tell their Bolshevik colleagues that their dreadful partner, the Great General Staff, had absolutely forbidden their most important concessions to the Bolsheviks, and that, regret it as they. did most sincerely, they would be compelled to apply the old maxim of "Nothing for nothing and precious little for sixpence." The history of the BrestaLitovak aegotiatians dearly show& how mach the Germans rely upon the, use of the "I have a Pariaer, 14r. Jprlp " aunt." That they mean to use it when the tliPt) °canes, a a tb.ey, h Qp a- it will come, for uegotiatioaa with the. Allies, there can be no sort of doubt. When they hear lir. Lloyd George's talk about the " good intentions" of their priae civilians, Hertling and, Kalman% they feel confldent that he can be taken im The reason why we have thought it worth while to dwell so strongly and so fully on these two capital examples of Mr. Lloyd George's levity is to be found in our dread of our Government, and indeed of the 4.11ies as a whole, getting entangled in a sudden German peace offensive, of beini overcome by the poison-gas of German "good intentions,' and, in a word, of succumbing to the desire to exhibit to the world our magnanimity and nebleneas of spirit as proved by our refusal to take Vengeance on our enemies—i.e., to punish, and so prevent, evil deeds.
In our opinion, the way to minimize this very terrible danger, which may be muoh nearer than people think, is for the Allies to agree among themselves that they will tolerate no negotiations in regard to the terms of Peace with the enemy. All they will do if Germany intimates to them that she has had enough fighting, and would like to begin conversations, is to state to her at once the full terms upon which she can have Peace. When, however, she hears these terms she must understand that they can never be made easier for her. She must, that is, remember that she cannot reject them now, and then ask for them again in three or four months' or a year's time. When she next applies the terms must inevitably be enhanced from the point of view of the Allies, and so rendered worse for her. Punishment must fall upon the Power or Powers which prolong the war.
If this is the answer we decide to give, when some day we get a formal application from the Germans for a week's armistice in order to provide an opportunity for preliminary conversations in regard to Peace—that is the way in which it will come—it is obviously essential that the specific terms should be got ready at once, if, as we fear is the case, they have not yet been set down in detail. Though they must not negotiate with the enemy, the Allies should negotiate with each other and clear their own minds. Again, when we insist that it is the Allies, and the Allies alone, who must fix the terms of Peace, this does not mean that their terms will necessarily be harder for Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey than would be terms drawn up by negotiations. What we want is, not to banish the idea of a General Peace Conference, in order to make Germany's position worse, but to make it certain that she shall not play the part which she played at Brest-Litovsk a part which appears to have produced so perilously false an impression upon Mr. Lloyd George. Let the Allies grant the Germans the best terms they can in view of the punishment or vengeance which inuat inevitably fall upon Germany, but let them make up their minds irrevocably not to negotiate a Peace, but only to dictate their terms. Those terms must be informed by a high sense of justice and sound policy, with the fullest determination not to sow the dragon's teeth of future wars by annexations which, like the annexations of Poland, Alsace - Lorraine, and §chleswig, violate the will of the inhabitants, and leave a feeling of burning injustice and a determination never to rest till the wrong done has been undone. The powers which we claim must be used, not as the Germans would use them, brutally and cynically, but with a sense of trusteeship in a new, improved, and demo- cratic world—a world in which the will of the majority of the People shall prevail, and not the will of Autocrats, Bureaucrats, or of the frantic Devotees of Political Abstractions.
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