GERMANY AND RUSSIA.
WE must not rush to conclusions about so vast and uncertain a problem as Russia presents, but it would certainly seem that the Revolution is assuming a new and more hopeful phase. The grave concern, real or affected, with which the German Press is discussing Russian affairs is in itself an encouraging sign. The removal of the German Embassy from Moscow to Pskoff, on the border of occupied Livonia, is another. We do not know whether it is true, as the Germans say, that M. Lenin and M. Trotsky have fled from the old capital to seek refuge in Kronstadt, whose garrison have the reputation of being what we may call super- Bolsheviks, and carried their principles so far as to proclaim the self-determination of free and independent Kronstadt. But we might suppose that the new German Ambassador, Dr. Helfferich, would hardly have left the central city of Great Russia if he could have remained there with safety, and the obvious inference is that the Bolsheviks cannot maintain order in Moscow. M. Lenin and M. Trotsky have resorted to terrorism of a more drastic kind than the Tsardom practised. They have arrested and shot hundreds of their political opponents, not merely bourgeois with clean collars, but also peasants and workmen belonging to the Social Revolutionary Party, under M. Chernoff, which is credited with the removal of Count Mirbach. But Bolshevik terrorism, it seems, has failed to suppress the growing opposition to a tyranny which is both unpatriotic and inefficient. The Bolsheviks have destroyed trade and industry ; but they have not been able to feed the multitudes of unemployed. They have shattered Russian society to bits ; but the task of reconstructing it has proved beyond them. The Russian townsfolk were offered visions of a new social order ; but what they want most, and are still denied, is bread. The despot who feeds his people may succeed • the despot who starves them is bound to fall. The Bolshevik usurpation is doomed irretrievably, though the end may not come just yet. It is well to remember, however, that we get very little authoritative news from Russia, and that the German Government may have a motive for spreading these sensational stories. We are inclined to think that they want to prepare their people for new developments on the Eastern Front. The sudden change in the official German attitude towards the Bolsheviks is suspicious. A month ago the German Press was rejoicing over the success of the Bolsheviks, who were doing Germany's work by ruining Great Russia. Now the German people are told that the Bolsheviks have collapsed, and that both in Great Russia and the Ukraine the anti- German ferment is assuming most dangerous proportions. It may be that the national movement in Russia has suddenly revived, now that the harvest is ending in many provinces and the peasants have time to think about politics, which affect their chances of selling their crops. It may be, on the other hand, that the German Government have determined to assert their power in Russia by occupying Petrograd and Moscow, and are providing plausible reasons in advance for a new Eastern campaign. This would of course be a very formidable affair, for Russia is a vast country, and to occupy Great Russia up to the Volga would involve the employment of many German divisions. Further, the necessary troops could not be found without denuding the Western Front, and as that front is already insecure it must be shortened. We might conjecture, then, that the rulers- of Germany propose. to extend their hold over Russia, and to evacuate a large portion of the territory which they occupy in France. They will have to retreat on the West in any case, as they know very well. But they might make a virtue of necessity if they voluntarily evacuated Northern France in order to take possession of Central Russia as far as the Volga, or even the Urals. It would be a daring move, and it would excite great misgiving in Germany ; but at the same time it could be represented in a more favourable light than a forced retreat from France with no counterbalancing territorial gains, however fleeting, on the Russian side. The Eastern school of annexationists in Germany has undoubtedly gained in influence during the past year, as the prospect of durable annexations in the West has grown dim. They are never tired of pointing to Russia and Central Asia as the true sphere of Germany's military activities, and they may have gained their point.
So far as the Allies are concerned, a German retreat on the West in order to seek compensations in the East would suit us admirably. The sooner we can free France and Belgium from the invader, the better. A retreat on a large scale might delay the resumption of the offensive, hut it would not delay it by many months, and the Allied armies would fight all the better if they were nearing the Rhine. It need hardly be said that a German offer of peace, following the evacuation of France and Belgium, would have no chance of success if it involved the surrender of Russia to Germany. The war will go on until Germany is beaten and renounces all conquests. Still, it is conceivable that the rulers of Ger- many may not take these assertions seriously, and may suppose that the Allies, if put to the test, would not carry unselfishness to such a pitch as to continue the war for the sake of Russia. If they think so, they make as fatal an error as they made when they invaded Belgium and yet counted on our neutrality, or when they started the unrestricted U '-boat campaign and brought America into the war. Yet it is characteristic of the Germans to commit these elementary blunders. Meanwhile we may take comfort in the fact that the subjugation of Russia, if the Germans attempt it, will be a tremendous business, and that the more the Russians know Of the Germans, the more they will detest the invaders. The German failure in the Ukraine is significant. Here was a people freed from Russian rule and anxious to make new friends at the dawn of its independence. With a little tact and patience, the Germans might have made the Little Russians their grateful friends. Instead of that, the heavy- handed German Generals and officials treated the Ukraine as a conquered country, upset its elective Government, and sought to extort by violence the grain of which Germany stood sorely in need. The natural result was that in a very few months the Germans had converted the Little Russians into their bitter enemies, and failed to get any corn worth mentioning. We may trust the Germans to repeat these tactics wherever they go in Russia, and to convert the most ignorant peasant into a fervent anti-German. The Allies' policy is plain enough, and is indeed being followed with commendable energy. The Allied forces at Archangel and Murmansk and at Vladivostok appear as impartial upholders of order. They want nothing from Russia ; they want to help the Russian people. They bring supplies ; they do not seek to extort food from the poor peasants. They do not seek territory, and are prepared to support any genuinely patriotic Russian party in building up a governing system anew and driving out the Germans. The contrast between the Allies and the enemy will gradually impress itself on every decent Russian. The forces of order, gathering round the gallant Czecho-Slovaks, are already considerable, and in the long run they will prevail with our help. A new German invasion may delay the revival of Russia, but cannot prevent it, if we persevere in the good work which we have at last begun.
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