THE UNITED STATES AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE.
WE do not quite understand the outburst of jealousy excited in some quarters by the publication of the recent American Despatches upon the relations of Chili and Peru. They are declared to involve " an extension of the Monroe Doctrine ;" and that, it is intimated, rather by shrugs than words, is something portentous. We can see nothing in the action of the United States, and nothing in the so-called Monroe Doctrine—except the absurd formula by which it is described—in the least inconsistent with European diplomacy. Every great country declares that there are certain territorial questions in which, though the territory lies outside her im- mediate dominion, she has a peculiar and exceptional interest. Germany has repeatedly declared this about the fate of Trieste, and that of Constantinople. Great Britain declares it always about Egypt, and the whole group of territories which abut in any manner, howeVer remote, upon her shortest sea route to India, Lord Granville, for example, only yesterday protecting Tripoli upon that avowed principle. The French Government at this very hour is moving armies to guard its exceptional rights throughout North Africa, where it owns nominally only one province. The Government of the United States, in precisely the same way, declares that political events on the American continent have for it a separate and special interest. That is all it says, and the importance of the saying is in no way increased by the foolish habit of calling its intimation a " doctrine," and attaching to it a President's name. Nobody questions that Germany is deeply interested in Trieste, France in North Africa, and Great Britain in the route to India, and America is entitled to make, if it pleases, a similar claim about the Western Continent. Nobody is bound by it, any more than anybody is bound by the British, German, or French declara- tion ; they are only informed of a possible danger of resist- ance, under certain contingencies, and it is well to. be so informed. If France resolves to threaten Egypt, or Italy to menace Trieste, the British or German" doctrine" on the sub- ject will be taken into as serious account as if it had been newly formulated in a despatch ad koc, no more, and no less. If a European Power has a grievance against Chili, it will con- sider whether it is worth while to risk American displeasure, as it would consider in a European quarrel the possible dis- pleasure of a great Power ; but no " doctrine," whether first promulgated by President Monroe or not, will have any influence in the matter.
In the present instance, the Government of the United States is certainly not exceeding rights which would be re- cognised in Europe. When Russia defeated Turkey, and pro- posed the Treaty of San Stefano, all the great Powers inter- vened, said that Treaty was too hard, and threatened resistance if it were enforced. On the most extreme view of his secret thoughts—a view which he has utterly repudiated since—that is all that Mr. Blaine, in his original despatches, can be held to have done. The Chilians, who were right in their original quarrel, are now showing themselves very hard. They are demanding such terms that the Peruvians, rather than grant them, are allowing their capital to be occupied and their country to fall into anarchy. M. Thiers threatened, at one point of his negotiations with Germany, to take that very course; and no one doubts that if it had been taken, any State in Europe would have had a right to intervene. In Mr. Blaine's original despatches, he asserted a similar right, directed his agents to use their good offices between Chili ani Peru to secure peace, and left on all minds an impression that if peace were not secured, and especially if any.European Power were called in, he would use force. That is just what Great Britain might have done in the Franco- Cthrman case, but even this was too much. for the new Presi- &era and the American people. The Republican newspapers grew angey, and Mr; Blaine, who is not, be it remembered, a responsible Minister of State, but only the executive agent of the President, was directed to qualify his previous views. In a second despatch to Mr. Hurlbut, American representative at Lima, therefore, he censures him for going much too far, tells him that he had no right to threaten, disclaims any idea of force, and announces that he has superseded him by a special Mission. So far from the Government of the Union having acted with violence or arrogance, it has simply inter- fered, in the general interest of civilisation, to advise two con- tending States, whose quarrels materially and directly affect the prosperity of its own provinces on the Pacific, to come to reasonable terms. It might have been better to leave the whole matter alone ; but America has clearly as much right to decide that question as Germany or Great Britain has to decide whether a distant movement affects her interests.
But then, we are told, there is the Panama Canal. " The Government of Washington is applying the Monroe Doctrine to the Panama Canal, which may benefit the whole world." Nonsense about the Monroe Doctrine. The Government of the United States perceive that a canal is about to be cut which, from the moment it is opened, will become the only water-way between their own Atlantic and Pacific States. The control of that water-way—or, at all events, the absence of foreign control over it—is, therefore, or. at all events, in their minds appears to be, a subject of the very first importance. They demand, therefore, that either the Union shall be considered the first guaranteeing Power of the Canal—that is, in fact, shall lay down the first conditions for its use—or that the European Powers shall leave the matter alone altogether. The demand was made in a very blunder- ing way, in total forgetfulness of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty— a blunder since repaired—but in its essence it was identical with our own demand, which we are supposed always to stand ready to enforce by arms, about the Suez Canal. We should not allow any single Power to control that Canal—most certainly not to open and close it at discretion—on any pretext whatever. America may be wrong or right in making her demand about the Panama Canal, but she is certainly not outside the usual rules of diplomatic action, and her reference to the Monroe Doctrine makes no difference whatever to her claim, no more difference than the English Kings' pretension to be Kings of France on their coins made to their diplomatic action. There is a notion beginning to prevail that because the Union is enormously powerful, therefore the diplomatic action of its Government is not to be as free as that of any other State. That is precisely as unjust as it would be to refuse diplomatic rights to a weak State, and, of course, far more foolish. We do not believe the Union is going to claim a Protectorate of South America, but she has as much right to do it, if South America pleases, as we have to" protect " the States of the Balkans, and she will become in the effort not stronger, but weaker. A protecting State must protect, and the Republic, strong as it is, would find the defeat of an invasion of, say, Chili was a very different affair from the defeat of an invasion of South Carolina. The whole alarm is unreflective, and only calculated to breed ill-feeling between States whose first interest it is to keep on cordial terms.
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