17 FEBRUARY 1923, Page 17

WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT.* THE writing and the publication

of this book involve some very important questions. As will be seen from the title-page, the book was written from President Wilson's unpublished and personal material, and the author of the book is Mr. Baker, who was the head of the American Press Bureau at the Peace Conference. Now, as we understand it,personal material in this case means secret material. But this special secret material is said to have been protected by an agreement among those who were called in the slovenly slang of the Conference " the Big Four." The terms of this minor covenant were that none of the notes taken of their private consultations should be given to the world.. We do not mean to offer any definitive judgment as to whether that agreement is or is not violated by the publication of this book. The problem is too intricate, too confused, and the facts are too little ascertained for any outsider, journalist or politician, to decide. All we can do is to record the allegation that the book has been condemned as involving a breach of what ought to have been a sacred engagement.

Anyway, we are inclined to think that Mr. Baker's intentions were good, even if it can be proved that he has shaken the pillars of diplomatic good faith. Mr. Baker tells us in his preface that in his belief " the only way out of present difficulties is through co-operation based upon a new study of the art of living together in a crowded world." He believes not only in political co-operation as in the League of Nations, but in economic co-operation, without which there can be no sound political co-operation. He believes, above all, that the only basis of co-operation is the willingness of each of the co-operators to assume new responsibilities, to make sacrifices of immediate interest for future benefits, and to be willing, if necessary, to make them first. He believes in the truth con- tained in Woodrow Wilson's saying at Manchester : " Interest does not bind men together ; interest separates men. There Is only one thing that can bind men together, and that is common devotion to right."

That, of course, contains excellent sense, excellent politics, excellent economics, .and excellent morality, even though it does not cover the whole ground.. But, unfortunately, it is very difficult to translate the aphorism into terms of action and very doubtful whether President Wilson did not jeopardize instead of improving the chance of carrying out his principles by the particular policy which he pursued.

The introduction to these volumes gives a very interesting account of the documents which record the work of the Council of Four (Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Nitti). It appears that one of the miracles of the Conference was the minutes which Sir Maurice Hankey contrived to take, describ- ing in précis fashion the deliberations of the Four. In addition to these there are memoranda, often in the President's own handwriting, and, thirdly, there are various correspondences, petitions, resolutions, and letters which came personally to the President before and during the Peace Conference. The documents under these three categories were, according to a letter from President Wilson which we are given in facsimile, and which is dated the White House, December 27th, 1920, packed away in a trunk. The President says : " I plunked them into the trunk in Paris, and have not had time or the physical energy even to sort or arrange them." Mr. Baker has done the necessary unplunking, almost without a quiver of the lip. For the ordinary man, however, the result is bewildering. Though the intention was, we are sure, one of honest elucidation, confusion—and confusion of the kind which sooner or later gives rise to suspicion—will be the outcome of the book.

The making of a précis of this précis, and the estimating of the value and justice of Mr. Baker's verdict, is a task which we will not attempt. Probably the only living man who could review this book with impartiality and could really estimate its historical value would be Sir Maurice Hankey. But he would most likely (and, we think, rightly) refuse abso- lutely at the present time to commit what would probably look to him like a breach of faith, i.e., the making of further disclosures either to corroborate or to correct Mr. Baker's conclusions. All the same, we hope that he will take a copy

• Woodrow Wilson and World Begtimeme, By Ur Btoonard Baker. 2 vole. 1.ondon : Heinemann. [Um oet•1 of this book; while his memory is fresh, and having interleaved it, make whatever corrections he may think are necessary in faet. Moreover, we hope he will set down any additions which he thinks essential to a just understanding of the' matters involved. This done we should like to see the book sent to Colonel House, whose good sense and sincerity cannot be doubted, with the request that he would, where he might think it necessary, endorse his agreement or disagreement. Then a copy of these doubly interleaved comments should be placed on record under seal in the British , Museum and in the Congressional Library at Washington. The lodging of the books should be coupled with an injunction that the seals should not be broken and the books released during the lifetime of any of the Big Four, or without the joint consent of the two annotators, or of the survivor. If such a plan were accepted, which we admit is most unlikely, the historians of the future would have a foundation on which to build for which there is no precedent.

But though we cannot give a just and comprehensive review of these two volumes, we desire to make one or two references to two chapters of the book, i.e., to the chapter entitled " The Economic Policy of Great Britain," and to that headed " The Economic Policies of Continental Europe." Some of the notes contained in these chapters are of vital interest and.of great moment at the present time.

Mr. Baker puts well the obvious truth that Mr. Lloyd George's chief blunder in regard to the indemnities was that he thought that he could play the reparation game both ways. `` While allowing the extremists to fix a sum, he turned round and listened to the moderates on the subject of building up Germany's power to pay. He did not perceive or care for the fact that these two policies were inconsistent." As he puts it in another way :_ " If damage to Germany were the object rather than receipts by the Allies, there was no sense in trying to help Germany to pay. On the other hand, if an all-round scheme of reconstruction was to be sought for, and reasonable reparation, settlement, beneficial to the Allies and not destructive to Germany, was an essential feature." Alas 1 - the politicians of France and those politicians here who support her seem still uncertain which leg they are going to stand upon. At any rate, our official policy at Versailles was futile to a degree that sounds almost incredible. One day we were all for going through the pockets of Germany. The next we were for restarting trade in Europe at all costs.

Mr. Baker does not. always understand the British view. For example, he is curiously blind and puzzle.:headed as to our policy in regard to the sea. He well estimates, however, the policy of France. The French do not understand, and appar- ently never have understood, the science of wealth. They have never, as we have, grasped the fact that peace is the greatest of British interests. Still less have they understood the de- rivative conclusion that the prosperity of our external trade , is the next greatest of British interests. France, he points out, has always held that she must be stronger than Germany, " even if the absolute standard of both, and of the whole world, be pulled down in the process."

It will be curious to many of our anti-militarists and anti- imperialists and internationalists, though it is by no means a surprise to us, to find that our soldiers, officers and men, often saw much farther than the politicians. Here is a curious story. On March 8th, 1919, Mr. Lloyd George told the Council of Ten that

" the British troops were indignant about our refusal to revictual Germany. General Plumer had said that he could not be responsible for his troops if children were allowed to wander about the streets half-starving."

There is an equally illuminating instance. Everybody, of course, at Versailles wanted to combat Bolshevism. The French wanted to combat it, not by removing the foundations on which it rested, but by a policy of direct military force :— " The appeal to help Germany's economic recovery as a bulwark against Bolshevism made no impression upon the French, although, it was put before them repeatedly by the British and Americans." .

Mr. Lloyd George is to be congratulated upon having' spoken out very plainly against the folly of the French view, and he quoted British officers who had been in Germany reporting that Bolshevism was being created and that the determining factor was going to be food. Of course it was ; but M. Clemenceau, we are told, could only reply that the Germans were using Bolshevism as a bogy with which to frighten the Allies.

The net result of our readings in Mr. Baker's book is to draw the conclusion that the affairs of the world were very ill-conducted at Versailles. None of the chief persons was equal to the job which had been undertaken, and least of all, in their different ways, Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson. The one was an egotistical opportunist with a certain leaning to a self-interested idealism. The other was an opportunist egoist with a rigid belief in a set of rather arid, badly analysed, and confused abstract formulae. Neither had real force of character, and both were too little inspired with the idea of self-sacrifice to be of any real help to a distracted world. If they had been stupider men they would probably have done much better. They could hardly have done worse than they did. The idealistic part of the Versailles settlement was fussy, futile, anaemic, and badly planned. The oppor- tunist part was often base and cruel. The settlement, as a whole, was a muddy mixture of pride and ignorance, cynicism and selfishness.

Yet all the same it would be foolish to entertain too tragic a view of the matter. We must never forget that the majority of human actions in all spheres are foolish and irrelevant. Yet this poor world, so shamefully abused by the leering, treacherous creatures that cling to its surface, somehow contrives to roll through the Ether, and will, we believe, in spite of all the malice and the follies, roll on till the Almighty Fiat stays its diurnal insolence to Heaven.

We are not going to lose heart or stand with pale face and chattering teeth because Mr. Baker has given us a peep into the Bluebeard cupboard of the Big Four :— " Mon Dieu 1 Quels hommes, quels petits hommes 1

Mon Dieu 1 Mon Dieu 1 Qu ils sont petits 1" J. ST. LOE STBACHEY.