LBJ's Other Wars

AMERICA From MURRAY KEMPTON

NEW YORK

'Ms your State Department and not mine.'— President Johnson to Senator Kennedy.

tr HE President's interview with Senator Ken-

nedy after the latter's European journey seems to have been appallingly acrimonious. It started downward when Mr Johnson accused Senator Kennedy of having 'leaked' the report that he had brought a Hanoi peace offer home with him and the Senator replied, apparently with some justice, that the President's own State De- partment had been responsible for these rumours.

For Mr Johnson to burst out that it was Senator Kennedy's State Department, and not his, was also just; President Kennedy bequeathed Secre- tary Rusk to this administration, along with the Vietnam problem which has done Mr Johnson as much damage as he has done it.

James Breslin, a journalist who reflects the current national frustration, observed last week that, when Mr Kosygin and Secretary Rusk appeared on television on the same day, 'Rusk looked like a pudding and Kosygin looked like a chair.' The President seems equally dis- enchanted with Mr Rusk and Secretary of Defence McNamara, who once appeared to him as his most handsome bequests from his pre- decessor. Secretary McNamara guessed wrong, and he is too close to Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rusk appears infuriatingly comfortable in that posture of immobility which most torments the President. McNamara seems unable to improve the war, and Rusk unable to end it.

Such are the indications that we approach that point of disliking one another more than we do the enemy beyond which no war is supportable. It is true that Senator Kennedy left the President fearful that the heightening of the war is more likely than its diminution; but, despite the resumption of the bombing, the broken frag- ments of their conversation which are available to us give the strong impression that he is wrong.

The most belligerent thing Mr Johnson seems to have said to the Senator was 'I'm going to destroy you doves.' What that suggests more than anything else is a change of emphasis; the Presi- dent's mind is consumed by his domestic enemies; the only war he wants now is against them. But it is difficult to believe that he could mean even this. Senator Kennedy is a concealed and sporadic enemy: he emerges every six months or so openly to express an otherwise muted dis- content; he cannot directly attack the President's strong point, which is his unshakeable control of the Democratic National Convention of 1968. Under the circumstances, the President has more to lose than Senator Kennedy has with a foray into the jungle for his pursuit.

The President cannot afford, in fact, to offend the doves, let alone attempt their destruction. Until now the more consistent of them have been Democrats; Mr Johnson has been able to limit them because he has been sustained almost

unanimously by the Republicans. Now there are signs that he is losing the latter resource.

Governor Romney of Michigan finally let go of his silence in the matter; all that was clear in this cloudy emanation indicated that he had set out on the road to opposition. And Senator Javits of New York, long the object of solicitous cul- tivation by the President, broke outright with his Vietnam policy on Lincoln's birthday. The President, Senator Javits said, had become locked into his own mistakes and illusions; he must give up the bombing of the North, and he must be prepared to admit 'the NLF'—until now the Vietcong—into participation 'in the political life in South Vietnam.'

The extended truce on bombing did not turn out to last very long. The fact that it was ex- tended at all, however, suggests not that talks may have been about to begin with Hanoi, but that Mr Johnson really does wonder whether the United States should not begin slowly to initiate a liquidation of the bombing altogether. There is considerable dispute about its effectiveness, but it does rather clearly appear to have been lees useful than hoped. As commander in the field, General Westmoreland insists that the movement of manpower and supplies from the North is larger this year than last; he has the interest in believing this analysis which is natural to any

'It's started already---"Dear Sir or Madam"!'

general in the field who wants more troops. Still, the Air Force's rebuttals have been unusually feeble even by its standards. The most plausible judgment is that we have used a weapon that did not work; common sense indicates that, what- ever Hanoi did during the truce, we took it up again with reluctance. It is, of course, quite pos- sible that Secretary Rusk, habit still triumphant over common sense, continued the truce even for that short period to show the world that Hanoi has no serious intention of negotiating, a pro- position that is almost impossible to establish beyond argument.

Here at home, however, certain facts do seem beyond argument : (1) If the war goes past 1967 with anything like its present force, it is difficult to believe that Mr Johnson can be re-elected.

(2) Opposition to the middle course which he has adopted as his posture is already general,

whatever the polls show. Opposition to the war itself is more and more respectable. The voters think themselves more ready to support stronger

action than they would be to accept withdrawal; even so. the prior failures of strong action have been followed by a shrinkage in the President's

public support; he would have lost all sense of caution by now if he gambled upon another with- out assurance that it would work. The Republicans have already begun to discover the advantages of being the party of peace.

(3) Our bargaining position as of now is as strong as it would likely be if we pushed another year on at our present level. If we reduced it, the position of the parties would not be significantly altered; the NLF would still have to bargain with a powerful force. The mechanical advantage which has been so much less than we needed for its destruction should be more than enough to pre- vent our own.

These arguments have existed since 1964, of course; what events have altered is the authority of the counter-arguments. We are unlikely to be freed of this war by normal negotiations; but the signs increase that we are entering that stale of mind which makes it possible for men to find their own freedom.