THE BILL FOR THE AFGHAN WAR.
IT is difficult to read the papers just presented to Parliament on the expenses of the Afghan War without a feeling for the late Administration of India which nearly approaches contempt. The blunders are so gross and the excuses so inept. The Indian Government, as our readers know, just before the Elections, under circumstances still unexplained, suddenly awoke to the fact that their Treasuries were getting dangerously empty, and that the cost of the Afghan War had been very gravely underrated. They telegraphed to the India Office that the cost of transport, supplies, camp-followers, &c., had risen upon them unexpectedly and very greatly, and that their estimates would be found incorrect by at least four millions. They still, however, though with some hesitation, believed that £10,000,000 would cover the whole outlay upon the war. When the statement was made public by the incoming Govern- ment, we pointed out that the blunder could not be one of estimates only ; that the past expenditure also must have been miscalculated, and that in all human probability the difference between the revised calculation and the truth would be double the admitted deficiency. Moved by sharp remonstrances from this side, the Government of India further examined the causes of the error, and at last, after searching, as they say, for some time "in a wrong direction," admitted in so many words that their excuse about the expansion of opera- tions and increased cost of transport and supplies had no foundation. Lord Hartington, as appears from his despatch of June 7th, had suspected this almost from the first, and on June 4th telegraphed to the Viceroy the following order for ex- planation :—" It would much help me to understand the case, if your Excellency could telegraph dates when first information reached Government, or orders were issued on points men- tioned by Sir Edwin Johnson, namely, purchase of transports, supplies for six months, great increase of prices, necessity for extra wages to followers, and for construction of protective works." To this message the Government of India, still presided over by Lord Lytton, replied in the following extraordinary telegram :— "Orders for purchase (of) transport, mobilisation, reserves, storage, supplies, &c., (were) all issued before closure of estimates, but local failure of crops and other causes augmented expense (of) measures thus sanctioned. Sir E. Johnson did not, in his Minute, intend to imply that above-mentioned orders had not been considered in framing estimates, but that cost of carrying them out was not then sufficiently appreciated, and was in- creased by circumstances, some of which could not have been foreseen." " All such considerations as these, however, have become unimportant, as explanations of failure of esti- mate, in light of full information subsequently obtained, which was not before Sir Edwin Johnson when he wrote, and which was sent by last mail. It is now shown that failure (of) estimates is due to Government having been misled as to actual past cost of war, not to any unforeseen expansion of military operations. It has been explained in papers accompanying last despatch that, for some time after first discovery of failure of estimates, we were looking for explanation in wrong direction ; and some of our telegrams, as well as parts of Sir E. Johnson's Minute, were consequently written under entire misapprehension of real causes." In other words, the accounts were wrong, and the explanation of their being wrong was equally wrong, the truth being, as is fully admitted, that the Government knew nothing about the expenditure actually incurred. They write on June 1st :- " The papers now transmitted will fully explain the circum- stances of the case. They show how the military accounts, in themselves accurate, gave an altogether erroneous representa- tion of the actual cost of the war, and misled the Government, not only in regard to the probable future expenditure, but in regard to the expenditure which had already been incurred." That is to say, the Government of India, the heads of a military monarchy, organised permanently on a semi-military basis, after rushing into a needless war, failed to ascertain net only its probable cost, but the actual expenditure upon it month by month. It is a positive fact that no statement of the money paid month by month by the Treasuries on military account was ever laid before Government, for Sir John
Strachey says so, adding that this " simple check" will prevent any future surprise of the kind. The millionaire knows that his agents are engaged in costly operations, half doubts if they are not spending more than they say, but never looks at his bank-book to see what cheques they draw We are not in- venting or exaggerating or concealing the exact facts, though we really cannot wonder that opponents who fancy us in- fluenced by party feeling are unable to believe that such things are. Here is Sir John Strachey's own statement, in his own words, cut from his Minute of May 20th :-
"Whether, however, that system be maintained or altered, we are, I believe, now secure against being again surprised and discredited. A simple check is already in operation which will effectually save us from such ignorance as that from which we have now suffered. Experience shows that it is no easy matter to reconcile in detail the transactions at the civil treasuries with the military accounts. The Report of the English Commission in 1861. contains serious animad- versions on the neglect of this duty in the past ; and we are aware that the difficulty still continues. The work involves tiresome, de- tailed, and apparently unimportant correspondence, which is apt to be neglected or overlooked ; and although much attention is constantly given to the subject, there are arrears of this kind now, as there were in 1864. But there is nothing to prevent the Government of India, in the Military and Financial Departments, being made acquainted, soon after the end of each month, with the actual amounts disbursed to the Military Department from all the treasuries all over India. Ar- rangements hare accordingly been made for the prompt and regular compilation of these figures, and for their communication to the Accountant-General, Military Department, upon whom will devolve in future the duty of comparing the expenditure of the Military De- partment with the departmental transactions at the civil treasuries throughout India. It will not, indeed, be possible to ascertain by this method the exact coat of any particular military operation, or of any branch of the military service. But with such a return before itself and the proper account officers, the Government of India may, I think, be assured that any very large divergence between the esti- mates and the facts can never again evade prompt detection, and that the Government will be as well protected from a sudden surprise in respect to the military expenditure as I believe it to be already pro- tected from any like surprise in respect to any of the civil revenues or expenditure. No system can ensure us absolutely against the failure of one estimate or another, but we ought to be secure against such a failure happening, as it has happened on this occasion, without our immediately discovering it; and 1 believe I may safely promise this degree of immunity from error in the military estimates in future."
No more astounding instance of carelessness was ever re- vealed, even in statements to a Commissioner in Bankruptcy. Be it recollected that this war had been going on for two years when the discovery was made, and that the sums expended in excess of the sums reckoned on were of a magnitude such as affects even the finance-managers of empires. It is no blunder of a few score thousands, or even of a million or so, such as has once or twice occurred before in Indian accounts. Speaking broadly, the subordinate accountants of the Indian Government proceeded on the hypothesis that the war would cost £200,000 a month, while it really cost £500,000. So obstinate or so careless were they as to the truth of this fancy of theirs—a fancy inconsistent with much that they must have known of war—that, as Lord Hartington points out, they actually adhered to it after the Army in Afghani- stan had been increased by 11,000 men, and had pushed on further away from its supplies. Lord Harlington says :- "But, putting aside this minor question, I cannot understand how an estimate based on the expenditure of 1879-80 could have been thought sufficient for 1880-81. I find from state- ments transmitted in the Military Department, that the total force in the field and warned for service amounted to 40,260 on January 1st, 1879, and to 51,746 on January 1st, 1880, a large part of the latter force being employed at a much greater distance from its base, and on much more extended operations, than in 1879. During January and February last the military expenditure is stated to have greatly increased ; yet, without any prospect of a speedy termination of the opera- tions when the estimates were revised just before the financial statement was delivered, no alteration of the figures was made." That is to say, in the opinion of the Accountants, an army of 11,000 men could be sent into the field for nothing! The Government of India knew that the army had been thus increased, they knew where it was, they were all, except Lord Lytton, familiar with the financial history of Indian wars ; yet they none of them suspected error until the difference between their calculations and the facts had grown to nine millions sterling, and had depleted the Treasuries to a dangerous point. They calculated the war would cost £6,000,000 ; it will have cost by October £15,000,000, and they are obviously doubtful if even that figure can be implicitly relied on. The Viceroy, this time Lord Ripon, telegraphs on June 22nd :—" No better estimate probable before statement (for) Parliament. Cannot
safely reduce 15 millions (in) paragraph 17, financial member's minute (of) May 20th, but, assuming evacuation begins (in) October, that sum probably sufficient." We agree most heartily with that implied doubt. If we get out of the war, an utterly purposeless war, begun in arrog- ance and ending in muddle, for £20,000,000, we shall be surprised ; and if it lasts another year, £25,000,000 will not pay the bill, even though we do not include in it the great and permanent addition which it will incidentally force us to make to the wages of the native Sepoys, whose detestation for trans-Himalayan service has brought the difficulty of recruiting the Native Army suddenly to a head.
We have told the story as simply as we can, and in the most moderate words, using, where possible, the precise phrases of the despatches. And we think three deduc- tions will appear reasonable, even to those who were not disinclined to the policy of the Afghan War. One is that the radical change of Administration which has occurred in India was absolutely unavoidable. The country could not go on trusting Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey, whatever their merits or qualities, with armies, and millions, and im- perial plans. Another is, that Afghanistan is financially a swamp, into which it is folly to pour more millions or more lives, and out of which the Indian Government must get, and that quickly, if it does not want to be suffo- cated without having accomplished anything. And the third is that Lord Ripon has before him a task in both financial and military reform which will strain every faculty he possesses, and which he cannot perform unless he is not only supported by Lord Hartington and Parliament, but enabled by the most peremptory instructions to beat down that passive but determined resistance which in India is always offered to changes involving large and successful reductions of expendi- ture. It is an almost revolutionary energy with which he must be inspired, if the immense machine is again to be made efficient, yet its cost reduced within endurable dimensions.
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