HOME GUARD PROBLEMS

By FRANCIS JONES HE Home Guard has suddenly assumed a new interest for the average citizen. Of late, it had hardly been Everyman's oncem, but it has now become so. And for the reason that vemment announcements of new plans for the civil population, 'n the event of an invasion of these islands, make it clear that civilian

• efence measures will be based upon the Home Guard. The force is to be vastly increased in strength, and those still outside it at he moment of emergency will be brought under its direction. The assive doctrine of " Stay-put " has been discarded ; it may be rusted for ever. Its place has been taken by the policy of Home uard-ing for all. • efence measures will be based upon the Home Guard. The force is to be vastly increased in strength, and those still outside it at he moment of emergency will be brought under its direction. The assive doctrine of " Stay-put " has been discarded ; it may be rusted for ever. Its place has been taken by the policy of Home uard-ing for all.

Let us therefore examine the Home Guard. First, as to the con- eption of what it was originally intended to be. The Home Guard the solution—and the only possible one—of the problem of how o man the whole of Britain as the front-line position. That problem rose with startling suddenness, and in an extremely acute form, in he early summer of 1940. When the Low Countries were over- un, and the collapse of France became obviously imminent, it was clearly necessary to put the entire country—every yard of it—into a state of active defence. To do that upon an adequate scale would ave involved enlisting the entire male population. That would ave been quite impracticable, and for very obvious reasons. The only way out of the difficulty was to create a part-time branch of the Army ; to keep the essential workers at their jobs, and to ake them as well into soldiers of some sort. Of necessity the new orce had to be organised upon a local basis, and the innovation was anned upon an ancient model ; that of the squire at the head of is retainers.

This vast experiment was a complete novelty for our own time. ere had been something very like it during the Napoleonic wars, ut England had been free from the threat of invasion for con- siderably more than a hundred years, and neither the population nor he authorities had any practical experience of part-time soldiering n circumstances of actual warfare. Both the novelty and the big: ss of the thing made it difficult to grasp. Even now, after two years, it may be doubted whether all its possibilities have been niversally visualised or all its implications fully understood. Perhaps the most important point about the new force is that it s not only a special force, but a force of specialists. Its members now their districts with a far greater intimacy than is possible for soldiers who are merely strangers. They are specialists in local defence. That is their strength and the one point in which they excel the Regulars. The Local Defence Volunteers, as the Home Guard was originally ailed, had no initial period of training ; it went straight to action Stations; to manning observation posts, and patrolling roads and so . Its first duty was operational ; that is, it was acting strictly

against the enemy, even if, in fact, it did not commonly encounter him face to face. The new force had practically no equipment. It was armed largely with shot-guns and an armlet served as a token uniform. Its organisation was, to say the least, sketchy. But it was characterised by the utmost keenness, and even by an astonishing degree of confidence. The L.D.V. might be a very scratch lot, but they went into what they expected to be a fight bald-headed.

The L.D.V. was, too, strong in individuality. Each commander did what was right in his own eyes, and was even encouraged to try anything that looked to him like a good idea. Local defences were devised, and improvised, according to the men and material at hand, and largely in the light of what sppeared to be common sense.

The first operational phase lasted, roughly, until the end of the Battle of Britain. The R.A.F.'s achievement and the approach of winter combined to reduce the apparent risk of immediate invasion, and the Home Guard was given a breathing space. It used it, very naturally and properly, to get itself into shape ; to improve its organisation, and to develop its training. That was the phase of regimentation, and it may be said to have occupied the second year of the Home Guard's existence.

Regimentation was quite clearly a necessity. But the gains were accompanied by certain losses. While it may be taken that all- round efficiency of the Home Guard underwent a great improve- ment, it may be not unfairly said that the new force took on certain fresh handicaps under which it had not suffered in the L.D.V. period. To an extent that was possibly inevitable.

Broadly speaking, two things happened during the phase of regi- mentation; that is, in addition to the general increase in efficiency and effectiveness. In the first place, a tendency grew up, varying greatly in its strength in different units, towards strict infantry orthodoxy. The Home Guard had naturally to be modelled on some existing Army formation ; it was also natural that the infantry forma- tion should be chosen. The normal organisation of a Regular infantry battalion was perhaps not always and everywhere entirely suitable for the Home Guard, but it was doubtless the best that could be adopted, at any rate for the time being.

It may be thought, however, that some commanders showed too great zeal in their application of infantry practices and modes of thought. They showed, in fact, more rigidity than appears to be common in the Regular Army itself. For by far the most part they were men who had gained their military experience during the last war, and they had neither forgotten nor developed the ideas that they acquired during that impressionable period of their lives. They sought accordingly to model their units more according to the standard laid down in the 1914 Edition of the Infantry Training Manual than those of present-day warfare.

This strong infusion of orthodoxy has curtailed very much of the Home Guard's original freedom, both as regards the unit and the individual. Its most unfortunate result has been to place a curb on initiative.

At the same time that it developed a tendency towards regi- mentalism, the Home Guard became much more a part of the Regular Army. In the beginning there was unquestionably a lack of co-operation between the Home Guard and the Regulars that might have proved dangerous in event of battle. That defect has been made good, but at the cost of what seems to be rather an excessive measure of the Home Guard's individuality.

Briefly, it would appear that the new wine has been put into old bottles, and with results as laid down in the Scriptures or some- thing very much like them. At any rate, this at least may be said : that in gaining its further efficiency, the Home Guard has lost certain things that are of value, and that the time has now arrived for seeing whether they cannot be replaced.

There will have to be, first, a greater encouragement of initiative and a development of individuality, by which alone local defence problems can most effectively be handled. That will clearly involve, at any rate in many places, a departure from the strict infantry standard. Orthodoxy must be sacrificed to secure the advantages of innovation, and there will need to be some considerable modernisa- tion of the common Home Guard outlook. In developing its individuality, the Home Guard will have to effect certain reforms in its organisation, and particularly where country districts are concerned. While it is suitable enough for urban areas the battalion organisation is very far from being ideal when applied to scattered country districts. It was, of course, never intended for such a purpose, and should be replaced by a new system designed to meet the new needs. That could be very easily devised.

An even greater measure of reorganisation is clearly indicated in connexion with the manning of the Home Guard. There is a crying need for the creation of some kind of Home Guard Reserve in order to utilise the services of men who, for one good reason or another, cannot undertake the normal amount of Home Guard train- ing. At the same time the cadet side is also in need of further development. A start has certainly been made with it, but much yet remains to be done. It should be made as easy for a boy, anywhere, to join the Home Guard and play his own particular part in its activities, as it is for a grown man.

Lastly, there is the question of women. If the Army cannot get along without the help ot the A.T.S., how does it come about that the Home Guard considers that it can do without an equivalent auxiliary? Also, if women are in fact helping the Home Guard, then why should they not be allowed the honou, of enrolment, even if unaccompanied by the issue of a uniform? I have frequently asked these questions, and have never yet had a satisfactory answer to either of them. For the very good reason that there isn't one!