TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE TERMS OF PEACE.
WE are glad for many reasons that the Boers sent their proposals for peace. In the first place, it has enabled the Government to put on record in the strongest possible way their determination not to stop the war except on the unconditional surrender of the Boer forces and Boer Governments. The talk of leaving the Boer Republics as independent, and therefore as inevit- ably and necessarily hostile States in the heart of British South Africa, is over once and for all. The Government could not now even if they would (though, needless to say, there is not the remotest fear of any such contingency) recede from the position taken up in Lord Salisbury's telegram. We are glad of this, and we are also very glad that the Boers should have conclusively proved by their telegram what has been so repeatedly denied,—namely, that the Transvaal was fighting to get rid of the Conventions, and was deter- mined at all costs to become an independent international sovereign State. People talk of the impudence of the Boers in asking, after having invaded our territories and having been defeated, for a return to the status quo aide bellum, but in reality their proposal is far bolder than that. They say that the only condition which they will accept is the recognition of both Republics as independent international sovereign States. This means iu the case of the Transvaal, the strong and important State, that the United Kingdom is to give up all its rights as regards paramountcy and the control of foreign relations. We are to cease to be able to veto treaties between the Boers and foreign States. We are to cease to be able to insist as a right that British subjects shall be treated as well as, and not taxed more than, Boers. British sub- jects and other white men are no longer to be able to enter the Transvaal freely and as a matter of absolute right. All these rights and powers are to be surrendered for no quid pro quo except that Lord Roberts is to be allowed to retreat from the Free State without further opposition. If these are the terms that the Boers offer us when they are beaten, what sort of conditions would they have proposed had we not relieved our garrisons, taken one of their armies prisoner, driven them out of our territory, and invaded their own ? To our mind, the Boer proposals show very clearly'that the Boers went to war not to protect their hearths and homes, but rather to win the position of a sovereign State which should gradually absorb all British South Africa. That aspira- tion was not a criminal one in any sort of way, though it was not one that we could afford to tolerate. The Boers were content to wait and not to translate their aspirations into action as long as they were free to do what they would with their own. When, however, we supported the Outlander demand for a share in the government of the country in which they had not only settled, but had a legal right to settle, and so threatened the Boer aspiration —it was an impossible aspiration unless the Transvaal remained absolutely and entirely in Boer hands—they determined on war. We do not blame them. It was most certainly a case of malum prohibit um and not of enaluni in se, but it would be foolish not to recognise the light that is shed on the nature of the Boer aspirations by the terms just proposed.
The form of Lord Salisbury's reply shows that we mean to make no treaty of any kind with the Boers, but to occupy both capitals and to enforce the surrender of all armed forces and the pacification of the whole country. When that is accomplished, and the soldiers have done their work in the most thorough way possible, it will be necessary for the Government to begin the work of reconstruction. What are the principles which should govern reconstruction ? We laid down at the beginning of the war certain propositions which seemed to us sound, and reconsideration of these in the light of recent events has not inclined us to modify them. We think, however, that the length and fierceness of the war will probably make it necessary to lengthen the period of military or semi-military government which must intervene before a democratic and liberal system of self-government which will certainly be, we will not say restored, for it has never existed, but established, can be actually set up. That there must be this intermediate period no reasonable man can deny. It would not be fair to the Transvaal Boers to put them at the mercy of the refugees, who, very naturally, i when they first return will be anything but inclined to take a lenient view of the Boer treatment of them and theirs. We are naturally unable to say how long the military period should last. That can only be settled after consultation with the men on the spot. What, nowever, is important is that the date should be definitely fixed. Nothing is more unsettling to a community than a vague statement that self-government will be given at some future time. Such declarations encourage agitation. If, however, men know that on such-and-such a, date, say three or four years hence, self-government will be given, the agitation does not grow, but decreases year by year. No one is going to descend into the streets and run all risks to get something which he will get automatically in a year. We trust, then, most sincerely that a limit will be placed on the intermediate period,—governed, of course, by some general proviso that the period might have to be extended in case of grave peril to the interests of South Africa. If not, grievance-mongers will be sure to say that the Imperial Government will do what they did in the case of the original annexation of the Transvaal,—say they are going to give self-government and then forget all about it. Remember that every Government tends to perpetuate itself, and that a semi-military regime once established will yield unwillingly,—unless the term of its life is fixed beforehand. What is wanted, then, is to fix a period during which the Transvaal will be able to settle down and fill up. That accomplished, the sooner the Imperial factor is eliminated the better. No one here, we can assure all South Africa, wants to force that factor upon the Colonies. John Bull is only anxious that South Africa shall be self-sufficing after the manner of Canada and Australia. The fact that he is being constantly called in to quell riots in his daughter's kitchen, or to put out fires in the coal-hole, he regards as pure evil. Such interference is no pleasure, but an unfortunate and burdensome obliga- tion.
Before we leave the subject we will once more set down the five essential principles which we consider should govern reconstruction. They are :— (1) Whatever form of government is established in the Transvaal and the Free State, those communities must in future be inside, and not outside, the British Empire.
(2) The new communities or community to be estab- lished must ultimately be self-governing communities of the freest kind known to the Empire,—communities in which the will of the majority shall prevail, and which shall be bound to the British Empire by the same ties that bind the great self-governing Commonwealths of Canada and Australia.
(3) The form of constitution adopted, and the political arrangements generally, shall not be of a kind which would impair the prospects of South African federation or union at some future time, but, instead, would facilitate their carrying out under reasonable conditions.
(4) Guarantees must be inserted in any scheme for creating any new self-governing community, providing that the Dutch minority—as it will then be in the Transvaal —shall not be placed under disabilities.
(5) Adequate guarantees should be taken fur the proper treatment of the natives.
By observing these conditions the settlement will be effected in accordance with what Lord Salisbury described as our traditional Colonial policy,—a policy which he wisely insisted must govern the settlement. We have seen this year what splendid fruits that policy is capable of bringing forth. Whatever the temptation to try a new plan, and whatever the apparent risks, let us stick to it. That is the ultimate path of safety, and to that path we must adhere. It seemed madness to grant rebellious Canada self-government as we did some sixty- five years ago, but the plan was not only successful in the particular case but has affected the whole world. Let our statesmen remember that when the timid talk of the risks they will be running if they treat the Dutch as if they were like other Colonists. The French Canadians were only made loyal by being treated as if they were loyal.
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