17 MARCH 1923, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE RAPIDS.

THE time has come when the Government must give a lead not only to the nation, but to Europe and the world. A month ago it would perhaps have been enough to speak our mind openly to France. Now we are so near Niagara that if we are to avoid destruction we must move the general opinion of mankind.

It would be a waste of words to blame the Government, or the French, or the Germans, for what has happened and is happening. The matter is far too serious" for recriminations, as the final words of Mr. McNeill's speech show. Unless we can speedily get the vessel out of the swirling current that is now controlling her, we shall be over the falls. The British Government, no matter what the risks, have got to obtain control of the situation, not in our interests alone, but in those of every civilized state. That sounds like heady sensationalism ; but remember that the alternative to our present drifting is dangerous beyond words. The only way by which we can gain control is first by making our purpose absolutely clear, and next by laying down a definite scheme of action for carrying out that purpose.

The purpose that must inspire our action is easily stated. It is to maintain the intention of the Versailles Treaty.

The intention of that Treaty, whatever its mistakes in practice, was to give us a Peace which would, as far as was humanly possible, sow no seeds for future wars.

For that reason there were to be no vindictive or even punitive indemnities and no fines for misdeeds, but merely reparation, as far as was physically possible, for the destruction wrought by Germany. Above all, there were to be no new Alsace-Lorraines, no scattering of the dragon's teeth, no fresh provocations to inter- national hates, no implanting of a fierce desire to regain some lost piece of a nation's flesh and blood and to reunite it once more with its Motherland. That was why such care was taken that a piece of debatable territory like the Saar Valley, allocated to France, expressly for reasons of reparation, should be allocated only for a short and definite number of years, and be subject at the end of that period to a final plebiscitary settlement.

That purpose we must show the world remains our purpose still. If we do this, we may be sure of an over- whelming measure of support. The public opinion not only of America and of all the neutral States of Europe, Spain, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the Baltic States, but also of a considerable part of Italy and Belgium, will be with us. Even in France itself there will be found dread and dislike of a policy which will rend from France her best and also her last chance of real security—the security of acquiescence in the European settlement by " the neighbour to the East." Wherever there is a friend of peace, rest, the healing of wounds and the restoration of commercial prosperity, there Britain, when restating and emphasizing her essential purpose, will have friends, sympathizers and supporters. Only those whose minds are clouded by ambition or fear as in •France will regard the purpose of. Great Britain either with hostility or indifference.

So much for the purpose which we should make clear to the world, and on which we should take specific action. This specific action must be in the first place to point out to France that her action in the Ruhr is not only contrary to the spirit of the Versailles Treaty, but is actually violating its provisions. The limited occupation of a strictly defined portion of German territory by the Allies, acting in consultation, in order to meet default by Germany, may have been contemplated by the Allies in their Agreement as to the amount of reparations chargeable on Germany, but that is not the present position.

France has made a regular military invasion of Germany. In the intensity and passion. of that invasion the question of reparations has been forgotten except for diplomatic purposes. The policy of France now is governed by, the idea not of money payments, but of a fancied security to be based on the creation of a buffer-State in the Rhineland buttressed by some scheme of commercial or economic control in the Ruhr. That policy is a flat negation of the object of the Versailles Treaty. It can give no security to France or to Europe. Instead of peace it offers us an unsheathed sword. It binds all Germans in a fierce and irrevocable pact to redeem their brethren in the Rhineland from their servitude ; for such the citizenship of the buffer- State will be considered. The Rhineland is no territory with a mixed population where an arbitrary frontier may have to be drawn as the lesser evil, but a homogeneous community purely Teutonic in race and language.

But we must do more than openly remind France and the world that the object of the Versailles Treaty was peace and a lasting peace, not war open or concealed. We must show France how her action has upset the balance of the reparation clauses, and has levelled a most serious blow at German trade and so at the hopes of a revival of prosperity. It will be necessary, therefore, to revise the reparations estimates. The object will not be to let off Germany, but to give France and the world true security—the security which can come only from a Germany not rendered hopeless and consequently indifferent to her fate. There is no nation so formidable as one driven to the extremity of despair.

Above all, there must be a general and complete settle- ment of world indebtedness, and it must be made in conjunction with the resettlement of the reparation claims.. We must find out what Germany can pay and pay quickly without being ruined. We and the other claimants on Germany must then agree to help France to repair her ruined areas. She and Belgium must get whatever Germany is able to pay without ruin, but neither must make any demand beyond that. In order that this renunciation may be easy for France we, and we hope also America, should express our willingness to forgo our claims upon her. Further, we should pledge ourselves by the clauses of a solemn treaty to stand by France if attacked by Germany, and to do our best to secure the adhesion of all other European and American States to such a treaty.

If France were to meet this friendly remonstrance and reminder with a mere negative, what then '1 • In that case we must tell her that not only shall we hold her responsible for the results of her action, but that we shall also deem it our duty to invite the adhesion of the rest of the civilized States of the world to our view.. If we do that France will not, we believe, consider it to her interest to treat us any longer as , a negligible quantity. As it is, however, France can rightfully point out that up till now we have not made any clear statement of our, policy. On the contrary, through a mistaken sense of friendship, we have given France the impression that we shall not interfere. That was a fatal error. It was as unfair to France as it was injurious to ourselves. The sooner it is corrected the better for us, for our Ally and for the world at large.