17 MARCH 1944, Page 3

THE DANGERS OF DISUNITY

AMESSAGE cabled to the News Chronicle on Tuesday by Professor Einstein contained a warning which, particularly coming from such a source, demands serious and considered atten- tion. "I look forward,"- says the eminent German physicist, " with mingled hope and fear to the post-war period. Will the German peril, after being momentarily averted, spring up again on a soil of jealousy and strife between the Allies? Will the losses of this war save us from repeating the errori and fatal experiences which we endured between 1918 and 1939? Merely to hope for this is not enough. We must also be firmly resolved to act con- sistently with this end in vietV." No one capable either of assess- ing the forces at work in the pre-war period or of reading the signs in the diplomatic firmament today can question the justice of those words. The maintenance of an impregnable unity between the Allies now fighting against Germany is vital to their own security and to the salvation of the world no less in peace than in war. In war Britain, Russia and the United States in Europe, those three Powers and China in Asia, must be the archi- tects and builders of victory. In peace Britain and Russia in Europe, Britain and America on the high seas, Russia, America and China in Asia, America and Australia in the Pacific, must be the bastions by which the fabric of peace will be defended. They will need, and they can count on, support from all the lesser Allied States, Poland and Czechoslovakia and Belgium and Holland and Norway and, of course, the full force of the British Common- wealth. The world will not consent to be dominated by four Great Powers, and should not, but it is on the strong States that the chief responsibility must rest, and round them that the structure of world peace and world security must be built up. Unless they remain united in word and deed, in policy and pur- pose, in principles and practice, all the hopes which the approach of victory, inspires will be disastrously and inevitably dashed.

This in a sense is, or should be, a commonplace. No one is likely to contest its truth. The necessity for unity is so indisputable that it might be supposed that unity could not be seriously threatened. No such facile optimism as that is warranted. There are no serious fissures between the Allies ; the situation would be alarming indeed if there were. But in such cases great clefts begin by being only small rifts, and it is on the first sign of small rifts that the alert must be sounded. The existence of small rifts today is not to be ignored or disguised. Individually they may be trifling. Collectively they may be inconsiderable. But they are visible enough to kindle hope in the heart of Goebbels—this is the one field in which he can hope anything at all—and visible enough to constitute a warning of which notice must be taken. Nothing could be worse than deliberate blindness to facts which may be inconvenient, and the candid speaking in which Lord Halifax indulged at Boston on Tuesday will no doubt be as generally approved in the United States as it certainly will here. Lord Halifax, as Ambassador in Washington, naturally was talk- ing primarily of unity between Great Britain and the United States. That, it is not invidious to insist, is more important to both countries than the association of either of them with any other State in the world, saving only, of course, our own associa- tion with the Dominions. Very little is wrong with Anglo-American relations, but there is perpetual need for both tact and contact. Tact is a manifest virtue in both public and private relations, and as Lord Halifax showed it is not at all incompatible with an occa- sional resort to friendly candour. Contacts have been multiplied in this war as never before, which is one reason why relations between Britain and the United States are better than ever before, and their development through the invitation extended by Mem- bers of the two Houses of Parliament to members of the United States Congress to visit this country should have admirable results. The frequent personal communications between Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt clearly make for good under- standing and smooth working, even if they sometimes short- circuit the Foreign Office and the State Department rather more than is wise. Even so Mr. Churchill has to put a not quite con- vincing gloss on what Mr. Roosevelt said, or is reported as having said, about handing over Italian ships to Russia, and Mr. Churchill's interpretation of the Atlantic Charter has perturbed considerable sections of opinion in the United States as it has here. This is not a small matter. That document has an inter- national status. One of its original authors has explained certain of its provisions to the extent of explaining them away. Does the . other author, and the representatives of the other States which subsequently endorsed the Charter, take the same view? This is a question on which neither disunity nor doubt must exist.

Next to unity between Britain and America comes unity between Britain, America and Russia. That is more difficult to realise. Britain and the United States share a common origin and large common traditions. Russia's history and experience and out- look have been totally different. That so much has been achieved is remarkable—and eminently encouraging. Confidence between Russia and the two Anglo-Saxon nations has grown steadily, and co-operation has been not merely well-intentioned but effective. Russia's impatience for the opening of a Second Front is under- standable and fully understood, and it would never be claimed that the great material help extended to her by America and _Britain can be more than partial compensation for her vast sacri- fices of human life. But relations with Russia need to be watched with the utmost vigilance, for it is here above all that German propagandists hope still to drive at least half-home one of those wedges of which they keep so large a selection for widening rifts between Allies. Russia is temperamentally more realist, and in- clined to care less for forms, than either Britain or America. The formality of consultation before action may on occasion seem irksome. Even so isolated action, such as the proposed exchange of diplomatic representatives between Russia and Marshal Badoglio's Government in Italy, is plainly unfortunate. It is sur- prising, for Russia is no more at peace with Italy than Britain or the United States is. Italy is an enemy which has surrendered and signed an armistice and is living under armistice terms.

Diplomatic representatives are not accredited to governments exist- ing under such conditions. It may be that after all it is not the appointment of an Ambassador or Minister in the ordinary sense that M. Stalin contemplates. None the less his action inevitably has the effect of strengthening Marshal Badoglio's Government. That may be a good thing or a bad thing, but the step is not one which one Allied Government can with advantage take without con- sultation and agreement with the others.

The dangers once realised—and an occasional concentration of thought on Dr. Goebbels' desires and designs will stimulate realisation considerably—what can be done to minimise them? So far as the average citizen of each country is concerned, his plain duty is to make a practice of thinking the best rather than the worst of the governments and citizens of the others—not, of course, to the extent of putting his judgement in pawn, but so far, at least, as to give the benefit of any doubt where it can reasonably be given. But if unity is to be preserved intact in days when military success may tend to obscure the need for that closeness of relationship which the menace of a common danger precipitated, closer contact at the top is desirable. Not all expectations in this connexion have been fulfilled. The European Advisory Commission, consisting of Ambassadors, not of Members of Governments, has not the authority with which it might have been invested, and since the Teheran Conference at the end of November neither the Foreign Ministers nor the Chiefs of State of the three prin- cipal Allied countries have met. Such meetings are of course exce7tional ; they could not be otherwise under present con- d:t:ons. And on the whole the right place for Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt and M. Stalin is in their own countries. But another meeting between Foreign Ministers might well be oppor- tune. Their discussions at Moscow in October were conspicuously successful and productive personal relations were established. Since then many questions, notably regarding Poland, have come up regarding which complete understanding is needed urgently. Personal discussions might not dispel every difficulty but they are a likelier means to that end than any other. The weeks imme- diately ahead will test Allied unity severely, as much in the diplo- matic as in the military sphere. Interests will diverge ; accommo- dations will be necessary. To realise the danger of disunity is to go half-way towards averting the danger. Whether it is being sufficiently realised is doubtful.