Votes and floats
The results of the French elections, given the political conditions obtaining in that politically unsophisticated nation, are as good as could be hoped for and are therefore welcome. The French electors came very close to returning a socialist-communist coalition the Sunday before last; but when they saw how close they had come to that brink, they hurriedly drew back and in their second round, last Sunday, they voted for the Gaullists and their temporary Reformist allies led by M. Lecanuet. M. Pompidou is entitled to modest satisfaction: he will not have to sweat out the rest of his present Presidency with a recalcitrant Assembly. Also, the Gaullists are beginning to look as if they are capable of surviving de Gaulle after all. It is even possible that France is groping towards a two-party system, for it appears that the Gaullists will retain their temporary association with the Reformists and thereby constitute a de facto party of the right while on the left the alliance of communists and socialists, initially put together for electoral reasons, looks as if it might outlive the election. If this proves to be the case, a new stability will have entered into French politics; but in this particular case it will be a very dangerous stability for a very obvious reason. The coalition of the left is half communist, which means that a government of the left would be at least half communist. A government initially half communist could prove to be a very stable government indeed: for it could very easily turn into a communist dominated regime. Once they have gained power, communists do not voluntarily, or democratically, give it up. A communist-dominated France might well bring.about a communist-dominated Italy—and in such an event, which the French elections have demonstrated to be not at all unlikely, where and what would the European Economic Community be, and what would happen to the ideal of a united Europe? The French electors have averted, or postponed, this terrible threat; but there is no point in pretending that the French elections have not demonstrated how very real the threat has been and remains.
A different kind of threat, brought about by a different kind of dangerous stability, now faces this country in its continental arrangements. It arises from the joint European float against the dollar. It is a peculiar float, in that one member-state of the original Six, Italy, has stayed out of it; two of the new memberstates, Britain and Ireland have also excluded themselves; and at least two states which never thought to join the Common Market, Sweden and Switzerland, are nevertheless likely to join the common float. Despite this, it remains very much a Common Market float, advocated by the Commission and so much desired by Germany that Bonn was prepared to revalue the D-mark by three per cent in order to sweeten the pill. The common float is obviously a step in the direction of a common European monetary policy, which itself is a step towards a common European currency. A common currency means a common financial, economic and budgetary policy, and this in turn means a common government, whether responsible to a European parliament or not. Again, there is no point in pretending that the recent manoeuvrings of the finance ministers and their upshot, have not demonstrated the reality of the threat of this development: A handful of people will see it not as a threat but as a golden opportunity; but whichever way the development is regarded, it cannot be disregarded.
For the time being, Britain has managed to remain outside the common float and, to this considerable extent, outside the development of a common European monetary policy. But if words of politicians mean anything, it is the earnest desire of the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer that as soon as it is safe to do so this country will abandon its floating pound, fix a rate with the continentals, and join the Common Market float.
We have already declared our eagerness to do so, and our terms. The terms, fortunately, were too stiff for the French and Ger mans; but given our willingness, and given that terms can be negotiated, it must be presumed that it is only a matter of time before we join the common float, bind ourselves still tighter to the continental block, and join the march — or Gadarene rush — towards a common European government. If the dollar eventually settles down into a steady rate against the European float, and if sterling also settles down (or up, as the case might be), then it will be very easy and also at the time almost painless for this country to join the European float at the existing rate. Nothing much will happen at that time. But come the next currency crisis, come the next bout of speculation, and Britain will no longer be
immune — as it has been, to our great advantage, in recent months — but will at once be afflicted with the disease. At present, the floating pound isolates us from the worst effects of currency speculation. A common float is much more a system of fixed parities than it is a system of floating. If and when we join
the European float, it will be like a fairly healthy man, recovering from an illness, voluntarily going to live inside an isolation hospital so that he can be sure of catching whatever disease may be rife within.
It is because of this likely development that all major European developments become of increasing relevance and concern to us.
The French elections, for instance, become almost a domestic matter, and potentially of far more importance than the local government elections we are warming up for or the by-elections-we have had. Given this unhappy state of affairs, we congratulate the French for having avoided a communist-socialist coalition, and we thank them, coldly, for giving us' clear warning that such a government could come about. Likewise, we congratulate the Chancellor for keeping us out of the European float, and we thank him, also coldly, for giving us warning that he and his colleagues intend taking us into a monetary union which will lead to a common financial. economic and budgetary policy, which will mean a common government — which could easily turn out to be a government formed by a coalition of socialists and communists. We note, in passing, that our " conservative " Government's recent spate of socialist measures will at least make problems of adjustment to such a European government that much easier.
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