Coalition prospects and perils
Patrick Cosgrave
It is easy to see why members of the Labour Party should be pathological in their fear of coalition, or of any talk about coalition. It is not merely as Mr Bidwell and Mr Benn and others have insisted, the danger that coalition would preclude the carrying out of the radical and thrusting and truly socialist policies to which Labour is pledged: it is, rather, the proven ability of the Conservative Party to swallow and digest coalition partners, that turns their faces white and makes their hands go all a-tremble. Even Mr Harold Wilson himself is probably more deeply committed against coalition that he is committed for or against any other policy that has come his way today. Yet, as many on the left fear, Mr Wilson would almost certainly find as little difficulty in entering into a coalition arrangement with Mrs Thatcher, supposing he had to do so in order to retain office, as he did in changing his mind on the question of a referendum on the EEC. Still, the Labour mind is pretty well set against the idea, at least so far; and Mr Roy Jenkins, often fondly dreamt of by coalition-mongers as a leading, if not the leading figure in an all-party administration, it is said to be adamamtly opposed.
So, greatly though circumstances may alter cases in the future (Mr Powell, for example, has always believed that our present troubles will issue in a coalition, led in the first instance at least by Mr Wilson) nobody of importance in the Labour Party is interested in coalition with the Tories. It is otherwise with the Conservative Party itself, where instincts and feelings and judgement are all every which way.
Just as socialists fear coalitions because the Tories once destroyed them within one, so, naturally, the more Machiavellian Tories hope for one in the belief that they could repeat the performance. All Conservatives are full of fear for the national situation, and find it difficult to see how a Government so apparently riven as Mr Wilson's can long survive in its present condition after the referendum in June. Mrs Thatcher herself is known, indeed, to believe that we will have another general election very much sooner than we suppose, and perhaps before the end of this year. But other would-be soothsayers are convinced that Mr Wilson will never again fight a general election unless he does so as head of an unbeatable coalition, for, it is said, he will never take the risk of another 1970.
Most Conservatives envisage the possibility of a situation in which they have to sustain the Wilson government in the House in pursuit of a draconian economic policy, and against the determined opposition of the Left. Mrs Thatcher and her colleagues would be delighted to do that: it would ensure that the divisions within the Labour Party were brought right into the open, and it would make them irreparable; it would ensure that Labour bore the principal odium (if odium there was) for the introduction of crisis measures; and it would place Mrs Thatcher admirably to pick up the pieces when the Labour crash was over. If, however — so the siren voices say — the Tories are prepared to keep Mr Wilson's government alive while Mr Healey squeezes all citizens until the pips squeak, why not go the whole hog, and gratify what is clearly a national yearning for a government of all the parties, with all good men (and women) and true joining hands at the pump and striving to bail the nation out (we can already see that one of the terrible dangers of a coalition period would be the banality of its metaphors).
Before coming to the reasons why Mrs Thatcher should on no account contemplate any such action it is worth looking at two groups of Tories who have more than a tactical interest in coalition. The first is, of course, Mr Heath and his admirers. I have been told that one or two of the wilder members of the former Prime Minister's entourage have actually contemplated the prospect of his one day standing again for the leadership against a discredited Mrs Thatcher; but the cooler heads among the Heathmen realise that if there is any prospect for a return to glory it is under the aegis of some at least temporary coalition arrangement As it happens I doubt whether either Mr Wilson or Mrs Thatcher, supposing they were to come together in coalition, could possibly find a place for Mr Heath (whatever. his personal newspaper, the Times, might say), for there would be too many people with real followings to find jobs for; but certainly coalition of some sort would be his last hope.
Not associated with Mr Heath and the Norman Shaw cabal, but affiliated in a general way to a number of his ideas, is another group of Conservatives who hanker somewhat after coalition. These are the Tories who still believe that the country cannot be saved nor the economy pulled out of its spin without the imposition of such measures as compulsory incomes policies. Having supported Mr Heath in his earlier attempts in these directions, and having seen the inability of the Conservative Party to carry them through on its own and in the face of entrenched trade union opposition, their fond hope would be that a coalition government possessing — as it undoubtedly would — massive public support would be able, at last, to enforce a tough, but consensus-based, economic policy. I doubt if there are many in the higher reaches of the Conservative Party who have begun as yet to think very positively along these lines; but it need only be remembered that the whole front bench went along with Mr Heath's national government proposals of last October (yea, even Mrs Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph, however mutinously) and it is likely that Mr Whitelaw and Mr Gilmour at least would find the prospect of rowing together in a grand coalition perfectly agreeable, for they are both perfectly agreeable men.
But almost enough has now been said to demonstrate how dangerous coalition would be to Mrs Thatcher, the Conservative Party and the nation. When we last had a peacetime coalition, also to handle a devastating economic crisis, and to take tough and hard measures, it occurred after the power of the unions had been broken in the general strike. A modern coalition, taking in its hands the weapons of consensus, and especially that of incomes policy, would confront not only a united and vociferous Labour left, but also an unbloodied, unbowed and unbroken trade union movement. It would of its nature, arouse extraordinary hopes in the national breast, almost none of them capable of fulfilment, and when and if it failed there would be no party or body left within the parliamentary democratic system to which the citizen could turn in hope.
The point that must be drummed home again and again is that a policy does not automatically become effective because it has the moral support of the people; and especially not if it is a bad policy to start with. Even now the coalition mongers are speaking hopefully of the difference there would be in implementing an incomes policy backed by a coalition and with the overwhelming support of the electorate and the pathetic last-ditch effort made by Mr Heath. But the Conservative Industrial Relations Act, to take but one of a dozen examples, had the overwhelming support of the people, and it failed totally and utterly because it brought the government into situations of confrontation where it could not win. And a coalition government backed by every single member of the House of Commons (and the Lords too, for that matter) which tried to impose a statutory incomes policy on an unbroken trade union movement would fail, and, what is more, would deserve to fail. It would, of course, be entirely a different matter if rising unemployment and various deflationary measures had already begun to reduce the monopoly power of the unions; but if that had begun to happen anybody could govern, and a coalition would not be needed.
Even apart from the particular fact that most of those who support, or who might support the idea of coalition, are dedicated to trying again with the weapons and policies of yesteryear there is, however, a further objection to the idea of coalition. It is in the most general terms, contained in the proposition that the country does need radical measures and that a coalition is incapable of taking them. Being essentially a temporary and expedient union of opposites a coalition, when It is not united on consensus or fashionable policies which will not work, is likely to be most united on doing nothing. Indeed, the Prime Minister's extraordinary performances on radio and television last Sunday suggested that what he most enjoys doing now is nothing, and thus that he is extremely well-fitted to be Prime Minister in a coalition cabinet.
Here lies the great danger for Mrs Thatcher. Essentially she is a doer. And when she took Mr Heath's place she gave new hope to Conservatives in despair at what had happened to their party and country during his time in government. She is unlikely, given her temperament and ambition, to sit easily in the bland and inactive hotch-potch which a coalition government would be. and she could well be eclipsed and destroyed inside such a body. Besides, what need has she for it? She has now only to wait.
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