CAPTAIN MAITAN ON THE WAR.* IT is not like Captain
Mahan to risk premature judgment by hasty publication. We are accustomed to expect from him much deliberate weighing of evidence, and finish if not finality in the sentence. In his present work, however, he lays down
his pen in July, when there was still much to be done before the campaign could be regarded as over. It is true, as he says, that since the British communications were opened between Pretoria and Durban, as well as Cape Town, " the actions of the Boers show that it is not in their power seriously to incommode " either route ; and " the trivial raids performed by their mounted men under De Wet and Botha may protract the sufferings of the war, and add to the close of the struggle a certain lustre of persistent resistance ; but, barring [sic] events now unforeseen and scarcely to be antici- pated, they cannot change the issue, which has become simply a question of endurance between combatants immeasurably unequal in resources." But if the war was over in July, the information concerning its history was still far from com- plete; official statistics were not fully published, official in- quiries remained to be made—as they remain still—and the historian admits that his conclusions are often based upon mere newspaper reports, and that he must suspend his judgment on various debated questions. A man who has studied docu- mentary evidence with the minute care shown in Captain Mahan's earlier writings must be painfully aware of the in- adequacy of his present materials, and we confess we are surprised that an historian of his reputation should have " rushed into print," like any popular novelist, just to catch the ball of public interest on the rise. Besides insufficiency of authentic materials, there are signs of haste and imma- turity about the writing. We have still Captain Mahan's austere, calm, and philosophic exposition of general prin. ciples laid down ex cathedra% but the narration of events grows hurried to the end, and even the general principles are seldom expressed with the terse emphasis of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson.
Nevertheless, a survey of the war in South Africa, however incomplete, from so proved a student of strategy as the author of the famous Influence of Sea Power must necessarily be valuable. The fact that he belongs to the Service afloat in no degree lessens his authority ; the naval men showed them- selves to great advantage in the war, if not in the subsequent election, and Captain Mahan has evidently studied land wars as well as sea wars, and brings the same careful scrutiny of facts and weighing of chances and alternatives to each. His new book is not a " story " of the war in any picturesque sense ; he seldom goes out of his way to indulge in raptures, and if he does he usually prefers to glow between inverted commas. There are, we need scarcely say, some animated passages in the volume, and we are glad to find them chiefly in connection with the courage of the British soldier. Con. trasting the finest type of Boer courage, such as Joubert's- " courage of the highest proof as regards personal danger, but not the courage that throws away the scabbard, much less that which burns its ships "—with the soldierly devotion of our own troops, "counting life nought if only by its sacrifice the end may be attained or honour preserved," Captain Mahan remarks :—" That element of stupidity which has been some- what lavishly attributed to the British officers' too simple- minded attention to their end, to the exclusion of care for their own persons and those of their men, has a military value not only great, but decisive. The quality needs direction and control, certainly ; but, having been reproached for now two centuries, the question is apt,—Where has it placed Great Britain among the nations of the earth ? " The author illustrates this contrast of national temperaments by the fight at Waggon Hill on January 6th :—
" Reluctant, therefore, though the Boers as a race have shown themselves to offensive tactics and to assault, the necessities of the case compelled them. In their plan, and in its execution, they showed all the courage, all the tenacity, heretofore displayed in their defensive operations, as well as in the peculiar stealthy rockcraft of a nation of hunters, which has equally characterised them. It is not, however, too much to add that at the supreme moment, when man stands foot to foot and eye to eye, and when the issue depends upon superior aggressive momentum of temperament, the national trait, whether original or acquired, asserted itself ; and the heroes who had scaled the heights bare- • The Story of the War in South Africa, 1889-1900. By Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N. Map and Portrait. London : Sampson Low, Marston, and Co. [10a. 6d.net.] foot and clung with undying resolution to their rocky cover, exchanging shots almost muzzle to muzzle, did not muster the resolution which might, or might not—the true soldier reeks not which at such an hour—have carried them, more than decimated but triumphant, across the belt of withering Bre to victory. The reply of the British Colonel on the other side of the sixty yards of plateau that separated the opponents, ' We will try '—a phrase which Americans will remember fell in the same tongue from the lips of our own Colonel Miller at Lundy's Lane—ex- pressed just the difference. Of the three companies who then rose to their feet on Wagon Hill and rushed, every officer fell and fifty-five of the men ; but the bayonets of the survivors reached the other side, and there followed the inevitable result— the men that would not charge fled."
On the other hand, referring to Graspan, he comments on the Boers' particular advantages for defence-
" their readiness in retreat, and, it must be added, the prompt facility with which they resorted to it. When the most that can be said has been said for their methods—and much can be said— it still remains that an eye ever to the rear, upon escape, is mili- tarily a demoralising attitude upon which no sound system of warfare can be built up. The nervousness of the Boers at any seeming threat to their line of retreat has been so obvious as to elicit frequent comment. As a predominant motive it is ruinous."
Apart from the characters of the combatants as fighting men, the book deals mainly with the strategy of the campaign, and it is on this subject that one specially looks to Captain Mahan
for instruction. His narrative of the various operations is chiefly valuable for the clearness of the main outline, and the firm dismissal of all mere incidents—such as Stormberg—to an insignificant position. The Boer strategy is condemned from first to last ; they began too late, they continued too leisurely, they divided their forces, and allowed them to be tied up, and thus turned what should have been a closely concentrated campaign into "a war of posts." Whilst condemning the British holding of so advanced a post as Glencoe, Captain Mahan admits that "it is impossible to withhold admiration from the rapidity and energy of the measures taken in the first fortnight of the campaign." In the defence of Lady- smith he rightly sees the key of the whole war. The holding of Ladysmith was no "unfortunate accident forced upon the British by the originally faulty dispositions of the cam-
paign"; no event was "more determinative of the final issues " than this obstinate tenure of an advanced post by a large force quite able to embarrass seriously any onward movement of the Boers. It is well compared to Mantua in
1796 and Genoa in 1800, as a decisive factor in a campaign. As to whether Sir R. Buller should have diverted the main advance in order to relieve Ladysmith Captain Mahan is doubtful. " As an abstract military question " the advance through the Orange Free State " was in principle the cor- rect plan, even under the existing conditions, as far as these are accurately known. But conditions are never accurately known to outsiders so immediately after a war." Just so, and that is why we are surprised at Captain Mahan's premature- ness. The same cause, no doubt, accounts for the absence of any searching criticism of Lord Methuen's much debated action at Magerafontein, though some of this reticence may be due to an officer's reluctance to pass a strong condemnation upon another officer's mistakes. He knows how easily mis- takes may occur in action. This feeling, however, does not prevent the author from endorsing Lord Roberts's censure of the whole conduct of the Spion Sop affair.
In spite of too much caution and reserve, and an obvious lack of mature consideration of authentic data—so far wanting—the book will be read with interest at the present moment as a criticism, however incomplete, of the subject most interesting to Englishmen by a singularly qualified and impartial judge. But it will not add to Captain Mahan's fame.
Previous page
