A Socialist's ambition
Sam White
Paris president Mitterrand's career has been 1 so richly embroidered with legends and calumnies, to say nothing of outright con- tradictions, that any attempts at a biogra- phy of him in the past have reduced themselves either to hagiography or exer- cises in venomous pamphleteering. Add to this his own passion for secrecy regarding various nooks and crannies of his life and one can realise the formidable nature of the task facing any would-be biographer. Now at last comes a biography really worthy of its complex subject, written by the well-known Paris political journalist Catherine Nay and revealingly subtitled The History of an Ambition. It was an ambition which he never fulfilled under the Fourth Republic when he seemed to be always the bridesmaid but never the bride — always a minister in its many- complexioned coalition governments but never President de Conseil, as prime minis- ters were then styled. Oddly enough he was to achieve his destiny in a much grander and less ephemeral fashion only under the Fifth Republic, to the destruc- tion of which he at one time seemed to be dedicated. It was a triumph which might have attended his more famous colleague and rival the late Mendes-France instead, had not the latter been so finicky about even contending for the highest office under a constitution of which he dis- approved. That, however, is another story and very much part of Mlle Nay's tale. What concerns us for the moment are the beginnings of Francois Mitterrand's career, which are rooted in Vichy. The devout son of a devout Catholic family, he had flirted with the extreme Right before the war and it was only natural that after escaping from a prisoner of war camp he would have made his way to Vichy in search of a job, and equally natural that he should have found one in the Vichy government's prisoner of war department.
He was, of course, an admirer of Mar- shal Petain and especially of his seemingly anti-capitalist ideals, then so much in tune with advanced Catholic social thinking, and as such he accepted nomination for the Marshal's highest award, the Francisque, a medal which has clanked disagreeably in his wake to this day. It was, however, at the time considered to be an award which not only marked one's loyalty to the Marshal but almost equally one's distaste for Laval. M. Mitterrand has always been tight-lipped on the subject, but has allowed his friends to claim that he sought the award only because it provided him with extra cover for his Resistance work. The Resistance did in fact claim him fairly early
in the war, but it was a Resistance which at the time could be reconciled with loyalty to Petain. It was this, however, which pro- voked Gaullist suspicions when he arrived in Algiers in 1943 — it was thought that he might be a representative of General Giraud — and not that he travelled in an RAF plane as has since been claimed. (What way was there for a member of the French Resistance to travel at the time except by British-provided transport?) Af- ter the Liberation Mitterrand continued to occupy himself with prisoner of war affairs — they were to provide him with his first ministerial post — was quickly elected to the National Assembly and there formed a right of centre group which provided the essential splint to hold an unsteady govern- ment together.
Or equally easily dislodge them. This power to make or break governments, combined with his considerable abilities, made him a member of the magic circle which provided ministers and prime minis- ters during the 12-year life of the Fourth Republic. (Mitterrand was 11 times minis- ter in almost as many governments.) As I have already pointed out, the office of Prime Minister escaped him, and his hopes, which were high towards the end of that regime, were finally dashed with its collapse and the return to power of de Gaulle. It was when he was Minister of the Interior in the only Mendes-France gov- ernment that the first of the scandals broke around his head, when he was accused of leaking defence secrets to the Communists. It was a baseless and crude frame-up aimed not so much at discrediting Mitterrand as discrediting Mendes, and the true culprit, a fellow traveller in the Ministry of Defence, was quickly unmasked. However, in the meantime Mendes had ordered that his minister should be put under investigation, and when news of this reached Mitterrand in a roundabout way an understandable chill came over their relations which de-
spite subsequent displays of mutual esteem was never to give way to friendship. But a much more serious scandal, which verY nearly destroyed his political career, came in 1959, shortly after the birth of the Fifth Republic, when he was involved in a fake assassination attempt against himself. This time he had only himself to blame. A disreputable Poujadiste Deputy called Pes' quet had come to him with the story that a, secret organisation to which he belongen had charged him with the task of `execut- ing' Mitterrand. Pesquet found the idea repugnant, but if he did not go through the motions of carrying it out, his own life would be in danger. It was, in short, a double hoax and Mitterrand fell for it. Between themselve,s, they arranged a scenario for the tempted assassination involving Mitterrand leaving his car at a point outside the gardens of the Observatoire, scaling its nearly six-foot - high fence, and then Pesquet following close behind in his own vehicle, raking the empty car with a burst of machine-gun fire; It seems incredible now that a man (3' Mitterrand's experience, former Minister of the Interior and of Justice, should have fallen for such a plot without informing either the authorities or even his closest friends, and vanity, with the vision of himself as a hero of the Left, was no doubt also a spur. And a hero of the Left he did become. Forty-eight hours later, however, Pesquet revealed that he had written two letters to himself, addressed to post ofhee5 in Paris and in Lisieux, both of which gave a detailed account of what would hapPen on the night of the fake attempt. There was no mistaking the post-marks on both let' ters — they pre-dated it. He had no sooner began the long steep climb of recovery from this calamity than he inflicted another upon himself. This was at the height of the riots in Paris in 1966 when he mistook de Gaulle's apparent impotence to cope with them for a readi- ness to abdicate. At the beginning of the troubles he and Mendes had come to an agreement not to give their patronage to the rioting by appearing at student rallies. Mendes, whose vanity matched Mitter. rand's, could not, however, resist the temptation of public acclamation,, and dulY appeared, silent, at one such rally. From that moment Mitterrand felt himself Iree from any obligation not to exploit the situation and duly announced, without consulting Mendes as his Prime Minister' that he was ready to form a provisiona government with himself as candidate for,. the Presidency. He was rudely reminded ot the fact that there was already a legal government in existence when de Gaulle, seemingly refreshed by his mysterious daY" long absence from Paris, announced both his return to the capital and his intention to dissolve the Assembly and hold new elec.: tions. To an enraged Mitterrand !' appeared that de Gaulle's anti-democratic perfidy in calling elections which he hiln.; self had announced he intended to cau knew no bounds and foreshadowed the
self had announced he intended to call knew no bounds and foreshadowed the General's intention to exploit the fears that the riots had provoked. He was right — the elections were a disaster for the Left in which both he and Mendes lost their seats. Once again his political fortunes were at lowest ebb.
It says a great deal for Mitterrand's personal magnetism that throughout his tribulations he retained the loyalty of a small body of energetic and influential friends, most of whom still make up the nucleus of his government and Elysde staff. Most of them were Socialists and it was clear to them that the old French Socialist Party led by the then dying Guy Mollet had reached a stage of putrefaction which rendered it ripe for a takeover. Mollet himself was one of the most discredited political figures in the country, and in two succeeding elections the Socialist vote had dropped, first to 11 per cent and then to only five per cent. At that same election the Communist candidate had polled close on 23 per cent. At the same time the then leader of the Communist Party, Waldeck Rochet, was understandably eager to promote an agreement between the two parties on a common programme. While the leadership of the Socialist Party re- mained hostile to any union with Commun- ists, Mitterrand, who remained a freeboo- ter on the Left, made it clear that he saw no prospect of the Left winning an election without such a unioin. His chance came in 1971 when without even being a member of the Socialist Party he became its leader by deftly playing off the rivals within that party against each other. He was greatly helped in this task by having established himself over the years, despite his misfor- tunes, as the most credible leader of the anti-Gaullist force.
In fact his formal conversion to socialism preceded by only a few months his capture of the Socialist Party. Looking back on his astonishing career there appear to be only two consistencies to it — his anti-Gaullism and his anti-communism. His anti- Gaullism looks ludicrous now that he glories in the full panopoly of the Gaullist constitution which he so vehemently attacked in a famous pamphlet now strangely unobtainable, entitled The Permanent Coup D'Etat. As for his anti- communism, this has proved entirely suc-
cessful and constitutes his major claim to history's notice.
It was Mitterrand who first realised that by bringing them out of their ghetto he could contribute most effectively to their decline. His party has, however, paid a heavy price for this. In weakening the Communists he has also weakened the French Left as a whole. Meanwhile as Mlle Nay puts it: 'Francois the first has given way to Francois the second. The new reign marks the end of ideology and to be a French Socialist today amounts to little more than helping the President to com- plete his seven-year term as peaceably as possible.'
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