RUSSIA AND JAPAN.
ON the whole, we fear the probabilities of war between Russia and Japan are greater than the probabilities of peace. Nevertheless, the situation is so complicated by certain elements, some of which are not clearly perceived, that we think we shall do our readers a service by recounting the chances for and against as impartially as we may. To begin with, we will state the circumstances which in our opinion make for peace. The first of these is the character of the Czar, who has many reasons for secretly disliking to engage in any war. He cannot himself command in one, if only for reasons of health ; yet he knows, as all his pre- decessors have known, that a Russian Czar is expected in war-time to take the field in person ; that if he is absent his generals will quarrel with each other ; that the troops themselves will make favourites ; and that he will run the risk, which so dismayed and worried Alexander I., of losing the power to choose his chief commanders with freedom. He knows that a war with Japan must be serious, and may be long, if only because the neutrality of China can- not be trusted, and because if Japan won a battle at sea she would have an inexpugnable base. He knows also, better perhaps than most of his counsellors, that he has two sources of danger to fear,—that his war with Japan would not only encourage the" fanatical " party in Turkey, but would at once transfer his influence over the counsels of the Sultan to his dreaded rival the German Emperor. He is, moreover, not quite ready, for besides difficulties arising from the imperfections of his Asiatic railways, and the enormous distance of Japanese waters from the Black Sea and the Baltic, a Government intent on war needs loans ; and the great financiers have of late shown themselves unaccommodating to the Treasury of St. Petersburg. He will, therefore, be personally inclined to peace, at least until Manchuria has been more com- pletely organised; and although the Russian Government is not quite the unchecked autocracy that it is imagined here to be, it is most difficult for the statesmen and great soldiers around the throne to force on a war to which the Czar is indisposed. The final legal power is his alone; he can instantly ruin any individual opponent, even if he were a Skobeleff ; and he alone can convince the people outside the Army that the war is essential to the interests and the dignity of Holy Russia. Add to these motives much fear of European complications, much difficulty in providing the necessary outlays, and much reluctance to send the very best troops to the shore of the Pacific, and we have a large body of influences in Russia working directly and strongly for peace. Nor are the Japanese influences acting in the same direction to be lightly set aside. The rulers of that strange country, so unlike every other Asiatic State, are painfully aware that the stakes are unequal; that they cannot, be they never so successful, hope to conquer even Asiatic Russia; while if they are defeated at sea the very existence of their own Empire, of which they are so proud, would be imperilled. They have nothing like the Russian resources either in officers or men, their Treasury is probably not richer than that of Russia—we say "probably " because we do not know what taxation the Japanese might not bear in war-time—and their statesmen have a vague dread of that energy in war which has of late years given Europe the advantage in so many stricken fields. We can hardly believe that, unless attacked, they will not feel some hesitation in commencing such a con- test, and as yet they are clearly masters of the situation in Japan.
Nevertheless, the chances of war are most serious. The Russian people expect it, and are prepared to welcome it, and no Russian Emperor likes to lag visibly behind his people. It is probable that the great Russian officers, especially those who have not been on the Pacific, at heart despise the Japanese as a small and comparatively feeble people raised by audacity out of their proper position, and believe that, as the war will be short and its result certain, they need not think of its reflex influence either upon Constantinople or Berlin. The prestige it will give them will, in their judgment, quite compensate for any momentary loss of influence. They are inclined to push forward while France is an ally, and England embarrassed by that fact ; and if their newspapers may be trusted, to include Korea at once, instead of ultimately, within the scope of their ambition. It is very likely that this is the policy of Admiral Alexieff, now Viceroy of the Far East, and invested with certain large powers which it is not the custom of the Czars, any more than it is our own when dealing with the Indian Government, roughly to override. Admiral Alexieff might not unnaturally desire a war with Japan, which, if successful, would leave him the second personage in the Empire, and certainly shows no sign of inclination to avoid one. An immense body of troops—probably a quarter of a million—has already been pushed into the eastern provinces of Asiatic Russia ; and as for money, the want of it has never yet arrested Russian action. The Japanese, too, are obviously.preparing for war. Their Army is quite ready except in the department of cavalry, in which the comparative weakness of Japan cannot apparently be remedied. The Fleet and the soldiers are eager for a campaign which will, they think, at last demonstrate that they are the equals in fighting power of any European race ; while as regards the supply of implements of war, the Japanese have the prevision and the patience of the Boer leaders. 'Japan is ready, her plans are laid, and it is a cardinal axiom of her policy that Korea must not fall into hands other than her own. Moreover, Japanese states- men may believe that this is the best time for fighting ; that Russia gains by every year's delay; and that if Manchuria is fully absorbed the Chinese Court will lose its strongest motive for strengthening the Japanese defence of Korea. The Manchu nobles, with the Empress at their head, no more like giving up Manchuria, with the accom- panying necessity for changing their capital, than the Piedmontese nobles liked the surrender of Savoy. The Japanese are, moreover, well aware of all that is occurring in the Near East, and of many circumstances which make them think that their colossal enemy is not just now in her most effective trim. They may consider it is time to strike, and there are certain indications that the hour of hesitation is passing away. We do not attach much -weight to reports of the movement of troops, for the Government of Tokio has its hand upon the submarine cables ; but there is a marked change in the communica- tions of Baron Hayashi to the European public. He, who for weeks past would not hear of war, now thinks it 'hypothetically possible,' and bespeaks for the Japanese 'side the " active " benevolence of Great Britain.
It will be difficult, if war does break out, to form even an opinion as to the respective chances of success. The Continent will at once decide for Russia ; but the Continent does not quite appreciate all the advantages which Japan, if she can but clear her own waters, will at the outset possess. She is very near to the scene, she will fight in her own climate, and her military organisation is almost .German in its perfection. She has a larger population than France, her Army includes six hundred and thirty-two thousand drilled men, and her people are said to be unusually ready to serve. Those resources are, of course, nothing to those of which the Czar can dispose; but the maintenance of a mighty army many thousand miles from its real base is a most difficult and costly task ; communications will depend upon a single line of railway, which in part of its course passes through disaffected country; and the Russians will be in a climate to which they are but little accustomed. That may seem a trifle, but it will aggravate an historic difficulty of Russian generals, the readiness of their ill-fed soldiers to die when pressed by climatic or other unaccustomed severities. The Japanese, moreover, will march quicker, will know the country better—the Russian fuss about spies and maps practically admits this—and will be less discouraged by occasional defeat. All these considerations are, however, we fully admit, trivial when compared with the great unknown quantity upon which the oldest soldier in Europe would hesitate to offer a decided opinion. Can a thousand Japanese in the open resist and drive back a thousand Russians ? The Russians deride the idea. The Japanese affirm that it is well founded. Experienced English officers and experienced Sikh Subandars inclined during the expedition to rescue the Legations to the Japanese opinion ; but there is as vet no irresistible evidence. The Japanese have defeated the Chinese with a certain ease ; but they have been slow to conquer, the hillmen of Formosa, and they have never yet contended in regular battle with European troops. Their scarcity of cavalry will hamper them, and there may be weak points in their armour as yet unrevealed. If, nevertheless, with numbers fairly equal, they can defeat the Russians, then the politics of all countries held by the yellow race, and of many European States besides, will enter upon a new phase.
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