FIGHT FOR FORMOSA ?
e- se THE reasons for not expecting a major war in the near future are familiar. Neither major group of world powers wants it, neither is ready for it, neither has been driven to such desperation that it would be prepared to resort to it; and the Communists in particular have lately been getting things very much of their own way without it. These general arguments apply throughout the world. They are supplemented by a number of particular arguments in the case of Quemoy, the Pescadores and Formosa, the islands which the Chinese CoMmunist Government has not yet succeeded in wresting from Chiang Kai- shek and his nationalists. The first is that for Peking to resort to violence; or even violent talk, in the attempt to acquire these last strongholds is to abandon the policy of solid gains in return for smooth talk which paid such magnificent dividends to the Communists at the Geneva Conference. Russian repre- sentatives in Washington are said to be showing some concern over their Chinese associates' use of guns when it had already been demonstrated that the best weapon to employ for the time being was soft soap. Such goings-on, particularly after the shooting down, by Chinese fighters, of a British airliner off Hainan and of an American naval aircraft (by Russians) in the sea of Japan, would seem to argue that the polite policy had been abandoned, or at any rate that the need for observ- ance of it had not yet been properly impressed upon the coastal forces. That would be, for the Communists, a very unfortunate impression to produce.
There is a second and stronger reason why, even from a Communist point of view, an attack on Quemoy at this moment Would be a mistake. It is that most Americans are less anxious to hold Quemoy for Chiang Kai-shek than the Chinese are to get it for themselves. If the Peking Government would only be quiet for a time about its intention to recover Formosa by force, if only the world could be convinced that there is a possibility Of -a long lull in the cold war—then the day might come When it would be less trouble for all concerned to give up Quemoy to the Peking Government than to continue to hold it. Conversely, if Peking goes on breathing fire and slaughter against Formosa then the feeling will grow—particularly in the United States—that it will be best not to give it up. It may be useless, and worse than useless, to the Western Powers in Peace, but it might have a considerable nuisance value in war. And so we reach the useful paradox, which surely must have Some appeal to the Chinese mind, that the best way for them to make sure of getting Quemoy would be to refrain from attacking it.
These particular arguments concerning Quemoy, added to the general arguments against a major war, completely outweigh any counsels of violence which any devil's advocate might put forward in Peking. They outweigh the fact that the Peking Government really does feel strongly about the continued occu- pation of Formosa by the Nationalists and would probably be Willing to take risks to remove this rallying point for all anti- Communist Chinese; that it might be possible to produce yet another division in the ranks of the Western Powers over the need, or lack of need, to protect Formosa; and that it is as well for an expansionist power always to be pressing outwards at some point, even if it is only a matter of leaning on doors to see whether they will open. When all that is said and done, the Chinese Government is still being foolish and short-sighted as well as wicked starting a fight at Quemoy. It is still more foolish to go on threatening war for Formosa.
Can we hope that the light of this truth will dawn upon Ptking ? Can we expect that Chinese wisdom, which long ago absorbed the idea that it is better to get the things you want by slow and peaceful means than by quick and violent, will lead to a cooling-off of the Quemoy fighting ? Can we, in consequence, sit back and let events take their course ? The answer is, of course, that it would be unwise to draw such a conclusion. The lack of co-ordination in the Asian policies of the Western Powers has already led to disastrous losses in Indo-China. It should not be allowed to lead to any more. Whatever the next Chinese move may be, the nature of the next Western move should be sufficiently plain—a consolidation of forces and a clarification of aims. Geneva showed how far we were from this essential situation. The Manila con- ference did not completely solve the problem. It still remains, and the first part of the answer to it lies with the Americans. They have, and are likely to continue to have, the strongest voice and the strongest forces in the Pacific. What they say and do remains the decisive factor in any problem which arises there.
The trouble in Indo-China was that when three Western Powers met to discuss the situation—which they did not do sufficiently often—there were always four points of view, and two of them were represented by Mr. Dulles. The Spectator, as a pro-American journal, is perhaps more likely to get a serious hearing in the United States than most British papers if it says that something of this ambiguity remains in the case of Quemoy. This time it is produced not by a series of over- emphatic speeches by Mr. Dulles but by his deliberate silence. It is right that the problem of Quemoy should be studied in the light of the defence of Formosa. It would be helpful to add that the more seriously the Chinese Communists threaten Formosa the greater will be the American disposition to strengthen Quemoy against them in order to hinder any foolish invasion plans. There is surely no harm in telling Peking that only peace will pay. There-is surely no sense in ' keeping them guessing' about that.
The same fundamental argument clarifies the whole question of Formosa. The more violently the Communists grab for it, the less likely they are to get it. The American strategic arguments for hanging on to this island—arguments which are by no means flawless—will be advanced more passionately if the Chinese step up their campaign to take it by force. And what is needed is not passion but coolness. The cold truth is that Formosa is Chinese, and that most people would be glad to see it integrated into China if only they could be assured that it would not be misused for aggressive purposes. Chiang Kai-shek has few friends. There are some things that the soldiers of the free world would be willing to die for. He is not one of them. But among the things they would die for. and did die for in Korea, is the idea that an aggressor must be stopped. To abandon Formosa just because the Peking Government threatens violence would be to abandon much more than a beautiful island of somewhat doubtful strategic value. It would be to abandon one of the best principles of the United Nations. And, idealism apart, it would be to abandon, the practical argument that the surest way to encourage the Communists to further aggression is to give way to them. If Formosa is ever to be given up to the Peking Government it should be as a reward for good behaviour. The Western Powers have few enough bargaining counters of this kind. They would be foolish to throw one away.
It should be clear by now that the right policy for the Western Powers in Asia is to draw a line against further Com- munist expansion, co-ordinate their own forces and policies, and wait. To wait for the Peking Government to settle down, humanise its foreign policy, and demonstrate a positive desire for peace with the non-Communist world (as distinct from a negative co-existence ') may seem like waiting for the millennium. It is nothing of the sort. It is the only practical policy. What is more, there are a few small signs that it might work within a reasonable space of time. The evidence of the recent Labour Party visitors that Chinese Communism is less rigid than the Russian variety is not entirely worthless. The occasional signs that Chinese foreign policy is not always com- pletely in line with Russian policy should not be completely ignored. Certainly there is no reason to expect the sky to brighten rapidly in Asia,- but to despair of a gradual change In the political climate there is to despair about the future of the world. We must wait. The right attitude of mind was well enough expressed in an epigram coined recently by Mr. F. W. Paish and published in the correspondence columns of Time and Tide.
Faced with the Gordian knot Untie it if you can, cut it if you dare. But if you can do neither, don't despair. The rope will rot.
Previous page
