The Last Twenty Days By ALAN BULLOCK I N the middle
of August, 1939, an ominous calm had settled over the diplomatic scene. The key to the situa- tion lay in Hitler's proposal of an agreement between Germany and Soviet Russia made at the end of July and now being considered in Moscow, but this was concealed from the British and French Governments. Unaware of what was being discussed in the Kremlin, the British and French Military missions sat down to negotiate with Marshal Voroshilov on August 12 and British diplomacy was preoccupied with persuading the Poles to agree to Soviet armies crossing their territory, the question on. which, Voroshilov declared, the success or failure of the talks must depend.
Meanwhile, in Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson, worried by an interview with the State Secretary. Weizsiicker, on the evening of August 15, wrote to Lord Halifax urging him to press the Poles to pocket their pride and make a new approach to the Germans. Henderson's prejudice against the Poles was alt ost as strong as his dislike of the Czechs had been in the previous year. ' We couldn't say Boo to Benes last year till we were on the abyss of war,' he wrote to Mr. William Strang. ' And we can't say Boo to Beck this year.' Two days later, Henderson added the suggestion that in order to make Britain's position clear the Prime Minister should address a personal and private letter to Hitler.
Lord Halifax was still turning over Henderson's suggestion in his mind when he was faced with the most severe test of British diplomacy throughout the crisis—the announcement that Ribbentrop was flying to Moscow. Hitler was convinced that the news of the impending Pact would lead the British to abandon their guarantee to Poland. Realising the danger, the British Government at once reaffirmed its obligation to assist. Poland and, to avoid any charge of failing to make their position clear to Germany this time, sent Henderson with a letter from the Prime Minister to Hitler as the Ambassador had originally suggested. Hitler's reception of Henderson was stormy and his reply defiant. Nonetheless, he thought it worth while to make a further effort to avert British inter- vention and so, on August 25, he summoned Henderson to announce a ' last offer.' He was determined, he said, to clear up the ' Macedonian' conditions on Germany's eastern frontier, but, once his dispute with Poland had been settled, he was eager to reach a settlement with Great Britain which would include a Gernlan guarantee of the British Empire.
Henderson believed that Hitler's offer should be taken seriously, but the Foreign Office was not so gullible. Nor were the permanent officials much impressed by the urgent comings and goings of Herr Dahlerus, the Swedish business man whom Goering was using as an unofficial prompter. On the evening of August 25, Lord Halifax signed the British treaty with Poland, and in their reply to Hitler's note the British, while politely acknowledging his offer of a settlement, brought the discussion firmly back to the Polish-German dispute. On August 28, Sir Howard Kennard, the British Ambassador in Warsaw, had secured from Beck agreement to enter into negotiations with the German Government under certain safeguards, the most important of which was an inter- national guarantee of any settlement that might be reached. Would the Germans on their side, the British now asked, be willing to start discussions ?
Hitler's answer, delivered the following evening (August 29) was too clumsy to deceive anyone. He agreed to resume negotiations with the Poles, provided that they sent an envoy to Berlin armed with plenipotentiary powers the very next day. The British did not fall into the trap. They refused to press the Poles to accept so unreasonable a demand: on the other hand they persisted throughout the remaining twenty- four hours of peace in trying to establish contact between the Poles and the Germans through the normal diplomatic channel of the Polish Ambassador in Berlin. Diplomacy could have done no more. In 1939 there were none of the missed opportunities which may have existed id 1914. Hitler had made up his mind to enforce his will on the Poles. The only question that interested him was whether he could break or weaken the British guarantee to Poland, and all the German diplomatic moves were directed to this end. The overriding concern of British diplomacy was there. fore to prevent Hitler driving a wedge between Britain and Poland and to avoid anything which might undermine confi- dence in Britain's resolution or suggest a repetition of Munich. The danger was not one of neglecting opportunities to preserve peace, but of seeing opportunities where none existed and so of being manoeuvred into a false position. The Poles had to bear the brunt of the British search for opportunities. Almost every day the British Foreign Secretary instructed the Ambassador in Warsaw, Sir Howard Kennard, to impress on the Polish Government the need for restraint. Considering the systematic provocation to which the Poles were being subjected by the Germans, Colonel Beck showed considerable patience with this well-meant advice from Poland's ally. On one point the Poles were adamant in face of heavy British and French pressure: they would not agree to the passage of Soviet troops across their territory, and they could point to the Nazi-Soviet Pact as subsequent justification for their distrust of the Russians. The last minute exchanges between London and Berlin which followed must have been watched with anxiety in Warsaw, but the Polish Government did not complain nor did they refuse to enter into negotiations with the Germans, provided these were to be conducted on equal terms. Whatever the earlier faults of their foreign policy, the Poles showed both courage and restraint in August, 1939: their loyalty to their allies was to be ill-repaid. Co-operation between London and Paris, at least as it is reflected in the diplomatic documents,* was less close than might have been expected. Although care was taken to keep the other informed, each Government conducted, its final negotiations with Hitler on its own initiative. There is no record of the French being informed of Herr Dahlerus's activities and the important exchanges between Lord HalifaX and Count Ciano were deliberately concealed. With M. Bonnet still at the Quai d'Orsay, the British seem to have felt some distrust of their principal ally. In the final stages this was sharpened by failure to agree on the timing of the ultimatum: in fact France declared war on Germany six hours after Great Britain.
Both Governments were still engaged in urgent negotiations with Turkey. The Turks held a key position in the Mediterranean. The Foreign Office, with an eye to German and Russian intrigues, was anxious to get the agreement with them signed before war broke out. More important still was the attitude of Italy, and here British diplomacy played a clever game.
Ciano returned from his Salzburg meeting with Hitler and Ribbentrop in the middle of August alarmed and angry at the prospect of war with Poland and the Pact with Russra, on neither of which had the Italians been consulted. Italy was unprepared for war and there was a good chance that Mussolini might swallow his'pride and remain neutral. Could the British do anything to stiffen the Duce's resolution ? Sir ,Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador in Rome, was opposed to any attempt either to bribe or to threaten the Italians. It would be better, he advised Lord Halifax, to leave events and the force of circumstances to produce their own effect. This was good advice and it was carefully followed. At the same time Lord Halifax went out of his way to draw the Italians into his efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.. On several occasions he spoke to Ciano over the telephone, while Sir Percy Loraine was instructed to keep Mussolini fully informed of every move between London and Berlin. In this way it might be possible to secure Mussolini's intervention with Hitler in favour of a negotiated settlement. Even if this failed,
* Documents on British Foreign Policy, Series 3, Vol. 7. Edited• by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler. (HMSO. 50s.)
by re-establishing friendly relations with the Italians and Pattering the Duce's bruised vanity, the British hoped directly to strengthen his desire to avoid war. Care had to be taken ,to avoid Mussolini's clumsy efforts to secure Danzig on the cheap or to stage another Munich, but British policy was rewarded when, on the evening of August 31, Ciano told Loraine in great secrecy that Italy would not go to war with Britain or France unless attacked.
If there is an air of futility about all the negotiations of these last few days, it was scarcely the fault of the diplomats. They had to continue the search for a peaceful solution, with little conviction of success. The important thing, as Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick minuted, was to avoid wobbling.' Firmness in face of Hitler's demands could no longer avert war, it could and did avoid the greater disaster of capitulation and dishonour.
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