PARIS RE-FORTIFIED.
THE late war had no sooner come to an end, than projects for fresh fortifications around Paris were broached on all sides. It was not only Frenchmen with talents for engineering who demanded new and extensive works ; the conquering Germans themselves, who admired the great de- signs realised during the reign of Louis Philippe, who ad- mitted that they left far behind the narrow views which had hitherto prevailed, frankly declared that even the relatively vast system created by Soult and Thiers required a thorough overhauling and a considerable extension. The weakness revealed in 1870 was not, except perhaps on two points, inherent in the works, but was brought to light by the in- creased range which the principle of rifling had imparted to artillery. The two manifest blots in the plan of 1841 are now held to have been the imperfect protection afforded to St. Denis, and the choice on the southern side of a nearer and lower, instead of slightly more remote and higher range of hills. But even these blemishes are mainly due to the progress of artillery. In twenty years the Attack over- took and surpassed the Defence, and despite a girdle of forts, which were never assailed by regular approaches, Paris lay under the fire of far-ranging rifled ordnance. But how came it to pass that invading hosts could sit securely above St. Denis, and look into the whole South-Western quarter of Paris ? It must not, in fairness, be forgotten that the reason was not the progress made in the art of hurling shells, but the failure of France to maintain an army in the field. Paris was invested, not because her fortifications were imperfect, but because at the end of a month's warfare France could not dis- pose of more than a brigade of regular soldiers. Hence she was not in a position to prevent an investment by manceuvring, or to act upon the German line of communications. If guns are more effective than they were twenty years ago, they are trans- portsd to the front with more difficulty ; and if railways increase the facility of transit, they are more easily interrupted and blocked than common roads. So that, considering the posi- tive power exercised by the existing Parisian forts, and the difficulties of transport which an enemy has to overcome, we may fairly infer that Paris could not have been invested in 1870 had Marshal MacMahon not been overruled by the Regency, and had he fallen back upon Paris either by the Marne from Rheims, or even by the Aisne from Rhetel. But although the investment and consequent bombardment were the direct fruit of Sedan, the French are right in taking into account the possibility of another series of disasters which should deprive them of field armies, and in so far improving the defences of Paris as to warrant a reasonable belief that the calamities of 1870 and 1871 shall not be repeated.
Nevertheless, few will have been prepared for the gigantic system which has been devised by the Commission of Defence ;
few will have expected to see the French relying so absolutely on artificial obstacles as a means of defending not only Paris, but France. The project, so far sanctioned by the Assembly, is based on the idea that by an adequate system of external works an "impassable zone" can be created on the Seine and Marne, and any future war " eternised " around Paris. The Commissioners have plainly imagined as a groundwork a series of events almost as fatal as those which were brought on the country by the Bonaparte dynasty, and have set themselves the task of creating means able to prevent an enemy from penetrating within ten miles of the bastions of Paris upon any side. In order to accomplish this end they have designed three great intrenched camps, thrust forward in huge salients into the surrounding country. One has its base-line between Stains, east of St. Denis, and Cormeilles, on the right Seine bank, its apex at Domont, on the hills of Montmorency, its right protected by a strong outwork at Ecouen, and its left by a work at Montlignon which stands midway between Domont and Cormeilles. The second camp lies on the southern side of the plain of St. Denis, resting its left flank on the Canal de l'Ourcq, at Vaujour, is prolonged southward by a fort at Chelles, near the Marne, by fortified bridge-heads on that river, and by some works which will carry the lines to Villeneuve St. George's, on the Seine, where a first-class fort will be built. By these two camps, the roads to Paris by the Oise, the Marne, and the right Seine bank are barred, while the wide gap between Stains and Vaujours affords an ample field for offensive operations, and the bridges on the Marne supply issues into the country lying south of that stream. The Commission rightly insists on the necessity of combining for- tified points with freedom of exit, not for mere sorties, but the larger and more decisive action of armies, which can seize favourable occasions for taking a foe at an advantage. The third camp is planned for a region which might be assumed to stand beyond the risk of danger,—the south and west of Paris. The new devices do not merely provide covering works be- tween Chatillon and Marly, which all parties consider desirable. They extend over a much. greater surface. The projected lines in this quarter start from Palaiseau, and have as their principal points Villeras, Haut Buc, St. Cyr, Aigremont, and Marly, while other works are to crown the ridge which, to the north of Palaiseau, overlooks the valley of the Bievre and extends to Chatillon. These are designed not only to stay an invader, but to furnish easy issues into the upper Seine valley and into La Beauce and Normandy. The farthest point in this stupendous scheme is nine miles from the enceinte of Paris, and the circumference brought under the direct and immediate influence of the works cannot be much less than a hundred miles. The cost will be very great, more than fifty millions sterling ; but the French will not be baulked by cost, if they are convinced that a chain of forts entrenching, as one Deputy said, the old Isle of France, will effectually prevent the recur- rence of a surrender like that which took place in 1871.
The real question is,—Are not the Marshals and Generals, unduly impressed by the late war, misleading the Assembly and France ? Have they adopted the true principles upon which Paris should be defended ? Could not the millions required for these extensive camps be employed to better purpose elsewhere ? Marshal Canrobert and General Chabaud la Tour say 'No'; General Changarnier and General Billot, the old and the new school alike in war and politics, say Yes.' M. Thiers finds himself also on that side, and the-only really able man on the other is Chabaud la Tour. The object of fortifying the excellent position occupied by Paris is to place in the way of an invader an obstacle which will arrest his advance, compel him at his peril to attempt an investment by sweeping round the flanks, and afford reasonable securities that the lines of communication between the country and the capital will not be interrupted. Now, a line of works from the heights over St. Denis to some point on the Seine above the embouchure of the Marne ought to make an investment impossible ; while if the roads to Orleans and Bourges, Le Mans and Cherbourg, were tem- porarily occupied, the fortification of Chatillon and Garches above St. Cloud would cover Paris from any artillery fire. Providing there were an army in Paris, no occupation west of the Seine could be other than temporary. The truth is, that Paris can be best defended from investment, which alone could force a surrender, by operations in the field. The vital point of an invading army coming from the Rhine and Moselle is not its front, but its communications. These must stretch from the Meuse to the Seine, and sound policy insists that the true field of defensive preparation is in providing a strong
base for an offensive attack directed from the south. The French might spend their millions more profitably in the neigh- bourhood of Besancon, Epinal, Langres, and Dijon, where, based on Lyons, they could form really formidable supports for a field army, which would have its own communications straight to the rear, while the invaders would have theirs to a flank. At the same time, the Northern forts should not be neglected, as an advance from Lille would also strike at the vulnerable points. No doubt, the Commission of Defence wishes to make the most of the Eastern frontier, as well as to protect Paris, and secure every possible advantage for the effective operation of field armies. But the vast scheme of the Commission looks like an attempt to do more than is necessary, and implies a serious distrust alike of French generalship and French mili- tary prowess "en rase campagne." The sums devoted to the entrenched camps about the capital would be better spent on the Army, or even not spent at all ; while the key to the whole position does not lie in Paris, but in Burgundy. It was bad strategy which deprived Paris of an army in 1870; and no subtle schemes of fortification, however extensive or costly, can safeguard a nation against the perils which grow out of inadequate military institutions, and a poverty of talent among those who are entrusted with command.
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