VITALISM RESTATED [To the Editor of the SPECTATOR.] Sut,—There has
always been a fundamental ambiguity in Bergson's account of matter. It is, in substance, not one account but two. This is convenient for Bergson's apologists, since it enables them to represent whichever account one happens to give as a misrepresentation of his real view by the simple process of quoting from the other. This is what Mr. Rostrevor Hamilton has done in his letter to you. Supposing, however, that his account of the thing is the correct one, that all the passages in which Bergson speaks of matter as the result of the view which the intellect takes—and takes erroneously—of, the universe are ignored, and that Bergson really does mean that matter is a something real existing independently, in the universe, as real and as independent as life itself, and that as such it is discovered by the intellect and not imposed by the intellect upon a universe which lacks it, what can we conclude but that Bergson's system is a dualistic one ? There is life and there is matter. It is of no avail to say that matter is the result of an interruption of or a division in the stream of life, since we must ask what it is that interrupts or divides life. Clearly, it is not life itself. It must, then, be something other than life. Yet the whole of Bergson's philosophy springs from and depends upon his fundamental assertion that the élan vital is the only thing in the universe, that in fact it is the universe.
It is, however, absurd to try to substantiate a criticism of Bergson in a letter or even in an article. I have set out my criticism of Bergson's philosophy, together with my own peculiar views, which Mr. Hamilton, of course, misrepresents— how can he help it if he insists on taking them from a couple of articles ?—elsewhere, and I hope that he will not think me presumptuous if I suggest to him that he should read them in the books in which they can be found before attacking or expounding them.—I am, Sir, &c., C. E. M. JOAD. 181 Cheyne Walk, S.W . 10.
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