Four-power frivolity
Vietnam has been a battleground for twenty- four years, almost without interruption, and the casualties of the United States forces alone now exceed those of the us in the- Korean war. In Nigeria hundreds of thousands have already experienced, or are facing. slow death from starvation. Yet these are matters thought to be too delicate for international mediation and negotiation. It is to the Middle East that the so-called 'Big Four' turn their attention; and we are asked to believe that it is here, on the borders of Israel and her Arab neighbours, where a number of extremely well-publicised in- cidents have led to casualties numbered not in millions, nor even in thousands, but in single figures, that the gravest threat to world peace and security currently exists.
The 'Big Four' have drafted a settlement involving the withdrawal by Israel from territories conquered by Israeli arms during the Six Day War, in return for guarantees of free navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and recognition of Israel by the surrounding Arab states. Such a settlement would not guarantee Israel's security, or peace in the area, for the terrorist organi- sations based on Arab soil would not feel bound by it in any way; and these organi- sations are not controlled by the govern- ments which offer them hospitality, nor would those governments dare to evict them. The only result would be that the terrorists would once more recover access to the areas of Jewish settlement, and the risk of further preventive strikes by Israeli forces would be increased rather than diminished.
In the absence of a settlement it is sug- gested that the Arab states might be unable to resist popular demand for a renewal of a war with Israel, into which the Russians and the Americans might too easily be drawn. The second of these assumptions looks inherently improbable. The present Russian government is far too cautious, and far too preoccupied with the troubles on its own eastern and western frontiers, to translate its theoretical and logistic support for the Arabs into direct intervention; and barring direct Russian intervention Israel has proved more than capable of defending herself. The possibility of a renewal of the war by the Arab states remains; but it is obvious which side would win.
The best guarantee of a measure of security and peace in the Middle East—a peace which no doubt leaves much to be desired, except by contrast with other parts of the world—is the military strength of Israel. Fortunately, there is little danger that the Four-Power proposals Will achieve any- thing more than was achieved by the famous United Nations resolution of November 1967. But if there is any validity at all to the proposition that the Soviet Union's tribulations in the Far East and in Eastern Europe offer opportunities for worthwhile East-West cooperation, then the Middle East is the .last place to test it.
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