18 AUGUST 1900, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE ADVANCE ON PEKIN. THE accounts from China suggest that the Manchu Princes and their Empress have struck their great blow too soon. They should have trained their masses of men, at least, for another twelvemonth in the use of the rifle, have brought up their cavalry from the desert, and have fortified the road to Pekin before they presumed to defy the European Powers. Their soldiers fight fairly well, but their fire has not the murderous effect of the fire of the Boers, and when beaten they fall into confusion, which is probably increased by their inherent fear of the unknown and half-magical resources of the white men. Like Frenchmen, too, Chinamen are much better soldiers after ai first success. Success in the relief is not even yet absolutely certain, because it is possible that the best Chinese troops, those which drove back Admiral Seymour, are encamped close to the city, and that the " Boxers" will make one desperate effort to defend the capital ; but it is more probable that resistance will be feeble, and that the Empress having fled to Segan, the army of relief will reach Pekin and relieve what is left of the Legations. They may have perished, the beaten troops venting their rage in a last and successful assault; but the evidence suggests that the Chinese Government retains its full authority, and may still be indisposed to make all com- promise impossible. In any case, and whether the Lega- tions escape or not, if the relieving force reaches Pekin, what is next to be done It is assumed on all sides, and, with obvious reserves, in all countries, that the objects of the Allies must be to secure the condign punishment of the authors of the insult s to Europe, to set up an endurable government capable, says the German Emperor, of giving "written guarantees," and then to leave everything very much as at present. That is undoubtedly the wisest policy if it is attainable, for it will postpone all the permanent and greater ques- tions ; but, then, how is it to be attained ? The supreme author of the whole atrocity, the Empress-Regent, is probably beyond our reach in any case, for Russia and France are believed to object to bold her personally responsible—"Mon role," once said Francis of Austria, "est d'être royaliste "—and even if those two Powers give way, both she and her superior agents are probably beyond pur- suit. The magnitude of a crime is no proof that it will be punished, and the murderers of the Ministers of Europe may escape like the murderers of the Armenians. Their punishment may be impracticable, and to punish inferiors or the common people while sparing the higher criminals would neither be just nor effective. The ManchuCourt, like Li Hung Chang, thinks all but great men "of no import- ance." We could, perhaps, after Lord Elgin's precedent, by running a most dangerous risk, plunder and burn the Im- perial Palace, a city in itself ; but beyond reducing a million of people to an extremity of distress for the means of sub- sistence, what would be the result of that ? Simply nothing at all, except to deepen the inner conviction of every Chinaman that the people of Europe are dangerous barbarians. The destruction of Pekin would bring us no nearer to the desired end, the more reasonable government of China. Yet we cannot retire doing nothing, and with nothing secured, for if we do life in China will be impos- sible for white men, and a most deadly, if not fatal, prece- dent will be established of which every Asiatic Prince will be eager to avail himself. The Government of China has fired on the Embassies of Europe, and if Ambassadors are ever to be respected again it must suffer for that firing. Then it is suggested that the feeble Emperor Kwangsu, who will never, his Ambassador states in a despatch published in the Blue-book, have any children, may be ackuowledged as the only legal Sovereign, and enabled through some strong Vizier to govern on "Reformed" principles. That would be an excellent device if it did not involve certain difficulties, such as the catching of the Emperor, whom the Empress will have withdrawn or killed, the discovery of a Vizier who is at once a strong man and a friend of Europeans, and the maintenance of a throne sure to be hated of the people either by a com- bined army contributed by jarring States or by a new Chinese army, which may prove three times as dangerous as the old one. We had drilled and petted the &pop! for a century before they sprang at our throats. Finally, it is proposed that, failing all attempts to control the central authority, we should protect and support the Viceroys, who are assumed to be ready to desert the throne, and set up kingdoms as the Viceroys of Delhi did. That also might do if we can do it, which, in view of Chinese characteristics, is more than doubtful ; but then that is partition under another name. All Europe will not support the same Viceroys, nor can any State guarantee a. Viceroy without subjecting him to some sort of control.. That would be, as Macaulay pointed out, to arm the bar- barian with the irresistible strength of civilisation.

Of course, if the Empress-Regent does not fly, and can be coerced by the threat of deposition, some sort of peace may be patched up, though Ambassadors in Pekin will have in future to lead strange lives ; but in the way even of that rather shameful arrangement there will be two immense difficulties,—the determination of Russia not to abandon Manchuria, which is her necessity, and the reluctance of the German Emperor to retire empty- handed. Still, an arrangement would be possible under which the Ambassadors would live in a fortified quarter of their own, and possess rights of direct audience, instead of dealing with the slippery and powerless Tsungli-Yamen ; but in the infinitely more probable event of the retreat of the Empress, with the Emperor among her baggage, what is to be done ? We cannot make an Emperor by decree, nor would the Powers agree upon the Emperor to be made. We strongly suspect that the Powers, in the absence of any other means of compulsion, will be tempted to use the one which lies ready to their hands, that is, to collect all import duties, and after paying the bond- holders, to pay over or retain the balance as the Chimse Government may behave itself. That device would be a singular innovation in international law, but it would be effective, and as European control of the Customs is already established it would be fairly practic- able. Moreover, it would place in the hands of Europe that permanent rein upon the Chinese Government which would make the remonstrances of civilisation something more than words. We could not approve the plan, for we dislike internal interference in any State unless accom- panied and justified by wise government ; but it would restrict the action of Europe to the coast, and, as it could be carried out by sea-power, would not involve the per- manent garrisoning of the interior. All, however, depends upon the events of the next few days, upon, that is, the entrance of the Allied troops, the fate of the Ambassadors, the character of the resistance encountered, and the fleeing or remaining of the Empress-Regent. When those points are cleared up, it will be possible to think without all thought being arrested in //mine by doubt as to the facts. At present all the statesmen and journalists of Europe are in the position of philosophers who raise subtle dis- cussions upon data chiefly imagined by themselves.