Political Commentary
Littlejohn and Robin Hood
Patrick Cosgrave
,There is still something fresh to be said about 1,he Littlejohn business; something that has a caring, not merely upon what is called con structive espionage (that which the critics describe as the employment of agents provocateurs). but upon the pattern of AngloIrish relations, and that hasty amalgam of instinct, logic, and stupidity which has invariably characterised London policy towards uublin (a far, far better formulation than English policy towards Ireland ') as well. In order to assess what can still be said, one Must distinguish quite clearly between the illOral and the tactical position. It IS
immoral, and strategically stupid, to to disrupt the affairs of a friendly state by
"le use of either professional agents or hired c2brkiminals (such as might compromise people, „",,w; uP things, or otherwise affect by violent -"Lon the o polity and opinions of that state) in vrder to secure a political advantage, Con erselY, it is perfectly proper to use whatever means lie to hand .0 suborn the government and People of an unfriendly state, especially when one's own troops are irrevocably entiNled in conflict with natives of that state. hese are the rules as they are normally un ` o,,rstood in relations between states, Now, ne essence of Lord Carrington's position when he sanctioned ministerial contact with wt'le Littlejohns was that he did not know ty.lether the Republic of Ireland was an untni„en.lzilY state or a friendly one; Lord Carringfe" is an able and intelligent man. He is perocic,VY Capable of weighing and assessing both "8 and relationships, even if he has a weakness to which I will advert in a moment. But — and it is a vital but — when the Littlejohns were Lie commissioned the ambiguities, hesitan„S' ,half-truths and half-arrests of Mr Jack n we'en, the then Prime Minister of the Repubb ' as conveyed in ministerial conversations retvveen London and Dublin, created a br„sonable doubt in Whitehall minds about 8 'II the intentions and the ability of the Z.vernfrient of the Republic. In such a situ re. a minister like Lord Carrington, with fr,sPonsibility for the lives of British soldiers s"traUwlster, could hardly fail to clutch at any crri straw or two — it certainly was. When 41.:,nals are employed (as they frequently an;) loY intelligent intelligence services, they aei emPloyed for operations limited in char time and expertise. The Littlejohns had theProven expertise; no limit to the time of et, Ir commission; and no defined character of saverations. That last is to say that Ministerial ornriFetion, which would not be accorded to doe'essional agents, was given to despera
s, who could offer no bona fides.
whIhere are two wholly Westminster reasons such incompetents as the Littlejohns uald have been employed — rather on the , to t, Pie that, when the good Friar was able thwurow Robin Hood into a stream he, by le action alo titenant. ne, proved himself a first-class mrst, the overseas agents of D16 — once were anxious to secure a professional 44, as their chief in succession to the stuffy dn'26rnatist Sir John Rennie. (They have now oici"fe this with the appointment of Maurice on Jeld-) On the way they confidently took the the screening and use of the Littlejohns, in co, hoPe of producing a definitive espionage P, of the constructive kind. of4.cund, Lord Carrington, who, as Secretary State for Defence, was responsible less for
the totality of Government policy in Ulster than for the fate of the army, felt obliged to go along with anything that might help his men, and was vaguely aware that, when he had told a junior minister to talk to one of the brothers, the intelligence services would take over from there, Lord Carrington is a man who does not allow intelligence to run to imagination. He has never been very expert in handling security matters — witness his maladroit governance of the Vassal affair, when he was First Lord of the Admiralty. He is a man straight and true, who deliberately keeps his mind free of complications and confines it to essentials. He is a man who tends to see small things as big things; he once told a Conservative backbench gathering, at a time of maximum crisis in Ulster, how effective were troops walking over rooftops with blackened faces; and elicited laughter in return. But this is not to decry him, in a situation that would defeat the complexity of a Machiavelli. Lord Carrington is, above everything else, an intelligent negotiator. When the negotiatee is slippery and devious, then such as Lord Carrington, with as his responsibility a weight of soldiers' lives, can be forgiven — and ought to be forgiven — for being foolish. Foolish he was, and foolish most British statesmen were — as, foolish were most Bri tish political commentators — in his failure to predict not only the emergence but the strength of Liam Cosgrave (absolutely no relation, by the way). In so far as Mr Cosgrave was known at all in Whitehall before his electoral triumph he was known as a man who incautiously ordered chicken soup in the Dail (Irish House of Commons) restaurant on a Friday and rapidly changed to fish pate when reminded by his secretary that Catholics did not eat meat on the day before the Jewish Sabbath. It is now known that, if Mr Cosgrave has foibles he also has a sense of power, and a capacity to use it. The mor tification of Whitehall about the Littlejohn affair now is that what began as an attack on Mr Lynch's prevarication ended as a silly affront to Mr Cosgrave's strength. But, if anybody is responsible in a moral sense for the irresponsible desperation of British ministers in employing thugs it is Mr Jack Lynch and that now European Commissioner, then his Foreign Minister, Dr Patrick Hillery.
When Mr Lynch and Mr Wilson and Mr Callaghan were in power there was a policy of charming drift in Anglo-Itish relations. Bombs might go off, but goodwill appeared to prevail. Personality, it appeared for a moment, might overcome every difficulty. Mr Heath and Mr Maudling were a trifle more abrasive on the British side; and Lord Carrington was not prepared (silly, un-political fellow he) to contemplate indefinitely the organised slaughter of British troops from bases south of the border. Mr Lynch and Dr — it is merely a medical doctorate — Hillery came to London
from time to time, said how sad it wasmrung their hands, and went home. When even practical matters, like the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Treaty, were discussed, the lack of knowledge, let alone of expertise, of the Lynch negotiators, was acutely embarrassing to Whitehall. On security matters it became clear, quite early, that Mr Lynch was more anxious to secure his party than his country; and that he lacked confidence in his capacity to command his party. It was quite literally true that British ministers could not understand the English of what Mr Lynch and Dr Hillery were, saying:. they were (in British eyes) less concerned with slaughter and justice than with the balance of moderate . and Republican opinion in their own party.
-. Tread your way through what fogs of ambiguity you will, but there is no doubt whatever that Mr Lynch gave British civil servants and ministers the impression that they could do what they liked, so long as the governing Fianna Fail party was not disturbed. Jack Lynch (and here I am paraphrasing a senior civil servant) could be relied upon — but outside his own country, not in it. The levels of ambiguity created were legion; and the British attitude to him was an extraordinary combination of trying to speak Noel Coward language to natives, and trying to save army lives. Mr Lynch never told the truth of what he knew; Englishmen tried to interpret him. They failed, and then embarked on espionage in his country, for want of anything better to do. He now claims he did not know about this espionage. Perhaps so. But he encouraged all that he now complains of; and conveniently departed to America a day after his administration was told about the Littlejohns.
In the Littlejohn affair British ministers did act in a Robin Hood fashion: they grabbed what it looked as if they could get. They did not, stop to think. They indulged their awareness of a weak, divided and indecisive Irish government. But they weren't very bright in thinking that the Irish government would continue to suffer those silly characteristics.
Lord Carrington and his officials and junior ministers are to be censured for being unintelligent in their acceptance of an offer of support from known and inefficient criminals; and for their failure to predict the emergence of a strong and uncompromising government — that which they now embarrass — in Ireland. But real blame lies at Mr Lynch's door: even if his Attorney General, Mr Condon, is correct in saying his office was told nothing of a British Intelligence tie up with the Littlejohns, Mr Lynch"s Government was so split, and he so unwilling to discipline it, that Mr Condon might not have known while others did. The real blame for Lord Carrington, with all the responsibilities he had, taking desperate measures lies at Mr Lynch's door, because he could not decide whether his republic was a friendly state or not.
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