18 FEBRUARY 1854, Page 16

1HE NEW ITALIAN QUESTION.

FEW things are more disagreeable than the actual coming of the time at which a very critical question must be put and must be answered ; and it is natural that the unconstitutional Italian Sovereigns should resent the advent of any person who would ask them face to face the question which the political world is generally discussing, and that upon which the Revolutionary party of Europe are actually speculating with much zest. It has been stated that a French diplomat who enjoys the confidence of the Emperor Napoleon, M. Brennier, has been on a roving mission to the Courts of Italy, for the purpose of learning the position which the Sovereigns would take in the event of war. This expe- dition of inquiry rests upon report, and the answers cannot have been authentically stated in public ; but the mission itself is highly probable, and the evasive answers which are hinted at are what might be expected. Even if the question has not been put by M. Brennier, it would evidently have been forced upon the Sove- reigns by the course of events ; and indeed it is one which more concerns them than the Powers who are about to engage in a great contest, and who must naturally be looking up the resources that they can command.

The position of the unconstitutional Sovereigns in Italy does not differ very greatly in its essentials from that of Austria, with one exception. They must be favourable to Russia, because that power has been the great asserter of autocratic rule, and still more because it has been the great stay of the despotic Sovereigns in Europe. In 1848, it appears quite possible that but for Russia the Austrian empire might have been broken up ; and if Austria were broken up, the Italian states, whose Sovereigns copy the model of Vienna, could scarcely anticipate a better doom. The difference in the present position of the Italian states is, that ne- cessarily acting so much under the shelter of Austria, they might be compelled in a great degree to follow the lead of Austria, either in a Western alliance or the reverse. On the other hand, they are, more than Austria, directly answerable to their own people ; and there are growing influences in Italy, distinct from the Re- publican or Unitarian party, which cannot fail to excite serious apprehensions, especially in Naples. If the Bing of Sardinia is gathering round him a genuine national support, as the return for the constitutional rights which he has secured to his people, the Neapolitans, disappointed of any new Parthenopeian Republic, and as unreconciled to their Xing as ever, are understood to view with favour suggestions that the turn of events might facilitate the restoration of a Murat dynasty. Independently of the calcula- tions, therefore, which are unquestionably going on amongst the Revolutionary party of Italy and its allies in other countries, there are these more certain elements of hostile movement within Italy itself.

There is, no doubt, one too probable contingency which would operate greatly in favour of the unconstitutional Sovereigns in Italy. In the event of a general war, it is too obvious to be over- looked, that many of the most important provinces of Austria will endeavour to make her danger their opportunity; and there is an equal probability that Russia may revenge herself for the neu- trality of Austria, and the hostility of the new French throne, by intrigues to encourage that revolutionary movement, which she would abandon and help to destroy as soon as it had served her purpose. An intermediate stage must intervene before any such conjunction of opposite powers could take place. Should Austria remain true to the Western alliance even for a time, and should the Italian Powers copy the example of Austria in remaining neutral while professing adherence to the general consent of Europe, any belligerent movement within the populations of Italy could not be distinguished, by those Powers who take the lead in sustaining the common law of Europe, from the disturbers of that common law ; and, however disconnected the Italian patriots might be from the Russian outlaw, there would be a concurrence in the acts of the two, and the defenders of order would find it incum- bent upon them to put down the one disturbance as a preliminary to a contest with the other. Should Russia persevere in forcing a general contest upon Europe, it is commonly agreed that no states- man can calculate the results, or predetermine how the political map of Europe shall ultimately be distributed. Protests against the unsettlement of boundaries will be unavailing in the face of the de facto powers, whether tyrannical or liberal, that may de- velop themselves in that contest. And at the conclusion it will be necessary to deal with powers de facto, and not with those de jure who have provoked their own destruction, or have through mistaken policy permitted their claim to lapse. Should the contest of the Western Powers against the great champion of autocratic rule proceed without untimely distraction by a combat against revolution, it would only result in a gain to liberal principles and institutions on the Continent ; and while the Western Powers are doing so well, it would be deplorable if the mistaken zeal of the patriots, however honest, were to complicate the quarrel and draw upon the leaders of the patriot party the same retributive sentence which ought to be reserved for the great disturber. Should the Italian patriots possess sufficient self-con- trol to abide their time, they would inevitably profit by their dis- cretion. On the other hand, should the unconstitutional Soveri3igns of Italy make a rash or a bigoted reply to the question which is asked them as much by events as by the French agent,—should they blindly rely upon powers which may fail them at the pinch,— they certainly cannot hold the Western Governments answerable for the consequences of the storm which they would brave.