18 FEBRUARY 1854, Page 25

COLONEL CHESNEY'S HUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGNS. *

" Time " prevented Colonel Chesney from carrying his scientific assistance to Afahmoud the Reformer in the war of 1828-'29. The Colonel bore a letter of recommendation from an old comrade of the Turks—Sir Sydney Smith. He had turned his attention to the growing power of steam ; and, thinking that its agency might restore the naval superiority of the Sultan, shattered at Navarino, he took out with him an estimate of the mode and cost of im- provising, as it were, a steam fleet. A commercial house was send- ing some rockets to Constantinople; and the Colonel, picking up a veteran who had served with the rocket brigade at Leipsic, ship- ped himself and man along with the Congreves to organize a brigade. Whilst the clipper was entering the Dardanelles, un- luckily General Diebitsch was passing the Balkan, and the treaty of Adrianople superseded the plans of Colonel Chesney. Being on the spot, however, the Colonel visited the seat of war in Europe, and subsequently in Asia; • gathering particulars of its incidents from Russian and Turkish officers, as well as from other sources. From this information is written the early part of the present vo- lume, containing a description of the countries which are now the seat of war, and a critical account of the European and Asiatic campaigns in 1828 and 1829. This is followed by a view of the present power, resources, and prospects of Turkey single-handed. An appendix of public documents, pretty well known to those who are likely to read them, with maps of the seats of war and the campaigns of 1828-'29, complete the work.

The military memoir of Colonel Chesney is full and clear ; occa- sionally presenting the active struggles of the combat, but more generally exhibiting the strategy—the moves of the game and the nature of the forces by which the final event was produced. It is in this point of view that the principal value of the work consists; because, by seeing the causes of failure or success a quarter of a century ago, the reader is enabled to form a probable concln- sion as to the present prospect ; and this seems to incline against Russia, with little assistance from the allied powers. If that as- sistance be given upon the scale apparently contemplated by France and England, Turkey may be considered secure, Russia doomed to defeat, and her armies to destruction should they ad- vance far beyond the Danube, unless a temporizing and timorous diplomacy should be allowed to snatch the advantages of victory from the allies.

The results of the last war and their causes, with the grounds of the better prospects at present, must be stated somewhat dog- matically and independently, for it would be long to present them otherwise. In all that concerns mere fighting, whether in open field, behind cover, or in that irregular hand-to-hand contest which accompanies the sally, the skirmish, or the desultory combat on broken ground, the Turks were quite equal to the Russians, 'and indeed superior. In the art of quickly covering themselves by in- trenchments, the Turks are superior to all European nations ; who indeed might learn a good deal from them in this respect. In the defence of a fortress or a rudely-fortified town they are also capital ; in fact, with Turks the hardest work begins "where it usually ends in more scientific warfare,—namely, after a breach has been effected in the body of the place." In regular battle the Turkish troops were not inferior to the Russians either for

attack or the power of resistance in position. What Russians, wanted was discipline. Yet even then, -with boys newly levied and the army in a transition state, the want seems to have been less that of instruction than of organization. They either knew enough to execute common orders in the face of the enemy, or their cou- rage supplied the place of knowledge ; but they could not manceuvre in large bodies, they were liable to surprise or panic, and they ne- • The Russo-Turkish Campaigns of 1828 and 1829; with a View of the Present State of Affairs in the East. By Colonel Chesney, B.A., D.C.L., F.R.S., Author of "The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris." With Maps. Published by Smith and Elder. glected the precautions which regular discipline with its due gra- dation of ranks enforces. The great source of failure was with the

superior officers, who wanted both experience and sometimes the commonest knowledge ; for, either from the etiquette of office or some other cause, civilians held high military commands. The consequence was, want of plan, of union, and even of general in- telligence. There was this further element of discordance—one if not several of the Pashas were, like numbers of the people, dissatis. lied with the Sultan and his reforms, and more prone to cavil and exhibit independence than to obey. In the cases of the surrender of Ibrail and Varna there were charges of treason. Colonel Chesney thinks that in both cases there were grounds for suspicion ; but at Varna the defence was long protracted, and the fortress reduced to a critical state.

" It is, however, right to observe, that the result of the operations which had been carried on at this time Southward of the fortress were calculated

to shake the constancy of the garrison, by depriving them of all hope of re- lief. At best this succour would have been very limited ; for an intercepted despatch from the Grand Vizir spoke of being able to spare only 2000 men for this purpose, provided he were successful."

The disadvantages which weakened the Ottoman empire in 1828 are now in a great measure lessened or removed. The Mahometans are more loyal and united ; the regular army is in a better condition as regards physique and discipline, though Colonel Chesney thinks there is still a deficiency in the number and character of the officers as well regimental as superior. The artillery is equal to if not better than that of the Russians ; our author attri- butes a similar equality if not superiority to the cavalry,—in which he differs from almost everybody, unless he confines the su- periority to bad ground. As regards leaders, Omar Pasha is evi- dently capable of forming a plan of campaign, and seems unlikely to be surprised or thoroughly outmanceuvered, while he has lieu- tenants under him who appear competent to carry out his in- tentions. In Asia, the old system of routine and office-holding were evidently followed till defeat caused a change which is said to be working well.

This difference in the situation of Turkey is of course an im- portant element of comparison ; but the larger ground of hope is an examination of the campaigns of 1828 and 1829. Diebitsch reached Adrianople by a bold and skilful measure, which could not have succeeded before a general, and which must have destroyed the Russians but for the divisions among the Turks and the panic caused by subtle audacity. The first year of the campaign was not very successful for Russia. Thrall and Varna had indeed fal- len, not without suspicion of bribery ; but Silistria had resisted the invaders, and compelled them to retreat before its walls, while they had been baffled or beaten in some partial combats. The opening of the campaign of 1829 was somewhat more promising for Russia. Besides smaller losses, the Grand Vizier, owing to want of proper precautions and intelligence, had been surprised on a march and defeated; but the battle of Kulewtscha, though discreditable to the leaders, was creditable to the Turkish army. The success of this battle, with its moral effects upon the Turks, prompted Diebitsch to attempt a plan which could only be justified by success. Neglecting flanks and rear, and in a certain sense even his front, he resolved to outmanceuvre the Turks and cross the Balkan, trusting to panic to procure peace and this he ac- complished.

"His plan being formed accordingly, he proceeded, on the approach of the troops hitherto employed in reducing Silistria, to make a more formidable demonstration against Schumla. So closely was this place invested, that the Grand Vizir, in expectation of an immediate assault, recalled a portion of his troops from the mountain passes, to aid in the defence of a position on which, in his opinion, everything depended. The defenders of the Balkan being thus seriously diminished, it only remained to attempt the passage before the Grand Vizir had time to discover and remedy his fatal error. In order to complete the deception, 10,000 men under General Krassowski were to press Schumla closely, whilst the main force, with an effective of about 30,000 men, feigned a retreat towards Silistria."

P. series of skilful manmuvres on the part of the Balkan-crosser and of errors by the Turkish commander enabled the Russians to reach Adrianople and dictate a peace. But the risk was enormous. Behind him was the army of the Vizier ; on his left flank, or rather on his left rear, was the Pasha of Scodra with upwards of 20,000 ir- regular troops ; 20,000 Turks had fallen back from Adrianople to Constantinople, while Diebitsch's army at the former place had not more than 17,000 bayonets. Equally to be dreaded, had there been unity and military capacity in the Turkish councils, were the obstacles opposed to him in the advance upon Constantinople.

"There is but little to obstruct an enemy between the Southern slopes of the Balkan and that formidable position, about twenty miles from the capi- tal, so celebrated in history, where, owing to the nature of the ground, Attila was stayed in his march to conquer the Eastern empire, and where at sister period the Huns were signally defeated by Belisarius.

"This natural barrier is formed by a chain of steep hills, which, running almost continuously from the inlet of Kara Bournu on the Euxine to the Sea of lSlarmora, separates, as it were, Constantinople and the extremity of the peninsula from the rest of European Turkey. The Northern side of these hills is washed almost throughout their whole length by the Kara-su, which in certain places forms a difficult marsh, and ultimately a lake, flow- ing into the sea below Buyuk Chekmedge, or the great drawbridge. In addition to the latter, which is about five hundred paces long, there are three other bridges leading to the capital; one from Midis, passing along the shores of the Black Sea to the mouth of the Bosphorus; a second, crossing the marsh between Tsjalatalatje and Tasjalik ; and the third, at Kastanakoi. By constructing tetes-de-pont at these passages and scarping some of the hills, as well as strengthening other weak points, these defences might be- come a second Torres Yedras, and one of the strongest positions in Europe. "Even in its present state, if defended by an organized force, assisted by an armed population, it would prove a serious if not an insuperable impedi- ment; since an enemy must either endeavour to turn it by landing, at great risk, close to the Bosphorus, or attempt to carry it by an attack in front; which in all probability would be attended with serious loss, independently of that still to be experienced in attacking another position six miles from thence.

"This position consists of a somewhat similar range of hills, running also nearly parallel to those just described, almost from sea to sea. But not being altogether continuous, it is scarcely so defensible towards the Eastern as it is at the Western side, where an enemy would have to cross six different streams in approaching the lake formed by them in front of the hills, both above and below Kuchuk-Chekrnedgii, or the lesser drawbridge. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that as the left of this position as well as that more in advance are particularly strong, their aefenders would be enabled to mass their troops towards the centre and right of the space to be defended. "After magering successively these two very defensible lines, the heights of Ramid Chitilik, just outside Constantinople, would be the last means of endeavouring to cover its dilapidated walls, which have been totally ne- glected since the conquest of the city in 1453.

" The exposure which has been the consequence of this neglect might, however, be easily remedied. By the ordinary repairs of the towers, walls, muntersearp, &e., with the addition of a line of martello towers, or a stronger description of works, constructed at certain intervals parallel to the contour, so as to prevent an enemy from bombarding the place until they are mas- tered, Constantinople could be rendered capable of a more protracted defence. In its present state, however, there is not anything to impede an enemy, beyond desultory resistance from house to house, until a terrible coullagra- tion, which must be the result of the bombardment of wooden structures, should end the struggle in the capital."

It should, however, be observed, that in 1829 the Russians were masters of the Black Sea. Diebitsch, unless overwhelmed, could have communicated with the fleet, and perhaps Constantinople was not secure against a naval attack. The Russians, too, had a fleet in the Archipelago blockading the Dardanelles. These- naval ad-

vantages no longer exist. • As the opinions respecting the strength of Sebastopol and the probability of successfully attacking it by sea are various, let us hear what Colonel Chesney says on the subject. "It is the author's belief that Sebastopol would be safe against the ac- tion of the combined fleets. No doubt, the hitherto unequalled efficiency of a steam-fleet, with its present armament, would effect all that can be accom- plished by skill and bravery; but the result of attacking a well-defended for- tress with a fleet remains as yet a problem for the future. * * *

"It is not, however, to be expected that the defenders of Sebastopol would be equally tardy in opening a fire of shells and hot shot on their assailants, [as at Algiers and Acre,] and testing with these terrific missiles the rela- tive strength of stone against wooden walls.' But we are here treading on difficult ground. Therefore, while expressing a hope that the attack of Se- bastopol, if it should take place, will be with an adequate force by land, rather than by a coup-de-main attack by sea, let us give due weight to the remarkable words of the late Duke of Wellington, when speaking of our suc- cess against Acre. His Grace, after expressing his cordial approbation of the services performed by the navy in the Mediterranean, and of those who were engaged in this glorious expedition, goes on to say—' He had a little experience in services of this nature, and he thought it his duty to warn their Lordships on this occasion, that they must not always expect that ships, however well commanded or gallant their seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully with stone walls. He had no recollection, in all his experience, except the recent instance on the coast of Syria, of any fort being taken by ships, excepting two or three years ago, when the fort of St. Juan d'Ulloa was captured by the French fleet.'" It may be observed, however, that the large guns in some of the steam-ships could probably carry further than the guns of the bat- teries, while it is said that the batteries are so badly ventilated that they would soon become unworkable. It is further asserted, that owing to the universal corruption of the Russians, they are so badly built that they could not sustain their own fire without fall- ing down. But it would not do to assault on the strength of on- dits.

The Asiatic campaigns are narrated with the same fulness and the same geographical knowledge as those in Europe, but perhaps with less of likelike character, because Colonel Chesney had not the same advantage of actual inspection of the combatants albeit when the fight was done. The Asiatic campaigns seem to have been characterized by even less ability and purpose in the commanders, and less of energetic courage in the troops, save on one or two oc- casions behind wails; perhaps for the same reasons that seem to have operated during the present war. The troops are "local militia," with less of professional feeling and more of district 'pre- judices.