Saving Somalia
As almost hourly the threat of a massive Russian-backed ulvasion increases, appeals for help from Somalia are becoming more and more frenzied. What, if anything, Should the West do? What the West must certainly not do is to take at their face value the pledges (whether by the Russians or the Ethiopians) that any counter-attack will top at the frontiers of Somalia. To do so would be criminally naive. When the frontier is a line of sand-dunes, it is foolish to expect marauding tanks to halt as they would Perhaps at a natural obstacle. But there is no Rhine, no Dnieper at the edge of the Ogaden; in any case, war in the desert is not waged in that way. And even if the Russians are sincere, would they be able to control a rampaging and victorious Ethiopian army? Even if the Ethiopian government is sincere, will it be able to control its own troops, or the unpledged Cubans? And there is no reason to believe that either the Russians or the Cubans are sincere.
By the time their insincerity becomes apparent, the West Will be presented with a fait accompli, given the speed with Which Somalia can be overrun. With superiority in the air and in armour a fortnight at the outside suffices — as both the Italians and the British have learnt by experience. This makes nonsense of any suggestion that the United Nations or the OAU, notoriously slow-moving, should be invited to take a hand. So if anything is to be done, it must be done at once, while Somalia is still a country intact. If not, the Probable stages will be: a drive to Berbera, a thrust towards Mogadishu, the overthrow of the present Somali government and the setting up of a puppet regime by those friends of the Soviet Union that fifteen years of alliance With Russia have undoubtedly left in place in Mogadishu.
But in what way should the West act? Not by sending in vast quantities of arms which will have to be accompanied by 'advisers' and their troops to use those arms. There is anyway no question of the United States sending in ground forces. American public opinion would never accept it. As for relying on armed reinforcements from the Saudis or the Sudanese or Sadat, that is mere wishful thinking. The Shah, a Possible deus ex machina, certainly has both the troops and the equipment — and no doubt the desire to try them out. But it is hard to imagine anything more potentially dangerous to world peace than his intervention. Even were it to be efficacious, which is doubtful, it is unthinkable that the Russians, who have their pride, would accept it without in their turn threatening Iran's northern frontier.
The West, however, does have one tangible asset in the area: Djibouti. The French have 5,000 troops stationed there, including the Foreign Legion, backed by naval units. The French should be encouraged to reinforce rather than to evacuate Djibouti — the only possible western base for an efficient intervention.
But there is also no reason why the French should go it alone. They must be backed up. And this is where both Britain and Italy can play a decisive role. France should be given open and concrete support. The three former colonial powers (who cannot be suspected of harbouring neocolonial ambitions in the area since they have voluntarily liberated vast chunks of Somali territory) could and should set up a joint naval task force in the Gulf of Aden. They would then be in a position to announce that they take Ethiopian and Russian declarations at their face value, that they assume Somalia will not be invaded, but that if by any mischance or misjudgment it were to be invaded, then the joint naval task force would intervene to halt the invasion by bombarding the probable invasion route — the ZeilaBerbera coast road — and by providing air cover over Berbera and, if necessary, over Mogadishu.
Rapid action on these lines has obvious advantages: it is a response to Somalia's cries for help, a show of firmness by the West, it involves no risk of superpower conflict, and above all it does not involve ground troops. It is almost bound to succeed in halting an invasion and it would give the West the moral authority to call a peace conference and demand as a quid pro quo the abandonment at least for the foreseeable future of Somalia's disruptive territorial claims in Ethiopia and Kenya. The spectre of Suez should not be brought up as an objection. This would be an entirely different operation, above board, with clear aims and clean hands. All that is needed is a certain initiative and cooperation and the ability to act rapidly.
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