NEWS OF THE WEEK.
THE momentous question of Peace or War occupies the thoughts of almost every Englishman who gives himself any concern about the great interests of his country. The subject is forced upon us by all that we see or hear, at home and abroad. We are absolutely threatened by two wars at the present time,— one with Russia, tor Turkish independence; another with Don MIGUEL, for the pacification of Portugal. The Cabinet is said to be as much divided in opinion with regard to both these questions, as those whose business it is to watch, not to direct, the affairs of Government: and both the Times and the Morninf. Post are supposed to represent the views of' one portion or another of the Ministers. We do not wonder that our rulers are perplexed. The ques- tions are environed with difficulties of the most serious nature. Let us endeavour to point out our actual position as regards them both, having an eye to the real interests of the country, not to the gratification of a ruinous longing Lir undefined and unsubstantial • oe'bjects of ambition. In the first place, no one can regard without some alarm the -encroachments of Russia. Should she succeed in the project of rendering Turkey a province of her empire, there is no doubt but the new kingdom of' Greece would soon be swallowed up, and that from the Polar Sea to the Levant the power of the Czars would be paramount and unresisted. If Russian principles were favourable to the improvement and social welfare of mankind,—if civilization and good government followed in the wake of Russian conquests,—then there would not be so much cause to dread their extension. But the despotism of Russia is of a peculiarly brutal and degrading species. The rule of Austria in Italy, and that of Prussia on the banks of the Rhine, are mild and paternal, though despotic, if compared with the savage tyranny of Russia in Po- land, before the breaking out of the last revolt. In the case of Poland, we see an exemplification of the Russian policy towards subjugated provinces. The wretched inhabitants are first stimu- lated into revolt by intolerable tyranny, and then their revolt is made the pretext for destroying every remnant of social comfort and public liberty among them. And it is important to bear in mind, that this is not the policy of the tyrant on the throne, but that of the nobility who control him; so that there is no hope of its change from his death. By the acquisition of Turkey, Greece, and the Islands (for, with the exception of the Ionian Islands, held by the British, they would all soon be reduced under her-power), Russia would gain what she greatly needs—naval ports, and a naval population. It cannot be doubted that a vast addition to her aggressive force would be the consequence of this. She would their make great progress up the Mediterranean, and we should soon hear of de- scents both upon the European and the African coasts. Thus we should hold not merely our trade in the Levant very much at her mercy, but our African and Italian commerce would be seriously threatened. Exclusive privileges would be demanded for the subjects of the Czar; and we should hear of nothing but attempts to form treaties injurious to the trading interests of England. All these projects would be resisted then (as, under somewhat similar circumstances, we would, if we could, protect the merchants of Frankfort against the power of' Prussia) : the question is, whe- ther, by an energetic opposition now, the business cannot be more effectually done, and at a cheaper rate. We have here stated the only grounds (except in the very im- probable event of being called upon to take arms in self-defence) on which a war with Russia could be justified, or rather on which men could pretend to justify it. - The first is, the danger to free institutions wherever they exist, and to the improvement and happiness of mankind depending upon the existence of free insti- tutions, which arises from the aggraudisement of a power whose main principle is to brutalize and degrade the people over whom its sway extends. The second is, the danger to which our com- merce is exposed by the transfer of an extensive territory from a weak and dependent ally, to a grasping, powerful, and unprin- cipled competitor. There can be no question, that in former times either of the grounds we have specified would have been held to furnish ample justification for war. Under similar circumstances, Lord CHAT- HAM, probably, would not have debated a day as to the propriety of bombarding St. Petersburg, or sinking the Russian fleet in the Euxine. But we live in a different age, when men calculate more closely the gain or loss likely to result from warfare : and in reply to the first argument urged in favour of an armed resistance to Russian encroachment, it may reasonably be said, that the danger is remote—that it does not affect us peculiarly—that as far as British freedom is concerned, we may safely bid defiance to the whole world. Why then need we trouble ourselves ? What obli- gation rests upon us to avert the evils which the loss of national independence may bring upon unborn generations of foreigners? This would be fighting for very unsubstantial objects. It would be a war of opinion ; and who is so bold in his ignorance as to pre- dict the amount of its cost, the period of its termination, or its con- sequences? It would be impossible even to define the exact pur- pose of the belligerents on the side of freedom—or the use to be made of victory, supposing that victory were the result of the fear- ful contest. But it is said that our commerce is endangered; and the pre- servation of trade is a definite object, and a sufficient ground for war. Here we must be careful not to assume too much. Is the diminution or destruction of our Mediterranean trade certain to. be the result of the establishment of Russian dominion in Turkey ' and the Levant, or even higher up, on the African and European coasts? We find that our exports to the Russian dominions are about three millions annually (official value) ; twice as much as the trade to Greece and Turkey. Russian despotism has not hitherto been a bar to commercial intercourse: what reason is there to sup- pose that it will be so in future? Why should we be cut off' from the trade of Constantinople, any more than from that of Peters- burg and Odessa? It is plain that the danger to our trade, arising from Russian preponderance in the Levant, is uncertain and re- mote : but granting that it were near and inevitable, how are we to better ourselves by going to war? Can we deal a deeisive blow in any quarter which would not do more injury than benefit to our commerce? It is difficult to answer this question in the affirma- tive for every injury that we inflict upon Russia, is an injury to a good customer of England. In the foregoing remarks, we have shown the extreme uncer- tainty of England deriving any benefit, political or commercial, from a war with Russia. The evil, however, that such a contest would entail upon us is obvious. Unhappily, we are too familiar in this country with the ruinous consequences of war, to render any description of them necessary. The nation after twenty years of peace is still staggering under them. What. would be the result of the increased taxation which a war would render neces- sary, it is hazardous to predict : but that a national bankruptcy together with a revolution—not such a one as Conservatives are now bewailing, but a real revolution by physical violence—might ensue, every one acquainted with the spirit which pervades large classes of men in the country must admit. We have looked at this subject as if there were only two parties to the quarrel, England and Russia. But it will be said that we
have an ally in France. On the other hand, Russia has allies in Austria and Prussia. Supposing, however, that these latter powers should deem it prudent to stand aloof, can we depend upon the French alliance? Indeed we cannot. • The policy of Loins
PHILIP is essentially selfish, bent on the building up of his own house in quietness; and the shuffling subserviency, the creeping baseness of his Ministers, has just been exposing them to the con- tempt of Europe. Moreover, if we went to war for the protection of British commerce, it would be somewhat unreasonable to ex- pect the assistance of France in such an undertaking. If we fight Russia, we shall have to fight her singlehanded. Let us state one distinction. The clo-ing of the Dardanelles, at the command of Russia, would be a direct act of aggression on those nations whose vessels were always alloWed free passage into the Euxine, when the Porte had a will of its ow:). Tho for cible removal of such an obstruction would be a measure isey-- defence,—a distinct act with a definite object, and notlo, lie t<8n founded with the undertaking of a war for the purpose :of stop- ping the progress of despotic principles, or even for ntrilling so - %ague as that which is termed "the protection of grlj 1PORI• 7-tierce." And here we may explain a passage of two lines in the Specta- tor of this day fortnight, in which our Meaning was imperfectly conveyed, and therefore, as We perceive from the remarks of some of our ablest contemporaries, has been imperfectly understood. We intended to convey the impression, that, according to the policy which generally governs nations in matters of peace and war, it was extremely probable—much too likely—that war would ensue; and that, in this view of the matter, it was wise in our Govern- ment and that of France to be prepared. We did not mean to decide at once that war would be necessary, or even justifiable, in
the supposed case of Russian aggrandizement. •
Leaking fairly, then, at both sides of this question of peace or war with Russia, we are certainly not surprised that Ministers are puzzled how to act ; and are by no means disposed to sneer at them fin. their want of decision. We wish we could add that we place much reliance upon their firmness or capacity to do that which is best under all the circumstances.
But, not content with the Russian affair, Ministers it is said, or a portion of them, contemplate sending an army into Portugal, for the expulsion of Don MIGUEL. We are bouhd by treaties to defend Portugal against French or Spanish invaders ; but as no invasion hostile to the Government of our ally, the Queen, has taken place, or is even threatened by the Governments of Spain or France, we are not bound by these treaties to interfere on the present occasion. The inroad of the Spanish General Rom., or any similar attempt, in search of Don CARLOS, was detrimental to the Rebels, not to the Queen, whose Ministers never would call upon the British to drive out such invaders. The argument, therefore, in favour of our interference, drawn from the treaties subsisting between England and Portugal, is of no value.
The great amount of British property in Portugal, and the se- rious injury which our trade to that country receives from the continuahce of the rebellion of the Miguelites, is a powerful in- ducement certainly to our Government to send effectual succours to the Queen, in accordance, as is supposed, with repeated solicita- tions to that effect. Here too we have a definite object—the expul- sion of MIGUEL, and the establishment of the authority of a friendly power, by which our commerce would profit.
But upon this principle there would be no end to interference in the concerns of foreign countries. And in the present state of our finances, it is unreasonable to call upon the nation to protect the property of the merchants trading to Portugal, at so great an expense. There is nothing to be dreaded from the increasing power of Portugal ; and it would be impossible to show, that in interfering in the Portuguese quarrel, we acted upon the principle of national self-defence,—perhaps the only justifiable ground of war; unless, indeed, the rescue of a victim from oppression—of a people from insufferable tyranny—be considered a moral justifica- tion for taking arms. An opportunity for such a display of na- tional magnanimity occurred, but was not improved, in the case of Poland. We then confined our interference to protocols and pro- tests. If the Government refused to assist the Poles by a fleet in the Baltic, upon what ground can they defend the despatch of an army to Portugal? In the former case, we should have been de- fending a power at one time actually independent, and having the strongest claim by treaty on our protection; in the latter, we should be interfering in a private quarrel between two royal repro- bates, for neither of whom the Portuguese people themselves have expressed any decided preference. Such a proceeding, we are persuaded, could not receive the sanction of the People's Repre- sentatives, merely on the ground that the restoration of tranquil- lity in Portugal by the complete triumph of the Pedroites would be serviceable to British commerce.
