TOPICS OF THE DAY

THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO 1N DIA

IN the course of the discussions preceding the Act creating the Dyarchy we advanced the opinion that the whole subject of the Indian Constitution had been approached from a wrong angle and under wrong c.on- ditions. The Indian Government should have called together a body of native statesmen, and administrators and jurists representing every race and every religion in India, including representatives from the chief reigning families of the Feudatory States, and should have asked their advice. That suggestion was, of course, not accepted and the system of the Dyarchy was imposed from the top. When in the spring of last year (March, 1924) the subject of the Indian Constitution was again raised, owing to a demand for immediate revision, we returned to the subject and set forth in specific terms what we thought the Viceroy in Council should say in reply to the demand. As that is still our view, we cannot do better than summarize our previous statement. What we proposed that the Viceroy should say was in effect what Lord Birkenhead said in his offer the other day. Let representative men, drawn from all classes and all races in India, tell us exactly what they want. Let them make a draft Constitution and submit it to the Government of India, just as an American State Constituent Convention submits a draft Constitution to the State's Representative Assembly, Senate and Governor. It will then be the duty of the Government of India to advise the Home Govern- ment on the proposal. The necessity for such a course is easily explained. A race or people, quite independent, and with democratic institutions, have only themselves to consider. India, with her network of responsibilities, caused by her past history, by the existence of the native principalities, by the unhomogeneous nature of her population, and by the presence of the British, does not allow of so simple a solution.

The consent of the Government of India, and in the last resort, of the British people, must be given to any new Constitution, and that consent cannot be given unless there is a proper acknowledgment of our rights and duties. And here we may note that to say this is not to make any proprietary claims on India. It is rather a statement of the fact that we cannot, and will not, remain in India as deputies, or " hirelings " if you will, of any one race, religion, or caste. We could, of course, theoreti- cally leave India altogether to stew in her own juice- i.e.1 withdraw our Army and our white administrators. But this, except for a certain minute number of fanatics, is not what the leaders of the opposition to our present system really want. It is admitted on all hands that the British troops and British military organization in India, and the British Naval Force upon the Indian coast, must remain. They must stay in order (1) to protect India from foreign invasion, either across the mountains or over the seas, and (2) to prevent internal disorder, and the possibility of a religious war between the Moham- medans and the adherents of the various forms of the Brahminical faith.

Even those who most hate the English rule, and who look forward to some day seeing us withdraw entirely, shrink from anything approaching immediate evacuation. hut if we are to stay on in India, as it is obvious we must, it must be on terms which recognize our rights and responsibilities, and secure our position as the Guardians and Trustees of law, order and justice. In other words, when we ask the Indian statesmen to tell us what is the kind of Constitution that they desire and think would be best fitted to India, we have to do so with the reminder that their Constitution must recognize and be able to fit in with the trusteeship just named. This means that when we ask, as Lord Birkenhead has asked, for suggestions for the Constitution, we ought, without binding ourselves or the drafters of the Constitution to anything in the way of detail, to lay down certain general principles which must be recognized in order to render any draft offered to us acceptable. It would be hindering, not helping, the work to talk as though we should accept anything and everything that was proposed, when in reality we knew that there are certain things which could not be endorsed here. In other words, we must ask the drafters of the Constitution so to draft the Constitution as to give a reasonable chance of its being agreed to by the nations of the Imperial British Commonwealth. We laid down in 1924 what, in our view, were those principles, and will now reprint them :— "(1) The object of the draft should be to create a Federal Constitution for all India, in which the constituent units should be (a) newly -created States with from two to ten or fifteen millions of inhabitants equipped with full powers of local self-determination after the manner of the States of the America= Union, of the Provinces of the Canadian Dominion, or of the States of the Austra- lian Commonwealth ; (b) the existing Feudatory States, provided they were not too small. In that case schemes for enlargement or fusion should be made.

(2) The former Provincial governments would automatically cease to exist.

(3) The new States should, wherever appropriate, receive Consti- tutions on a democratic basis. In some cases a native ruler might be restored, as was lately done in Benares. Where that was not appropriate, a Regent should be named by the Central Government, either with a local assembly under him or with powers analogous to those of native rulers. The State Assembly, subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, should in its sphere be the supreme authority.

(4) Whatever powers and rights were not delegated to the States should belong to the Supreme Government and the Indian Supreme Court.

(5) The Central Government should consist of a Viceroy and Governor-General, named by the British Government, and have the same relation to the Secretary of State for India as at present.

(6) The Supreme Government would have sole authority over :— (a) The Army and all military and naval forces formed in India, it being illegal for any native State in the future to possess military forces.

(b) The railways, telegraphs, territorial waters, navigation of the principal rivers, the Post Office, Excise and Public Works should be in the hands of and regulated by the Central Government.

(7) The interest on the existing Indian Debt should be guaranteed by the Supreme Government of India.

(8) Certain taxes, i.e., Salt tax, specific Customs Duties, &c., should be placed in the hands of the Government of India in order to make provision for the Army, Central Establishments, &c., &c.

(9) There should be a Senate of the Indian Empire for the co- relation of Administration in the various States, and for consultation and advice, but without executive or legislative authority. The Senate should consist of a representative from every State within the Indian Empire.

(10) All disputes as to whether action by the States was or was not ultra vim% all boundary and other internal disagreements between the States, and differences between a State and the Central Government, should be adjudicated on by the Supreme Court.

(11) The Supreme Court, besides its federal jurisdiction, should be given the right to hear appeals in cases of capital punishment, all cases involving charges of treason, or sedition, and all religious disputes.

(12) The Government of India should have no right to interfere with the Administration of any State except by judicial process, i.e., in order to enforce an order of the Supreme Court declaring

that there had been an infringement of the rights secured under the Constitution.

(13) No State should have any power to interfere with religious Opinion, or to persecute any person for the holding of such opinion, Pr prevent the practice of his religion.

(14) All foreign relations should be in the hands of the Central Government."

The Constituent Convention to which should be en- trusted the work of drafting the Constitution on these lines should consist solely of 'natives of India, one-third to be named by the Assembly, one-third by the Govern- ment of India, in order that every race, class and religion should have representation, and one-third by the Feu- datory-Princes and Chiefs. There should be no discrimina- tion in the matter of membership on grounds of caste, or religion, or even of allegations of previous treason. The Constituent Assembly must be absolutely compre- hensive. A body of British administrators, jurists, judges, and men of business should be named as assessors in order to give their advice and supply information if and when required. Their functions would, of course, be purely consultative. They would not vote.

We shall perhaps be told that we have gone too far in what we have said, and that our suggestions are too specific. That is possible ; but we are convinced that Lord Birkenhead's offer was not specific enough. We would not bind the Constituent Assembly too rigidly. Indeed, we would leave them absolutely free in the matter of discussion ; but it is only right that we should warn them that if they want to make a scheme to which we shall be able to assent it must not violate certain general principles. At the same time, information is always illumination. We desire to know exactly what the leaders of the opposition to our rule demand even if we cannot accept it. The essential need is light.

J. Sr. LOE STRACHEY.