NATO
The Hand of Power
From DON COOK
PARIS
IN the writings of Henri Bergson, the philo- sophersopher who is one of the influences in General de Gaulle's life, there is a passage in which the exercise of power is compared to a hand sweeping across a table-top covered with iron filings. The filings and their arrangement represent, in the Bergson image, the static positions, attitudes and policies of governments or society. The hand of power descends, sweeps through the filings, and completely disrupts their arrangement. But the mind and the intellect. Bergson contends, never even see the movement of the hand. Intellect is simply left to contemplate and deal with the new pattern of the filings which is left on the table-top.
General de Gaulle, acting with the same sweep of the hand of power which he used to block British entry into the Common Market three years ago, has now disrupted and rearranged the iron filings of the NATO alliance.
The General could have proposed an overhaul of the NATO command structure, a reduction in American bases and supply installations in France, new arrangements. with his allies to tighten France's 'sovereign control' over non- French troops and headquarters in France. But he has proposed none of these things. Instead he is abrogating all NATO military arrangements in France, while announcing at the same time that he will not abrogate the NATO treaty. He will accomplish this all very simply in the end by denouncing at an appropriate moment France's adherence to the NATO 'Status of Forces' agree- ment, which extends certain fundamental rights and privileges to NATO soldiers in uniform stationed in any of the countries of the alliance. When this is done, then the rug is pulled out from under all the officers at SHAPE, all the PXs and air bases and military schools and supply depart- ments in France.
De Gaulle wants NATO out of France while France remains in the Atlantic alliance. The allies have nothing left to do except to adjust to the new arrangement of the iron filings on the table-top. His purpose and aims with regard to NATO have been known for a long, long time. All the same, most governments and diplomats believed that this was going to be a matter of negotiation and discussion when the crunch came, and not one of abrogation. Why has he moved with such ruthlessness against the interests of his allies and why has he chosen this particular time?
The answer to the first question is fairly simple. He and his advisers, notably his Foreign Minister. Maurice Couve de Murville, came to the conclu- sion that negotiation with the allies was impos- sible because nobody was prepared to make concessions or come to arrangements which would remotely accord with General de Gaulle's aims and demands. Faced with this fact, and unwilling to adjust to his allies, de Gaulle simply decided to exercise France's sovereign rights and have all 'foreign military' moved from the country.
French officials, NATO diplomats and Gaullist theoreticians cite four elements in the timing of his action. Apparently, there was a sudden change on the part of de Gaulle after his February 21 press conference, in which he spoke in general terms about 're-establishing a normal situation of sovereignty' by April of 1969, when the NATO treaty reaches the end of its first twenty-year span, to bring by that time 'any foreign element that would be in France . . . under French command alone.' Then, two weeks later, de Gaulle decided to act now instead of letting things take their,course.
The first point which is being made in Paris is that the General's scheduled visit to Moscow in mid-June put him in a box on his NATO policy. If he waited until after his return from Moscow to tell his allies to pack up and go. it would certainly look like some kind of a deal with Russia against NATO. Therefore he realised that he had to act in advance of his meeting with the Soviet leaders.
A second point, which French officials stress, is de Gaulle's growing obsession with 'indepen- dence' of the United States. The key words at his press conference were: 'The prospects of a world war breaking out on account of Europe are dissipating, while conflicts in which America engages in other parts of the world—the day before yesterday in Korea, yesterday in Cuba, today in Vietnam—risk being extended to general conflagration. In that case Europe, whose strategy is, within NATO, that of America, would auto-
matically be involved even when it would not have so desired.'
After the press conference came the British Defence White Paper, which flatly declared Britain's policy to be just the opposite—a clear alignment with the United States, not only in weapons systems, but also in the peace-keeping tasks east of Suez. Gaullists contend that this played into the General's hands the same way as the Polaris deal at Nassau became art excuse for vetoing Blitish entry into the Common Market. In neither case was British policy basic to de Gaulle's action, but in both cases they heightened the circumstances and the moment of his timing.
So the hand of power has swept through the filings, and for the rest of the alliance the ques- tion now is how to re-magnetise what remains. For the other fourteen members of NATO, there is one simple, central initial decision from which all else will then flow : where to put Supreme Allied Headquarters?
Britain ought not to be either bashful, uncer- tain or too preoccupied with the election to come forth loud and clear, immediately, with an offer of a suitable site near I.ondon and all the infra- structure backing which a British government can give. The argument against a headquarters in Britain is the old one about distance from the Continent. But it is precisely tc meet that argu- ment that Britain should do all she can to hive SHAPE move to London. Britain is part of Europe and her defence is tied to Europe. What better way to prove it?
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