THE ARMENIAN REFORMS.
IT is difficult to speak at all positively upon the value of the scheme of reform which has been submitted to the Sultan by the Ambassadors of the three Powers, so long as we are ignorant of its exact nature. In matters of this kind, distinctions which at first sight may seem little more than verbal may turn out to have very serious consequences. It is quite on the cards, therefore, that the criticisms we propose to offer on the telegrams which profess to state the general drift of the scheme, may in the end prove wide of the mark. It will naturally be asked why, with this possibility in front of us, we should offer any criticisms at all. The proposed reforms will, by and by, be printed as a Parliamentary paper—white or blue, as the case may be—and we have only to wait for their appearance in this shape to give our remarks the accuracy which, as it is, they necessarily want. Our justification for what may seem undue haste is to be found in the fact that by the time this certainty, in itself so desirable, has been attained, criticism will be of no use. The reforms will probably not be made public until they have been accepted by the Sultan, and have acquired the force, if not taken the form, of a definite Treaty. Then criticism will be purely academical. The demands of the Powers will have been made and granted, and journalists, like the public in general, will have nothing to do except to see how far the acceptance of them meets the case. Those who, like ourselves, have formed a clear conception of what is necessary, if the Armenians are to be delivered from their present wretched condition, will naturally be unwilling to exercise a patience which may defeat its own object. They will prefer to speak while the negotiations are only beginning, in the hope that what they say may have an influence, however small, upon the policy of their own Government. The delays incident to all negotiations with the Porte may in this respect be beneficial. So many counter-proposals are likely to be made that the Powers will have time to modify in various ways the demands originally put forward. Concessions in one direction may be balanced by greater urgency in another.
The first remark suggested by the proposed reforms, as they appear in the telegrams of the last three days, is that they are very much too detailed. They seem, at all events, to amount to a series of instructions to the Sultan how he is to govern his Christian subjects. Stress, we are told, is laid on the appointment of fit and com- petent Governors, upon whose appointment the Powers shall have a right of veto. Then, in order that these fit and competent Governors shall have the assistance of an equally fit and competent staff, one-third of the officials in the Armenian provinces shall be Christians, and the gendarmerie, who will carry out their orders, shall be recruited both from Mahommedans and Christians. Assize Courts are to be established, and prisons are to be inspected, though no particulars are yet given as to the composition either of the Courts or of the inspecting authority. The collection of the taxes is to be intrusted not to the gendarmes, but to tax- gathers appointed by the Communal Councils. This regu- lation might, it is obvious, lead to much irregularity in the receipts ; but this is guarded against by a provision that the inhabitants of the commune shall be liable for the total amount. It is difficult to foresee the precise extent of this liability, or the nature of the machinery by which it would be enforced, though any scheme which abolishes the farming of the taxes must be an improve- ment on the present system. The heads of the communes will have the right to retain out of the taxes a sum sufficient for the needs of the local administration. In itself, of course, this is a most excellent and reasonable arrangement. But it is also one which is likely to lead to a good deal of friction between the communes and the central authority ; and we cannot but doubt whether the position of a head of a commune who proposed to keep back more than the Government thought necessary would be altogether enjoyable. When so much new machinery is being created in the provinces, it is only natural that some addition should be made to the machinery at headquarters. Accordingly, a Commission composed of Christians as well as Mahommedans is to sit at Constanti- nople and watch over the administration of the Armenian vilayets. All these reforms will, of course, take time to carry out, and so long as it lasts, the process is to be under the supervision of a High Commissioner, of whom nothing is as yet to be learnt beyond the fact that he is not to be a European, and that his appointment is to be subject to the approval of the three Powers. Finally, the Kurds are to be disarmed when their arms are not in use, and are thus to be reduced, at intervals, to the level of the Armenians.
The more we look at these proposals, supposing them to be accurately described in the telegrams, and supposing also that they contain nothing of importance which is not there described, the more unsatisfactory they seem to us to be. The one wheel in the whole machine upon which the three Powers can make their influence effectively felt, is the High Commissioner ; but though the appointment of this great personage is to be subject to the approval of the three Powers, we hear nothing as to his removal. He is to remain in office until the reforms are accomplished. But how if his supervision prove languid or partial ? The Sultan is not likely to dismiss him for these faults, and apparently the Powers will have no right to do so. They can, of course, remonstrate with the Porte on the inertness of the High Commissioner, just as, if there were no High Commissioner, they might remonstrate with the Porte on the inertness of the Governors or of the officials or of the gendarmerie. But the Porte by this time is pretty well used to remonstrances, and Europe generally is pretty well used to nothing coming of remonstrances. If this weapon is all we have to look to for the execution of these reforms, how are we better off than we have been under the Treaty of Berlin ? All the rights conferred by that instrument were not enough to prevent the recent massacres. Why should the rights conferred by this new instrument, if the method of enforcing them is identical, be enough to prevent—we will not say similar massacres, for these probably the Porte will for some time to come be careful to prevent in its own interest—but that constant steady oppression which, if it does not kill, makes life all but unendurable ? It may be said, perhaps, that the con- sent of the Powers to the appointment of the High Com- missioner will be sufficient security against any such failure on his part. But it will be very much safer not to say this until we know who the High Commissioner is. It is true, of course, that if Lord Dufferin or Lord Cromer were going to Constantinople in this capacity, we should be quite at ease upon this point ; and no doubt there are Frenchmen and Russians whose names, to those who know them, would convey an equal sense of confidence. But Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Russians have at least this in common, that they are Europeans, and on this ground, therefore, they are alike ineligible. We do not deny that there may be an Asiatic—which we suppose is what is meant by not a European—who would be willing and able to ensure the proper fulfilment of the Sultan's engagements. But we cannot feel certain that the Powers would know enough of the Asiatic candidates for the post to veto all but the right men ; and supposing a man to be appointed, of whom the best that can be said is that nothing is known against him, the fact that he cannot be dismissed by the Powers takes away the only real guarantee for the proper exercise of his functions. An official must have an exceptionally high sense of duty, if his reading of it is not affected by what he knows to be desired and expected of him by his own Government.
The same objections apply with much greater force to the provision that the Powers shall have a veto on the nomination of the Provincial Governors. Of the High Commissioner it is probable that the Ambassadors will have some knowledge, or that, if they have not, they will be able to get information about him. But the further down we go in the official scale the more difficult it becomes to get this information. A veto on the appointment of one man, whose place is at Constantinople, has some value, though, as we think, an inadequate value. A veto on the appointment of many men, whose places will be in the various provinces of the Turkish Empire, will have no value whatever. If Russia and France wished to influence the administration of the law in England there might be some sense in giving them a veto on the appoint- ment of the Lord Chancellor. But what sense would there be in giving them a veto on the appointment of County Court Judges ? We would far rather have the details of the scheme left to the discretion of the High Commissioner, provided that he were made a permanent officer, and were removable by the Powers as well as appointed by their consent. This in some shape we believe to be the one essential condition of any lasting reform in Armenia. Any arrangement which stops short of this will not give the Christians of Turkey the indispensable mini- mum of protection, no matter what it may give them in other ways. As to the occasional disarming of the Kurds, we will only remark that it would be very much more effectual to give the Armenians the right of carrying arms.
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