WHY GERMANY LOST
By STRATEGIGUS
This may seem. very .mtch like a commonplace ; and so, indeed, it is. But there is something in the Germans' character that prevents them from seeing, or at all events steering by it. If we attempt to trace the fault to its root we are driven to suggest that there is something dentesure, ill-balanced, exaggerated, in the German make- up. But many people suffer from an exaggerated self-confidence with much less justification than the Germans. When all the tumult and the shouting have died the student will be driven to admit that the German army is the most remarkable force in the world. The people take to warfare naturally, almost with relief. They have a natural aptitude for it, in a way that no other nation can equally claim. I have little doubt that when the losses of the Russians are made known—if ever they are—we shall find that they are immensely greater than the Germans'. And when we survey the amount of force which has had to be mobilised to defeat the Germans we shall be astonished. To the very end they maintained their discipline. I never felt much belief in the suggested prolonged resistance in pockets ; and in the event the soldiers surrendered with the same discipline that made them hold out so long. Most soldiers know what it is to fight without air cover ; but the Germans came in the end to find their Luftwaffe "shot out" and their armour in little better case. But they fought on, and many British units, who can face any troops in the world, were compelled to fight as never before in these last months.
We can recognise all this without becoming mesmerised by it. But
the theory of a Herrenvolk may derive from .it, and at least it is
certain that the Germans lost their heads aver it. The ultimate basis of the Allies' success is a triumphant sea-power ; but the remarkable
thing is that the Germans never fully weighed its meaning. Land powers rarely do ; but Germans like Rundstedt and Leeb were profound students of warfare, and it is astonishing to find them seeing only one side of sea-power. These two generals emphasised in their lectures the blockade aspect of sea-power, and came to propound a means of escape from it. But they never gave sufficient weight to the fact that amphibious operations depend upon sea-power. The only explanation I can find is the complete conviction that their land forces could deal with any amphibious attack. They were fatally over-confident. It is difficult to regard the Germans as philosophers when one considers how superficial was the investigation into the problem facing them. All their emphasis was on land-power. Even the Luftwaffe was considered mainly as an adjunct to the Army.
When the time for-disclosures comes it will be seen how much more wisely we allocated our own resources. So well was our original disposition made that when the United States came in it was neces- sary merely to fill out the cadres. How correctly we read the Germans ; how incorrectly they read us. They appear from the very beginning never to have shown any signs of profound con- secutive thought. When the opportunity came to invade this country there were no preparations for that great but necessary adventure. They had made their plans, like every aggressor, at their leisure. Hitler even admitted, later on, that the war came at the best moment for them ; and this means that he launched it at what he considered the optimum moment. But he seems to have lost his head entirely when the development towards which he had shaped his course actually came about. France was out ; but he felt he must turn on Paris. But Paris would keep ; and he should have foreseen that Britain's defencelessness would pass. There was no sufficient con- sideration of his objective in terms of real things. When it is idly said that France was " ripe " to fall and Hitler knew it, that is the worst condemnation he can suffer ; the ripe fruit falls of itself. Hitler had shown in Mein Kampf that he knew what the fibre of Britain is ; and yet, when the chance came to strike her down there was no preparation, because he had not thought his problem through.
Sea-power ultimately broke him because it enabled Britain and the United States to invade his " fortress." There was the same lack of vision about his approach to air-power. The captured Gen- erals have all emphasised the effect of the Allies' strategic bombing ; and there can be no doubt now about the part it played. How right, again, we were in placing so much of our strength in the R.A.F.; how right to allow Air-Chief-Marshal Harris to have his head. It was we who demonstrated the deeper imaginative insight into the possibilities of air-power ; Smuts' memorandum bears witness to that. It was we, too, who saw the inspired integration of ground, sea and air power take shape and blossom into a mighty instrument of destruction. But, while this complex of force could not be applied, the Air Force went ahead with its destructive attacks on German factories and communications, so that production was cut down, both directly and indirectly, by being rendered unavailable.
It was the antecedent blunders that led to gross errors in the war. When, too late, the Germans opened the Battle of Britain, as a preliminary to invasion, the initial error began to have fatal results. The gambler who loses seeks to recoup himself by doubling his stake. Hitler attacked Russia, and later challenged the United States. The Russian adventure was the fruit of the obsession with the " siege " side of sea-power. But it was so gross a miscalculation that it led eventually to his undoing. The challenge to America was an attempt to divert supplies from Britain. When Japan attacked, it is true, there was a diversion of shipping to the Pacific ; and if this had been avoided, or moderated, the war might have ended sooner. But the general effect was fatal for Germany. With the United States in the war, it became certain that, sooner or later, Germany would be invaded in force. But errors breed errors. These blunders of 1941 were bred by the short-sightedness with which Germany had entered the war.
It is gratifying to remember that we laid down so much of the successful ground-plan of victory when we were quite alone in face of a brutal, mighty power. It is even pleasanter to remember the fine victories achieved when we were so gravely outnumbered by the Italians in Africa. But what a blunder on the part of the Ger- mans to have left intervention in North Africa until we were well on the way to the elimination of the Italian Empire! Best of all is it to recollect that, on the very edge of strategic defeat, we dis- covered two commanders whose names will compare with any in the world. Alexander and Montgomery are very different in char- acter ;. but each of them has taken his million prisoners and fought the best German units to destruction. We have many feats of which to be proud ; but this was no single army's victory, and it is to the credit of General Eisenhower that he achieved something that had never been done before: he made out of heterogeneous units from many parts of the world a homogeneous force that broke Ger- many's professional army. It is certain that the victory belongs to the United Nations, though Russia, the United States and Britain played so much the greater part. Germany lost because she deserved to lose ; and the cost of that demonstration has been so immense that one trusts there will be no further attempts to conquer the world.
[With the end of the Ettropean War the notable series of articles which Strategicus has contributed to these columns weekly without a break since September, 1939, necessarily ends also, but Strategicus will continue to write from time to time on the Far Eastern war as occasion requires.]
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