18 SEPTEMBER 1841, Page 14

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

SOME OF TILE DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF CORN-LAW REPEAL.

THE natural inference of any person who has been satisfied that a restrictive corn-law is an evil in itself, that it is incapable of pro- ducing any good to counterbalance its inherent mischievousness, and that there is nothing in the allegation we so often hear re- peated that peculiar circumstances in British society render a re- strictive corn-law eligible, is that the sooner we get rid of our Corn-laws the better. A proposal of this kind, however, is inva- riably met, even by many who profess to be convinced of the evils of the law, by representations of the hardship that the process of repealing it will occasion to particular classes.

Assertions of this kind are not to be lightly passed over. We are not entitled to occasion unnecessary pain to any individual in our endeavours to effect general good. The task of the publicist is to create the greatest possible amount of enjoyment at the least possi- ble expense of suffering. Even though the power of immediately repealing the Corn-laws were in our hands, before giving it effect it would be our duty to pause to inquire who are likely to be suf- ferers by the change ; to what extent they are likely to be inju- riously affected ; to reassure their minds, disturbed by their exagge- rated estimate of the danger to which they are exposed ; and to take such precautions as may reduce the unavoidable suffering (for no change in human institutions can be effected without occasion- ing some suffering or inconvenience, more or less) to its minimum. Under any circumstances, this would be the duty of those who seek the repeal of the Corn-laws : in their actual position it is their interest, seeing that the power of conceding or withholding that repeal is possessed by the very class which is or believes itself likely to he injured by a repeal of the Corn-laws. It is asserted, then, even by some who admit that the agricul- tural as well as every other interest would be benefited eventually by the repeal of the Corn-laws, that some time must elapse before the good effects of the change can be felt ; that the immediate effect of the repeal of the Corn-laws, by increasing the amount of grain in the country, would be to alter its relative value to other commodities ; and that on this account, farmers who have long leases, or landlords who have mortgages on their estates, might be ruined before any general improvement could take place in the con- dition of the classes to which they belong. Let us, as a prelimi- nary step to the inquiry how much truth there is in this assertion, endeavour to form an accurate conception of the effect which a repeal of the Corn-laws is likely to produce on the condition of persons so circumstanced. ;a the surplus crop (or its value in money or other commodities) after rent and the expenb..:.c..elti. 'ration are deducted. The landlord's annual income is the portion of the crop (or its value in money or other commodities) which the farmer agrees to pay him yearly for the use of the soil. The admission of foreign corn into the market by a repeal of the Corn- laws would not affect the fertility of the soil: the same labour would produce the same crops as before. But there being a greater quantity of corn in the market to exchange for the quantity of other goods in the market, the quantity of the goods received in exchange for any given quantity of corn would be less. If before the repeal of the Corn-laws there were in the market for every bushel of corn one coat, one hat, one pair of shoes, &c.—and if after their repeal the quantity of corn in the market were to be increased one-half—there would be at the later period one coat, one hat, one pair of shoes, &c. in the market for every bushel and a half of corn : three bushels of corn would exchange for no more than two bushels of corn exchanged for before. It is clear from this, that, leaving all other effects of a repeal of the Corn-laws out of view, the exchangeable value of the landlord's and farmer's share of the crop will be at first diminished in value exactly in proportion to the greater amount of corn brought to market. So far the case of the landlord or farmer would be exactly the case of the producers of any commodity which in consequence of some new invention is brought to market in greater quantities by the same amount of labour. No improvement can be made in machinery—no new or richer vein of coal or ore can be opened up—no improved line of road can be made, without affecting some individual or individuals in the same way that landlord and farmer are likely to be individuals, by a repeal of the Corn-

laws. We have never heard any proposal made to compen- sate the hand-loom weavers for what they have lost by the introduction of power-looms ; or even the farmers round London for what they have lost by better turnpike-roads and railroads and steam-boats enabling the farmers and graziers a the remotest districts in the country to compete with them in the markets of the Metropolis. It is only those landlords and farmers whose cases have something peculiar in them for whom any claim can be ad- vanced; the rest, it is admitted, must even take the chances of trade, make the most of their diminished income, or try to in- crease it by other means.

The peculiar cases of hardship emphatically dwelt upon, are those of farmers who are tied to their farms by long leases with money-rents, and landlords who have mortgages on their estates. In both cases, the hardship to the suffering parties is occasioned by their annual liabilities being expressed in a commodity which has not had its value diminished by the process that diminishes the value of their annual income. The fanner who is not tied down by a lease, if he find the quantity of the annual net produce of the farm left him by his landlord under the old bargain inadequate M support him, may give up his farm or obtain a reduction of rent The farmer who has a lease may be forced to pay what he bargained for, and keep labouring on, although the exchangeable value of his share of the crop has been so far diminished that it has become insufficient to support him and his family. If his bargain with his landlord has been for a money-rent, he will be forced to sell more of his crop to procure that money : his share of the crop will be reduced in quantity as well as in value. Then with regard to the landlord : his farmers, if not tied down by leases, will insist upon a reduction of rents, or throw up their farms, which he will only be able to let to others at reduced rents. Those who are tied to their farms by leases may be made bankrupt if he insists upon having the full amount of his bond, and their farms also be thrown into his hands. The consequence of a reduction of the value of corn by more being brought to market, must one way or other be to diminish the value of the proportion of the annual crop to which the landlord is entitled, without increasing its quantity ; while the quantity which he must dispose of in order to procure the sum of money necessary to pay the interest on his mortgages is increased.

Parties so circumstanced have this to say for themselves—" The engagements which threaten to be productive of so much embar- rassment to us were entered into when there was no prospect of any change in the Corn-laws. We made our bargain with refer- ence to the existing state of social relations, a state of affairs which every thing concurred to persuade us was likely to last. We took our chance of the ordinary changes in business, but we could not calculate on a sudden change to be effected by act of Parliament. If it is sufficient to justify others in promoting that change that they look to be benefited by it, surely it is sufficient to justify us in opposing it that we look to be injured by it." This argument is seldom advanced directly as an argument against the repeal of the Corn-law ; it is used ostensibly for the purpose of advocating deliberation and delay—a delay which in such cases is generally equivalent to a denial of the innovation demanded. To this latter extent it is clear that the argument cannot be le- gitimately pushed. The question lies not between the alternatives of equivalent advantages for one or other of two classes; it lies between permanent advantage to all classes on the one hand, and transient pressure on the other, which may last long enough to ruin individuals belonging to one class, but must in the long run benefit that class in the aggregate, along with all the other classes that ge to make up society. The very utmost that the individuals exposed to danger can be entitled to demand, is something in the way of compensation. All they can ask with any appearance of fairness ia, "Since so much good is to be procured for the general body at our expense, let us receive some compensation at the hands of those who are to benefit by our suffering." The request is deserving of attention inasmuch as compliance with it may render a settlement of the

attention, question, satisfactory to all parties, more easily and speedily attainable. The repeal of the Corn-laws, if obtained without a previous change in our institutions, must be obtained from a Parliament in which the agricultural interest prepon- derates. Nor does the agricultural interest stand alone in its support of these laws : the great monied interest, concentrated in London, and able at any time to cripple or promote manu- facturing enterprise by granting or refusing pecuniary advances, is as sensitively alive to any thing that threatens to affect the in- comes of the mortgaged property, as the agriculturists themselves. All who seek a peaceable and constitutional settlement of this question, will see the necessity of respectfully listening to and discussing any plea urged by parties having so much power in their hands.

There are three classes of landowners whose incumbmnces lead them to entertain the apprehensions to which we are now advert- ing,—those who have borrowed money to expend it in the acquisi- tion or the improvement of land; those who have incurred debt by their extravagance ; and those who have succeeded to property upon which money had been borrowed by way of mortgage in order to make provisions for younger brothers and sisters. In strict justice not one of these has any claim for compensation. Every man knows that laws are liable at any time to be repealed or modified ; and this is taken into consideration by every prudent man (just the same as other contingent risks) in buying or improving land, or 42 providing for his family. On the plea of humanity, the spendthrifts who have incurrred debt by extravagance have not the shadow of a claim for compensation. The speculator in land is a more re- spectable character, but his claim is scarcely a jot stronger : be could see the signs of the times, and ought to have taken into account the chance of the Corn-laws being altered. There is more to be said in behalf of him who has succeeded to an estate burdened with family provisions : the debt incurred was not by his act ; the miscalculation argues no overweening want of caution on his part ; he has innocently become owner of a pro- perty, the possession of which has entailed upon him the necessity of keeping up a certain expenditure ; and if his apprehensions of what is to be the effect of repealing the Corn-laws be realized, that property will prove illutlory—affording creditors a plea for exacting from him the payment of debts amounting to more than its value. We repeat, that in strict justice not one of these classes has any claim for compensation : but it is impossible to divest ourselves of a sympathetic feeling for the last-meptioned; and, so deeply are we convinced of the immense benefit that would be derived to all classes from the repeal of the existing Corn-laws—so certain are we that the apprehensions entertained by the landed interest of the

extent even of the temporary pressure are exaggerated—that we think the repeal would be cheaply purchased by giving sufferers by it, the improvident and even the criminal as well as the inno- cent, security that compensation would be made for any serious amount of injury it might inflict upon them. The apprehensions of the agricultural interest might be allayed by a proposal of this kind, on the part of those who seek the re- peal of the Corn-laws—" We admit that any loss imposed upon in- dividuals by the operation of a repeal of the Corn-laws on con- tracts entered into with a fair and reasonable prospect that these • laws were to be permanent, entitle the losers to compensation in the event of repeal being carried. We restrict this concession to such cases of loss as can be clearly traced to the repeal of the Corn-laws, and are of sufficient extent to render compensation ne- cessary to enable the losers to retain their place in society. On this understanding, we agree that the sum of shall be se-

cured upon the public revenue for the purpose of affording com- pensation to all losers who shall be found on inquiry to belong to

the class herein designated." We believe that the repeal of the Corn-laws would be cheaply purchased at any sum that has any chance to be inserted to fill up the blank left in this formula of agreement. It binds the nation to compensate none but real losers, to a serious amount, and by the operation of Corn-law repeal. The number of those really needing compensation would be found to be trifling compared with those who are deterred from con- ceding repeal by the vague fear that they themselves may be the losers. It is much easier to convince a man that an impending evil will affect only a few of the class to which he belongs, than

that be will not himself be one of the sufferers. The guarantee proposed would do good mainly by establishing confidence in the

measure. On the other hand, it would afford a guarantee to the agricultural classes that every care would be taken to make the transition from a restricted to a free trade in grain in the way least calculated to affect them injuriously. The tax-paying classes being held bound to make good all tangible losses traceable to the repeal of the Corn-laws, would have an interest in reducing the loss occasioned by the operation to its minimum.

It will be observed that the agreement here suggested refers merely to the landowners : it is evident, however, that the benefit of the security given to them would extend to their creditors. A special provision may require to be embodied in the act of repeal, for the security of the farmers occupying farms on long leases : it might be made incumbent upon every landowner applying for com- pensation, in proving his title to it, to show that reductions cone- eponding to his claims bad been made in the rents of his leasehold tenantry.

We see no other means of affording a fair and reasonable security to all parties against loss by the experiment. than some such arrange- ments as are here indicated ; but we entertain no in their favour strong enough to exclude others that may be sug- gested and shown to be capable of being more easily worked. The gradual repeal frequently spoken of is a very inadequate substitute for arrangements of this kind. It does not reassure the minds

of those who object to any experimenting upon the Corn-laws from apprehension of loss to themselves individually. It is as clearly demonstrable as the consequence of any untried act can be, that the effect of a gradual repeal of the Corn-laws would be to post- pone the benefits anticipated from such a measure ; and it is ap- parent that any prolongation of the general suffering of society must be for the disadvantage of those who are to bear the largest proportion of temporary suffering necessarily occasioned by any state of transition.

Arrangements of the kind here suggested seem to be the most fair and satisfactory method of meeting those objections to Corn-law repeal which rest upon the inconvenience that such a measure would occasion to individuals. A preliminary resolution of the Legislature, such as we have proposed, might have the effect of allaying sectional distrusts, and of bringing all classes to labour upon the great measure of relief with a sense of a common interest.