TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE CHANCE OF WAR.
WE are by no means willing to believe in war, still less to prophesy it, but it is impossible to deny that there are ugly circumstances in the present situation in Eastern Europe. That war between Russia and Austria which General Fadayeff declared to be inevitable, and which General Skobeleff hoped for, is certainly much nearer than it was a few months ago. The Hapsburgs will avoid it if they can, and would wait on with the tenacious patience of the House for another twenty years before they would give the signal ; but control of the decision is not entirely in their hands. The Panslavist party in Russia, always the strongest in serious crises, has evidently captured the Czar, who has just publicly decorated and praised their great exponent, Katkoff, and the Panslavists are believed to be inclining towards war. They hate Austria always, as a State which divides the otherwise irresistible Slays; they know that they cannot have Constantinople without either beating or bribing the Hapsburgs ; and they think, not without some reason, that the opportunity is favourable for action. England, they believe, hampered as she is by the occupation of Egypt, by the insurrection in Burmah, by the Irish Question, and by the diffusion of peace- ful ideas among the democracy, is in no position to declare war, or to wage it with energy if she did. She will protest and remonstrate, and urge on Turkey ; but she will not land sixty thousand men at Varna or in the Caucasus. Germany, on the other hand, is neutralised by the hostility of France, and the rise to power in that country of a generation which trusts in its new Army ; while Turkey is more or less exhausted by recent armings. There is only Austria to fight, and the Russian Chauvinists have always been confident that, if let alone, they could defeat Austria in the field. At all events, Austria, successful or defeated, would be glad to make peace ; and the war, great as it would look, would, for Russia, be one with limited liability. These are dangerous ideas to be entertained by a party which includes so many Generals and possesses such influence with an Emperor who commands a million of men, and their danger is greatly increased by two temporary facts. One is that many of the ablest Russians have a latent desire for war as the only road out of a miserable situation. Victory would give the Imperial system a new strength, and make submis- sion honourable; while defeat would bring the present system of government to a final end. They feel, as the Magyars felt in 1860, that war must produce either glory or freedom, and they can be pleased with either. The other fact is that there is in Russian eyes a real occasion for war. It is quite evident that the Court of St. Petersburg intends to triumph in Bulgaria, whatever the cost may be, and that in forming that decision it can count upon its people. The desperate measures already adopted, the cynical defiance of Western opinion, the publicity given to the menacing messages of the Czar, even the peace manceuvres of the troops, all tend to prove that the Russian Court has made up its mind, rather than fail in Bulgaria, to employ direct force. It is by no means certain either that it can succeed without force. The Bulgarians are clinging to their Prince, anxious for their independence, and jealous—the military especially—of an inroad of Russian officials. They may insist on re-electing Prince Alexander, or forming an anti- Russian Administration, or picking a Prince whom the Russian Court must veto ; and then there would be nothing for it but occupation. The "moral invasion" of Bulgaria is only an alternative to be tried first. The Czar could not, and, we may be sure, would not submit to open defeat in the face of his people, and there would, if Bulgaria rejected his proposals, be literally no other step remaining to take. If after the violent removal of Prince Alexander the Bulgarians are still penetrated with Prince Alexander's spirit, the Russians must either leave Bulgaria independent —that is, acknowledge failure—or crush out her independence .at once.
Austria, it is true, could remain quiescent even if Bulgaria were occupied or submissive to St. Petersburg ; but then, is quiescence reasonably probable ? We doubt it greatly. The Germans of the Monarchy, always at war with the Slays, would think the Hapsburgs timid, or wholly surrendered to Slavism. The Magyars, always keeping themselves with difficulty above the Slav masses of Hungary, would think their last hour at 1mnd, and have already signined through M. Tisza that their
Kingdom will not bear the Russians in Bulgaria. The Poles of Galicia who paid such honour to Prince Alexander would be enraged by the thought of such a victory for Panslavism, and the Serbs and Wallachs would see in it the destruction of all their hopes for the future. Above all, the composite but well-cemented Army, which in many ways is Austria, and which the Hapsburgs will not offend, would see in the whole transac- tion a defiance and a challenge which, from the continental point of view, it would be almost shameful not to accept, and would demand to be led into the field. We doubt if the states- men of Vienna, long-suffering and cool as their experience has compelled them to become, would be able to resist pressure so varied and so severe, and should doubt the continued humility of the Austrian Emperor. He might " compensate " himself by taking Salonica ; but that would only throw Turkey into Russian hands, and he is much more likely to declare for the freedom of the Balkans and risk the chances of what would be, from the strategical point of view, a defensive war. Austria, it is true, has seldom been successful in war, and the present Emperor has twice been seriously defeated, and has lost self- confidence ; but still the Hapsburgs have never been ruined by war, and the Emperor may trust that in the long-run neither Germany nor England can afford to abandon him. He will have the aid from the first of Roumania, Servia, and Bulgaria, and great sympathy from Italy, which, if France threatens Germany, must almost perforce declare on the other side. As we have said, the Austrian statesmen will avoid war, and are not above listening to projects of partition ; but there is a limit to their patience, and it is said to be already reached. At all events, the cue has been given to all correspondents and interviewers, that Russia will not be permitted to occupy Bulgaria, nor to carry its "moral conquest" beyond a certain point. What that point is, is not defined ; but we may be nearly certain that the present demand of Russia for the command of all Bulgarian troops will, if conceded by the Regents, be found to go beyond it. The Austrian Court is not warlike, but it is essentially military.
That alarm is felt upon the Continent, and war regarded as possible, is clear from the energy with which England is advised in every direction to ally herself with Austria. Lord Salisbury is adjured to take a decided course, and to forbid a Russian occupation, despatching, if necessary, a fleet to the Black Sea. If he will do that, say a hundred pens, there will be no war, and Bulgaria will remain free. We doubt it greatly, holding that the Czar must and will run any risk, and that he would bribe Turkey to shut the Dardanelles against England rather than let Bulgaria go free, and so lose his road to Constantinople. In the face of the undying Russian tradition he dare not, even if he were willing, sanction such a retreat. Any Prince may yield to force, but his people believe that force is upon his side. We should accomplish nothing, therefore, by joining Austria, even if the people would sanction such a step, and they would sanction nothing of the kind. The new electors understand nothing of Eastern Europe, they are possessed with the idea that commerce is momentarily unprofitable and that they are all distressed, and they would turn out the Government for asking the necessary sacrifices. Nor could English statesmen safely say that their instinct would be wrong. The quarrel is not ours except in the most indirect way ; we are not in a situation to fight a long land war, and we should be from the first embarrassed by the fact that Austria would not end the war without heavy "compensations." The issues would not be clear enough or peremptory enough to rouse the people, and the statesmen would be divided into three parties,—one, and the strongest, opposed to war ; a second clinging to the Palmer- atonian policy ; and a third arguing that the time for inter- ference would arrive, if at all, when the combatants were growing exhausted. The Austrian statesmen may be sure of English sympathy,—firstly, because the dread of Russia is widely diffused in this country ; and secondly, because the partly Federal form of the Austrian Monarchy allows some play to the nationalities ; but they will have to do their own task, and it may be a serious one. So far as we see, Russia may be forced by her aggressive policy to occupy Bulgaria ; and if she does, the Austrian Government will be forced, how- ever reluctant, to act with an energy which can hardly end otherwise than in war. The occupation may be postponed by the submission of the unhappy Bulgarians ; but they are as yet in no disposition to submit, as their address to the Regents shows. They will rather, if M. Stambouloff may be • trusted, take "desperate resolutions."
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