America and the Manchurian Affair

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Of the second of these events we now have an authoritative account, carried as far as March, 1933, from Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State in the U.S.A. throughout that period. His book, The Far Eastern Crisis, will at once be recognized as of the first historical importance, for while it is of course written from the special angle of the author, it is based on all the information available to him in his position from every source throughout the world ; and it records the impressions and conclusions of a singularly fair, dis- passionate and judicial mind. The book has a second claim to attention, of equal and perhaps even more enduring importance, in that it illustrates both the possibilities and the difficulties of co-operation between the- U.S.A. and Great Britain and Europe through the League of Nations, as seen by one who has probably one more to advance it than any other living man.

Mr. Stimson begins his narrative dramatically with an account of the congratulations exchanged between him and the Japanese Ambassador on the tranquillity of the international horizon on September 17, 1931—a few hours before the coup in Manchuria. The subsequent account falls into three clearly defined periods, the first ending with the fall of the Minseito Government on December 11, 1931 ; the second with the abandonment of the Shanghai adventure on May 31, 1932 ; and the last with the final adjudication of responsibility by the League on February 24, 1933.

In the first of these periods, that of " efforts at concilia- tion," the essence of Mr. Stimson's policy was to exercise American influence in such a way as to " help Shidehara, who is on the right side, and not play into the hands of any nationalist agitators " and " to co-operate with League policy.- The first of these considerations was based on a belief in the personal character- of Baron Shidehara and his colleagues, which is shared by those who best knew them and has not been destroyed by subsequent events. (On a personal visit to Tokyo earlier in the year I formed the same impression of the sincerely pacific intentions of the Civil Government.) The second was expressed in the appointment of an American representative to participate in the Council's discussions " when they relate to the possible application of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which treaty the United States is a party." For a time success on this line seemed possible, since the League was able, on December 10th, with Japanese assent, to appoint an investigating commissionwith Lord Lytton as Chairman and General McCoy as United States _Member. On the very next (lay, however, the-.change of Government in Japan showed clearly that power:W(1s in the hands of the army leaders,' reinforced by this.-tinie_hy an inflamed nation-

alist passion throughout the nation. . • The second period is the one on which Mr. Stimson has

inoSt of interest to contribute to: our knoWledge of the negotiations. It includes his introduction of the " non- recognition " principle ; the astonishing Shanghai advenitire, and a serious divergence between American and British Polley. The most important instance of this divergenCe -was in January, 1'932. Early in that month Mr. StionSon wrote n Note, in which the American Government refUsed to recognise any action inconsistent with treaty provisions as regards (a) the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of China, (b) the " Open Door " policy and (c) the obligations of the Kellogg Pact._ This was drafted as an American note, and not in con- sultation with other countries. It was, however, read on the 5th to the British and French Ambassadors before being communicated on the 7th to Japan and China, and on the same day to the six other signatories of the Nine Power Treaty." Mr. • Stitnion . states -that. he hoped that our-action Ttvoidd be -received at least with'. sympathy and Ail/is-with inimedia-telsupport.7 The Far Eastern Crisis. By Henry L. Stimson. (New York : Harper. London :Boyal Institute of International Affairs. 15s.) SEPTEMBE,R, 1931, has a strong claim to be regarded as the principal turning-point in recent history. In that month the world financial crisis reached its most dramatic expression

in the fall of the pound. In the same month, and almost at the same moment, Japan started her Manchurian adventure, of which the repercussions still continue from the Far Fast to Abys:-• inia and Central Europe.

On January 11th the British Government issued a Press communiqui, in which they said that, Japan having gfven assurances that it would adhere to the Open Door policy, " H.M.G. have not considered it necessary to address any formal note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the American Government's note."

Upon this Mr. Stimson comments :

" The contents of this communique were such as to be taken by most readers, including—what was most important-the Japanese Government, as a rebuff to the United States. Its omissions were the most important feature. It was entirely silent as to Ole preservation of- the sovereignty, independence and integrity , of , China, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the assertion of the principle of non-recognition of the fruits of unlawful . aggression. It thus ignored entirely the questions of world peace and China's integrity, which we had deemed the most important features not only of our note but of the previous three itionths' negotiations in which we had been supporting the efforts of the League of Nations and the British Government. The communiqué dealt solely with the single problem of continuing trade relations with Manchuria." - Mr. Stimson writes with restraint, but his deep -feeling is evident. What is the explanation of the communique? Annoy- ance at not being consulted (as distinct from being informed) be- forehand ? Perhaps. But it was surely more than that. The communique reveals an attitude of mind that explains much in the Manchurian affair—and in later events, too. It is difficult.to believe that it could have been -written if those whose minds it expressed had sincerely meant what Great Britain agreed to as a Member of the League ; if the protection of the League system had been as much a real object of their

much a •

policy as British trade interests ; or if they had :sincerely and consistently realised that full, • Anglo-American C97 operation was the essential condition of success.

A somewhat similar divergence of ..opinion des-eloped in

February upon a proposal of. Mr. Stimson to make use of the Nine Power Treaty. In this and in other cases it is easy. to understand the difficulties-arising with these. Treaties alterna7 tively available as the basis of action, :with; initiatives being taken on both sides, of the Atlantic. . There is still in:. sufficient information publicly available to form a confident judgement on this and other_ incidents in the, negotiations, but the British communiqué of January 11th. cannot :but affect adversely the opinion of any, objective ,historian upon

the part played throughout by Great Britain. , Mr. Stimson's book brings out very clearly the facts that

collective restraint of Japan was impossible .without full American and British co-operation ; that this was sometimes, but not consistently, achieved ; and that both intrinsic difficulties and personal faults contributed to the failure, It does not give a decisive answer to the question whether, even if there had been no such errors,, success would have been possible under the actual political conditions of the Manchurian- dispute. , • In the event, as we know, all that the League :could do was to adjudicate on the responsibilities.. Mr. Stimson was deeply impressed by the justice and unanimity.. of. the Assembly's verdict, and he pays a high tribute to the Lytton Commission. He concludes with some comments on; the general position which are speCially, valuable at this moment. " In any system of sanctions, much will depend upon the wisdom and vigour of leadership with which the first international tests of the system are carried- through to comPletion. Ultimate' succe will greatly be facilitated by momentum. . . . The influence of success would not be oonfined to the League of Nations. • It would be very potent, I believe, in America. My observations- of public opinion in America, while the League was proceeding unfalteringly with its programme of sanctions 'during. the autumn of 1635, cdii- firmed me in this view. -Co-operation between the United States and a League which had-shown itself steadfast . . •I believe would be a comparatively easy matter." . . . What, are the principal conclusions to retain ? I suggest three.. First, the League, will only be successful if we mean the action which we take as a Member in the same sense as when

_ in we act n defence of a purely national interest. Second,

when we can rebuild a collective system that works .for League Members,. we can make it into a: world system by. organised collaboration with America but disunity among, ourselves drives America farther off and cannot be C0.111- pensated for by , American help. „ Third, it should be a fundamental principle of British policy to seek always and consistently collaboration with America, with a patience and _determination. sufficient to override- all.--questions- of office pique or remembered differences in past policy. • •

ARTEUR SALTER.