In the Middle
From SARAH GAINHAM
BONN
NEWSPAPER guesses about the 'secret' of Rambouillet and—now—the secret of the Bonn talks between Adenauer and Macmillan mostly ignore one thing. Charles de Gaulle has Published at great length an open account of What he wants to do, and his reasons for wanting It. There is no secret. Neither is there a secret of tk'nn. We have taken one stumbling step among Many, some of them backwards or sideways, towards the only goal that makes any sense in the latter half of the twentieth century. President de Gaulle is often, here as elsewhere, referred to as an enigma, a question mark. Seen from Bonn, Particularly by those who have taken time off, to read his Memoirs, it is not de Gaulle but (he British who are the enigma. Do the islanders mean business this time? Has Mr. 'Macmillan really abandoned his belief that an agreement can be reached with the Russians? Were the c.1°8ing sentences of the then Foreign Secretary in the Commons debate a hint that, if the two Problems he propounded could be solved, real Progress could be made? Up to the Bonn meeting these two stumbling-blocks—regulations to"pro- tect Britain from the misuse of Commonwealth free entry of goods by third parties, and conce(n for those members of EFTA who will not or e,annot join a tighter organisation--har been Interpreted as a brusque rejection of European Union, economic or political. Significantly it was the British spokesman who expressed the differ- ence between the talks fifteen months ago be- tween Adenauer and Macmillan and those of last week. The difference is the Summit. '
One of the facts of British internal politics has always been underestimated here; the existence of a hod of opinion (including all the anti-bomb groups) which wants, and believes possible, an 'agreement,' never , clearly formulated, with Russia. It seems unlikelY that anyone as hard- headed as Mr. Macmillan ever believed anything so Utopian himself, but because it had to in- fluence his foreign policy so extensively it was thought here to be his own 'belief. It is hoped, and begins to be believed, that Paris in May changed Mr. Macmillan's mind for good.
The other point about the Summit disaster, which may yet prove to have been a blessing in disguise, is not mentioned openly here at all; but the paralysis of United States policy is just as present in Chancellor Adenauer's mind, though for different reasons, as it is in President de Gaulle's. The prospect of possible recurrences (possible because it does not have to happen, but on past form seems likely) Of American in- decision for what amounts to one year out of every four is as great a source of fear to Adenauer as it is of opportunity to de Gaulle. This does not imply a swing away from the acceptance of American leddership by Adenauer; even if he wished it, independence of America is imposs- ible --and he does not wish it, for Adenauer does not want anybody's hegemony in Europe, not even France's. And the existence of a group in French political circles which would view with in- difference if not satisfaction the exclusion of England from the Continent is not seen here as a serious barrier to agreement. De Gaulle is above such jealousies, it is believed; but he would not himself enter into an attempt to persuade the British. This, the Germans are undertaking; warily, but with cautious optimism. Though it is not going to be easy, the removal of the highly doctrinaire secretariat at Brussels so suddenly and completely from the political scene may make it easier.
The reason for Chancellor Adenauer's deter- mined efforts to get Britain into Europe lies where the key to his thinking always lies, in the East; specifically in Berlin. The chance that the Russians will be tempted, before a new American administration can work itself firmly into office, to try another move against West Berlin is only too obvious.
The internal condition of the Soviet Zone (DDR) is quite enough to give weight to such suspicions. The Ulbricht oligarchy in East Berlin set its industrial contribution to the in- tegrated planning of East Europe's economy far too high, in an effort to prove the DDR the fore- most pupil of Russian Marxism. After sonic initial successes the long-term results are over- strain in every branch of industry; constant break- down in raw materials deliveries and resulting hold-ups in production. The neglect of small everyday needs such as needles and socks makes life one long strain for the citizen, as such things do not count in the Plan. Above all, the forced collectivisation of the peasants has been a serious failure. All kinds of basic foods are lacking.
These consumer troubles are always blamed on distribution, but nobody believes that story any more. The oligarchy blames the lower ranks of party functionaries for the dissatisfaction of the populace. The rank and file of the party are in a grumbling and rebellious mood. Experts of every kind leave their work every day for the West and the proletariat has rejected, implicitly if not openly, the doctrine of 'Socialist con- sciousness,' which is supposed to mean present sacrifices for a glorious future, but seems to simple people just harder and ever harder work for less result. The miserable difficulties of life in the DDR can be illustrated by one fact. In the whole city of Leipzig there are only nine child- ren's specialists left for a population of 600,000. What that must mean to families where the parents both work long hours does not need to be emphasised. The temptation to risk a peace treaty with East Germany and a move against West Berlin as a heartener to the discouraged party and a. rich sop to the proletariat must be very great.
It is between this wretched situation in East Germany and the Paris of de Gaulle that Adenauer balances. No wonder he is willing to forget his old resentments towards the British if we can bring ourselves to bury ours towards his Countrymen. For if internal politics is the art of the possible, then foreign politics is the art of seeing your own position clearly in space and time. And Adenauer is the first German Chan- cellor since Bismarck who soberly recognises his country's position—in the middle.
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