The War Surveyed
FAR EASTERN DANGERS
By STRATEGICUS
THE position in the Far East has now been clarified. In general it seems that the Japanese have lost as many capital ships as the United States in the surprise attack upon Pearl Harbour. If these had been the only naval losses, therefore, the Japanese strength would be impaired more than that of the United States, which has, so far as we know, a much superior total tonnage. But we have to add to these losses the British battleship and battle-cruiser ; and these casualties are not only great in themselves, but much more disturbing in their implica- tion. Indeed, the circumstances of their loss form part of a general problem that calls for most serious and most urgent consideration. It has been stated that these very valuable ships were not given air-support because of the lack of undamaged aerodromes. If the reason were to prove untrue, we should be left with a completely inexplicable situation. Air-support nowa- days is essential to naval action ; and already Japan has been made to appear more enterprising than the nation which wrought such havoc with the air-weapon at Taranto, Matapan and in the ' Bismarck' battle.
If this incident stood alone it might be imagined that some strange oversight, very unusual in the Navy, had led to the operation of this strong squadron without the support it needed, and with which it would have seemed only natural it should be provided. Indeed, a British admiral has been driven to attempt a justification of the action taken by Admiral Phillips. There has even been a statement that the general cloudiness of the day was part of his justification. This falls very little short of sheer absurdity. There is a school of naval opinion which takes the threat from the air so seriously that. it would think long before risking ships where it might be involved. This attitude was prevalent at the time of Italy's Abyssinian operations, when it was customary to regard capital ships exposed to air-attack as if they had the fragility of eggs. The experience of the war has done much to sweep that fallacy from the naval outlook and to favour the other school, which tends to think that the air-attack really does not matter, but must be taken as among the risks the King's ships are built to encounter and overcome.
Of the two attitudes the latter is the more reasonable ; but it must make some provision for air-attack, not only in the matter of anti-aircraft defence, but also in arranging for the support of fighter and other aircraft. Who, remembering Taranto, Matapan and the ' Bismarck,' would have ventured to think this is not now accepted doctrine? But the loss of the fine battle- ship and battle-cruiser have come to remind us that it is either not universally accepted, or not uniformly applied. Of course Admiral Phillips was thoroughly justified in steaming out to destroy the enemy transports and cut his communications. For what other purpose was he sent to Singapore? He was sent out to attack the transports even at the risk of battle. There would have been no point otherwise in sending two such powerful ships to the Far East. But there cannot be the smallest doubt that he should have been assured of sufficient air-support. The suggestion that he could only operate in cloudy weather is itself a little absurd, and can only be otherwise if no aircraft were available ; 'and we have been given to understand that Hurricanes and Spitfires had arrived at Singapore in numbers adequate to the role they might be expected to carry out.
It is now a commonplace that, with a restricted range, such machines cannot operate without the use of adjacent aerodromes. In general, it is admitted that aerodromes are necessary for the functioning of all kinds of aircraft, either shore- airfields or the floating aerodromes which aircraft- carriers supply. But for the use of fighter-aircraft it is adjacent aerodromes that are needed ; and as the two warships were apparently operating not far from the shore they should have been able to rely upon such a condition. If the aerodromes had been put out of action we should be driven back on the problem that faced us in Crete. Indeed, a war which appeared to be largely one of aircraft is now seen to be one of aerodromes. If the aircraft are only of use when provided with appropriate aero- dromes, it is the aerodromes to which we must attend ; and this factor seems very likely to be the deciding element in the main- tenance of the Malay Peninsula. The problem, as it has taken shape there, is this: if the Japanese can bomb the Malayan aero- dromes to uselessness from Indo-China or from aircraft-carriers, why cannot we from Malayan aerodromes destroy the airfields in Indo-China or the aircraft-carriers?
There appears to be a tinge of absurdity even in posing such a problem ; but can it be said that it is unreal or too crudely stated? We have lost the aerodromes at Kota Bahru, in northern Kedah and in the neighbourhood of Victoria Point. They would have been almost invaluable in the attack upon the railway from Bangkok, which is presumably now being used to reinforce the Japanese main advanced base at Singora. They would have been of the utmost importance in providing direct and close support for the garrisons of northern Kedah and Kelantan. They would have given the opportunity of assisting any movement we intended to make from Burma against Thailand. But all have been lost ; and now we shall see them very shortly used for the support of the Japanese advance southwards towards Singapore.
The Japanese apparently seriously propose to sweep all Europeans out of eastern Asia. They have attacked Manila, where they have, on balance, had little success as yet. They have driven in to the island of Hong-kong and are concen- trating against it their heavy artillery and bombing-aircraft. They are driving southward in the Malay peninsula It is here that the position at the moment looks most serious. They have advanced to the southern border of Kedah and are making for Selangor, from which place there runs a good road across the peninsula to Kuantan. The news about the operations near Kuantan is unsatisfactory. But it is obvious that even a small force established there could provide a very difficult problem for the troops attempting to stem the advance down the west coast road towards Selangor. This place is less than two hundred miles from Singapore ; and the Japanese intention is evidently to press sufficiently close in to Singapore to render it useless as a base by incessant air-raids and, if possible, artillery-fire. They are already about that distance from the Malacca Strait, and have therefore created a bottle-neck of the same character as the Sicilian Channel to interfere with traffic between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.
They have already marched a considerable distance towards the severance of communications between Britain and Aus- tralasia and between the United States and the Near East and Russia. They have made it difficult for the United States to interfere with their operations, by the capture of Guam and the attacks upon Wake and Midway Islands. Most of this success is due to air-support, and our lack of it is attributable to insufficient attention to our aerodromes. It is wiser to face the situation with all its bleak realism, since, as we have to sur- mount it, we do well to recognise the enemies that confront us. We cannot prudently estimate our chances unless we first weigh our risks. It is the fact that all of the achievement of Japan depends upon the precarious basis of her sea-power. Without that she cannot operate abroad ; she cannot in the final analysis even exist. It is the strangest fact in this situation, which one is tired of hearing described as " confused," that so little has been heard of the main fleets. Of the Japanese capital ships two have been mentioned. One is sunk and the other probably seriously damaged. The United States has lost one battleship, and another is damaged but repairable. The two British capital ships are sunk. Apart from this we do not know what is the strength of the great fleets in the Pacific, or where they are.
It has been stated that the whole of the remaining considerable strength of the United States Pacific fleet is seeking the elusive Japanese fleet. No one can imagine that Britain and the United States cannot spare sufficient strength to cope with the Japanese fleet, as far as we know it. But Japan has given the aircraft- carrier a supreme role. The Italians have never liked the type and have suffered accordingly. But Japan has constructed a con- siderable number of large and small aircraft-carriers, and it is important to note that she has recognised the use of the small carrier. Her air-strength has been consistently underrated. It is not that we have been ignorant of her numerical strength, but that we had not realised what reliance she places on her aircraft.
There is here one of the many ironies of the war. It is Britain that has been most enterprising in her use of naval aircraft ; and yet it is that factor that has caused our greatest loss. Japan so far is reaping all the advantages of the initiative and of the offensive, and we are suffering all the disadvantages of the defensive. But the United States has not begun to make its weight felt vet.
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