SPAIN AND FRANCE. T HERE are unrecognised facts in politics as
well as in science. In the region of international affairs no fact is more often ignored than the special relation which exists between France and Spain. People are too apt to regard Spain as a State which practically stands outside the European system, if not, indeed, as a survival or a derelict. The talk about Europe ending at the Pyrenees has been taken so seriously that men have come to regard it as axiomatic. But if Spain is outside Europe, Europe need be little concerned with her. That deduction shows the folly of trusting to epigrams. European civilisation and the European social fabric may end at the Pyrenean wall, but for all that Spain is bound to be of very great interest to Europe. The reason is plain. France is the neighbour, and the only neighbour, of Spain. Therefore France is bound to concern herself with Spain. You cannot have a land frontier of three hundred miles with a country and not be deeply interested in her destiny. But whatever concerns France must in the long run concern Europe, for France holds, geographically as well as morally and politically, so central and so commanding a position that, weak or strong, perplexed or at her ease, she is almost of necessity the pivot State of Europe.
But it may be urged,—The interest of France in Spain is not made sufficiently clear by merely stating the fact of neighbourhood. A very little elabora- tion and reflection will make the matter obvious. In spite of the fact that Spain is, from a military and naval point of view, a weak State, her direct hostility to France might be a matter of the most vital importance. France has, besides the neutral States of Belgium and Switzerland, three neighbours,—Germany, Italy, and Spain. Suppose her at war with Germany and Italy, and obliged to place armies along both the Alps and the Rhine. It is clear that under these circumstances the ability to leave the line of the Pyrenees unguarded would be most important Spain may be weak, but, however great that weakness, a hostile Spain would require at least one hundred thousand men to watch the Pyrenees, and prevent the South-West of France being plundered. But a hundred thousand men locked up in this way might mean the difference between victory and defeat. Thus, though Spain may• be a negligeable quantity for the rest of the world, for France her atti- tude during a great struggle might be a matter of the utmost moment. Prince Bismarck realised this quite clearly, and in the eighties almost succeeded in getting King Alphonso to become a satellite of the Triple Alliance. Fortunately for France, however, Alphouso died, and Spain gradually edged away from the Triple Alliance, and regained her complete independence. Since then France has very quietly and discreetly endeavoured to get as much hold over Spain as that proud people will tolerate. On the whole, France has been successful, and the official relations between the two nations have become very friendly. Spain's difficulties have of late become France's opportunity, and we do not doubt that it the secret archives of the Foreign Offices of Paris and Madrid were published the world would find that France had given help to Spain in many ways undreamt of by the public. Whether France has actually come to the pecuniary aid of Spain, directly or indirectly, is a very difficult question, and one which cannot be profitably discussed here. It is, however, a very curious fact that, in spite of many indications that Spain was quite at the end of her financial tether, Spain has managed to get the money absolutely necessary for her military and naval preparations. But even if France has notigiven financial encouragement to Spain, it is by no means improbable that diplomatic encouragement and support have been rendered her in what is the most effective way, —i.e., privately and unostentatiously. There are well-informed people who believe that when in the autumn the United States almost came to close quarters with the Cuban question, she found that there was a stiff- ness in the Spanish attitude which could only be accounted for by the fact that Spain knew that in the last resort she could appeal for help to a Power which could not afford to neglect her demands for help. Of course France did not threaten the United States, or state in any way that she could not allow Spain to be bullied. It is, however, by no means unlikely that she let it be understood indirectly that considerations of the utmost importance to her as a nation would not allow her to see Spain treated in an unfriendly spirit by any Power, and that a Spanish appeal made to France must cause in the end the intervention of France. If that had been said openly, the pride of the United States would no doubt have obliged them to treat the suggestion with disdain. If it was felt rather than said, or even hinted, it would have been comparatively easy for the Americans not to resent it, and it would quite account for the way in which the United States shrunk in prac- tice from treating Spain in the way originally suggested by the protests of their Government. America might for an adequate cause build a fleet and drill an army, and then take from France half her colonial empire, but that is not the sort of struggle to be entered upon over Cuba. If France really made herself felt behind Spain the United States Government, which is not the Senate nor the newspapers, would hardly feel justified in going forward. After all, it is only a small section of America which is really excited about Cuba. The farmers of the North-Western and Middle States know little and. care less about Spain. But supposing France is thus quietly standing at the side of Spain in her hour of danger, France has gained a great deal. She has absolutely secured the neutrality of Spain, and possibly she has secured some advantage in the West of Africa. After all, Spain, by the possession of the Canaries and of the Rio d'Oro territory on the coast which lies between Morocco and Senegambia, has, even if she does not part with actual territory, a good deal to give in that quarter of the globe.
In any case, it is as well to remember that France can- not possibly afford to neglect Spain, that she has occupied, and does occupy, a special relation towards her, and that quite lately this relation, in some way or another not yet fully intelligible, has been strengthened and developed. The " face " of Spain has been saved by France, but subject to this France has managed to do what the prize- fighters call give Spain "a knee." People may think all this sensational and dreamy, but in reality it is nothing but the purest common-sense. No one could be responsible for the government of France for a single day, and not realise the absolute necessity for keeping Spain from falling into the hands of Germany. Remember, if France did not give Spain "a knee," Spain would apply, and almost certainly with success, to the Triple Alliance, with which the Queen Regent has, owing to her birth, such close and influential relations.
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