TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUSSIA'S VhS INERTL2E.
IT is of importance that the English nation should appreciate with the utmost attainable precision the resources of the enemy, should the war, in spite of pacific appearances. [that have before proved delusive, be continued through another campaign. Such an ap- preciation guards us against miscalculated anticipations, saves us from unfounded hopes and unfounded fears, guarantees modera- tion in triumph and calmness in failure, fixes the mind firmly on the permanent elements of the struggle, and more than anything secures a right choice of aim and: a right selection of means to effect the aim. In this view, Mr. Cobdtlh has done good service, by directing public attention to such peculiarities in the resources of Russia as render her difficult of exhaustion, and such pecu- liarities in our own resources as render the efforts necessary for the prosecution of the war disproportionately exhaustive to us. Even though no ingenuity on our part could modify these relative proportions, it would be well to know the fact ; and it can hardly be doubted that the fact has not been so constantly and clearly present to the minds of the nation, at large, as to prevent very exaggerated estimates of the power possessed by the Allies to act upon Russia by gradual sustained coercion.
Russia is comparatively insensible to the exhausting effects of our operations, mainly from two causes. Her foreign commerce is so unimportant that the portion of it impeded_ by our blockade contributes but a trifling fraction to her revenue, while the war causes an increased demand at home for many of the articles usually exported, and the remainder passes out by land at a price which, if enhanced, weighs principally not on the producer but
the consumer, in this case the inhabitant of Great Britain. On the other hand, she produces at home all articles of prime neces- sity for the support of her population ; and the sources of produc- tion the Allies make no pretension of being able materially to affect. We may insult her coasts, bombard her coast-fortresses, destroy fishing-boats, stations, and villages ; but we can neither impede the agricultural, pastoral, and musing processes in which her wealth mainly consists, nor obstruct the communication be- tween different districts of the country which live by supplying each other's wants. Even in the Crimea, our utmost efforts, with unquestioned mastery of the waters that nearly sur- round it, have failed to act appreciably on the supplies of the Russian army ; and in any other part of the Russian dominions, it is safe to presume that the Government would find means of supplying their armies, except in case of complete investment by an enemy's force. The only pressure that such a con- dition of things leaves available to an enemy, consists in the drain of men employed in defending the parts of the empire assailed and assailable ; in the financial embarrass- ment arising from the necessity of paying foreign holders of state securities, and of purchasing stores used in war and not produced at home ; and in the depression of the authority of the Government by its inability to prevent the hostile occupation of its territory, and the destruction of its ship- ping and coast-fortresses. Wien one calls to mind the wars of the French Republic and Empire from 1792 to 1815, and that these were for the most part—whatever their origin—aggressive wars carried on far from home, and when the state of French finance is remembered, it will hardly do to calculate much on the drainage of men, or the embarrassment of finances, as necessarily crushing the spirit of a people or obstructing the efforts of a millions government. Seventy Wens of agricultural people are not easily exhausted : and so long as food can be produced in the country, the army is certain to have its share of it. We are then reduced to depend mainly on the effect a continued occupation of the enemy's coasts may produce on the Government. But when once her fortresses are destroyed or captured, and her ships of war sunk, that resource is exhausted. Now, the real question is, whether the Russian Government on the one hand prefers to lose her other great naval arsenals, as she has lost Sebas- topol, or to submit to make the concessions demanded of her ; and on the other, whether the Allies are strong enough and skilful enough to capture or destroy. Sweaborg, Cron- stadt, Nicholaieff, and Ismail, to say nothing of recapturing Kars and driving Russia North of the Caucasus. Whether Mr. Cobden's statistics are exactly true or not is little matter. Broadly viewed, there is no doubt that any notion of exhausting the resources of Russia for resistance is fallacious, and that on these coast operations and their effects upon the pride and authority of the Russian Government our main dependence hangs.
It is plain, too, that though France and England are far richer countries than Russia, their inhabitants better provided with the necessaries and comforts of life, their revenues and resources for aggressive war much larger, yet the demands the war makes upon these resources are also larger in proportion, and the dispositions of the people to submit to sacrifices less, both from habits of living and from the power they possess of making their inclina- tions tell upon their Governments. Neither Louis Napoleon nor the English Government could employ such a degree of compul- sion in straining the resources of the two nations, and enforeing sacrifices on the people, as would present no insuperable obstacle to the Russian Government. Great financial disturbance in France or England would seriously affect the military efficiency of either country in a war carried on so far from home, and would besides produce social consequences that would press hard upon the reso- lution of the Governments. Nor could England, without sacrifices disproportioned to their effect, annually provide great armies from her own population. In short, to sum up the relative positions of the two contending parties, the war is at once more expensive to the Allies than touIt ssia, and the disposition of Russia to en- dure sacrifices is greater than that of the Allies, both from the nature of the contest and the habits of the nations.
Now, since the strength of one party rests in its power of en- durance, and that of the other in its superior resources for con- centrating overwhelming force upon particular points—and this is the exact military difference between the two parties—our plain policy is to strike heavy and rapid blows, to accumulate all the means of attack that our wealth and skill can provide in doing the work of destruction upon. such Russian fortresses as are acces- sible, and not to spend, our strength in idle blockades and desul- tory forays, which cost a great deal more than the loss they occa- sion to the enemy. We cannot, from political and financial rea- sons, conquer Russia by simple exhaustion, but we might perha by great effort overmatch her wherever she can be assailed. When we have captured something more than half a great fortress —when we. have left not one coast-fortress unattempted with all our might—when Sweaborg, Cronstadt, Nicholaieff, and Ismail, are in our power, or have shown themselves beyond it—will be time to despair of affecting the obstinacy of the Russian Govern- ment, and to resort to Mr. Cobden's pacificatory patent. Admit- ting as approximately true Mr. Cobden's statistics, and the direct inferences he draws from them,—admitting the superiority- the Czar possesses in his absolute authority over a people capable of great endurance when their patriotism and their religious feelings are aroused,—we entirely reject Mr. Cobden's secondary inferences embodied in the advice he offers to the nation. of which he is a citizen .and a councillor. It was not of the general of an in- vading army that the Roman poet sang,
" Unus homo nobis cnoetoudo restituit rem."
Nor can a Fabian policy ever suit a nation which has to conduct wars far from home on an enemy's soil. Such a policy may be the salvation of a. country which with great power of endurance has to contend against a superior invading force supported at vast expense. This policy has hitherto been successfully pursued by Russia : she has shrunk from combat whenever it was pos- sible ; her ships she sinks rather than fight. On our side, with every motive for rapid success at any cost, we have acted too much, by sea at least, as if our ships of war were toovaluable to be risked ; our admirals have thought mainly of bringing home their fleets as trim and perfect as they took them out. It is no doubt difficult to hit the mean between rashness and timidity - but policy under the present circumstances would be to err rather on the side of rashness. If we cannot beat Russia in three years, we shall not beat her in thirty.
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