THE RUSSIAN BREAK-THROUGH
By STRATEGICUS
S0 majestic is the sweep of the Russian offensive that it is not easy to bear in mind that the full scope of the design has not been revealed even yet. Up to Monday the Germans were describ- ing eight different attacks, whereas Stalin had only admitted the one great break-through. On Tuesday came the news of the Zhukov offensive ; and it may be that other thrusts will be announced when they have passed through their preliminary phase. When Koniev struck it was recognised that there were other Generals of higher prestige and proved ability waiting their cue ; and, although -Zhukov's attack accounts for the commander who is perhaps the most skilful executant, it remains true that the complete design has yet to be revealed.
Koniev struck about a week ago precisely where it was expected he would strike ; but, judging from the front on which Zhukov's armies are marching, the major role has been allotted to him. The bridgehead across the Vistu!a in the neighbourhood of Sandomierz was obviously held against the heaviest German counter-attacks for the facilities it offered to a decisive thrust towards the Silesian frontier ; and the same applies, though with less force, to the bridgeheads from which Zhukov struck. Two of them launched a's armies ; and, just as the forces issuing across them have joined, they will link up with those of the Koniev bridgehead. The Germans between the two armies will either have fallen back already or be striving to do so now. Zukhov and Koniev are advancing towards the Silesian frontier and the heart of Germany. Silesia, important in the present as in the last war, has steadily tended to become vital. The home of the refugee industries from the western air-attacks, its value in the German war potential has appreciated by a sort of geometrical progression. It covers also the shortest route to Berlin ; and though the weather is at present far from perfect, it is normally good tank country.
Zhukov took his cue some two days after Koniev, and the two armies are moving ahead at such a pace that it is almost meaning- less to note the stage at which I write. But it is obvious that Koniev Is less than a day's march from Cracow and only about 4o miles from -the Silesian frontier. Zhukov is through Radom and moving on Lodz, leaving Warsaw partially outflanked behind him and the great bend of Posen ahead. These details at least show that the Russian armies are through the deep defences with which the Germans had tried to effect an insurance against such a blow as this. They will no doubt find in their path other of the obstacles which modern warfare has cast up ; but Guderian will probably be relying on some force of mobile reserves. Behind the Russian offensive there will probably be representatives of the staff to co- ordinate the various movements, according to their custom, in order to circumvent the enemy's attempts to check the advance.
To describe the situation as changed by this remarkable offensive would be a meiosis. Possibilities that seemed almost impossible to dream of now begin to peer over the horizon. The Germans, it has been seen, are fighting again with a skill and stubbornness that appeared to have vanished below the Seine. They have rallied and had some time to comb out their better troops and increase their number by fresh levies ; and in the east a considerable period of inactivity has enabled them to accumulate a reserve. But unless all the Allied estimates are wildly wrong they have not sufficient numbers to withstand the pressure of a grand assault. They thought that their defences in the east, as in the west, would give them more time still to economise strain and numbers. But what can be said now that the defences in Poland have been torn open over a front that must extend for about 120 miles? If they could not hold the defences, how can they check the Russians in the open? It is not so long since a German commentator insisted that a line must be re-established because the German armies could not engage in open warfare without grave peril. General Bradley said quite rightly that it was the perilous success of the Allies in the west that led Rundstedt to launch his counter-offensive. It seems certain that the penetration at Aachen lacked Jill,/ the weight to turn the whole
defensive belt. The Arnhem assault only just fell short of the maxi- mum success its daring and skill deserved. In the east the Russians have the numbers and material to press home their attack ; and if this offensive is to follow the usual curve it will accumulate suc- cesses for some time yet.
What concerns everyone now is how far Rundstedt has succeeded in securing the reserve price of his offensive. Every general has some such scale of values before his mind when he launches an offensive. There is the optimum he may achieve, with some luck of the weather or of surprises ; and there is the objective that will secure at any rate sufficient success to justify the losses he may incur. When we consider the Russian offensive, which seems at present to be sweeping everything before it, we have to weigh the extent of the freedom from interference in the west which Rundstedt's offensive has won. The evasion of the full effects of a two-front war must have been the minimum success the German Staff set before themselves ; and, at first sight, Rundstedt seems to have timed his blow with unfortunate prescience.
On the face of it, Koniev and Zhukov do not stand alone in their contributions to the great offensive. Buda-Pesth is presumably at its last gasp. The counter-attack which the Germans so skilfully and so stubbornly directed below the Danube appears to have vanished like a dream. It had occupied the attentions of some of the best of the German armour and the best infantry divisions. Malinovsky's blow towards the west, on the north bank of the Danube, may be now absorbing some of this force ; for it is evident the Germans dare not leave the Russians to move ahead towards Bratislava and Vienna. The Germans picture the Russians as de- livering another attack through Czechoslovakia. It is not easy to see how the units used to attempt the relief of Buda-Pesth can be withdrawn into Poland ; for, however poor the communications on which the Russian advance rests in Hungary, the pressure on them must depend upon the resistance encountered. The operations at the other end of the Russian front must also have their diversionary effect. The Germans will view their expendable ground with a realism that would startle many people ; but can they weaken in East Prussia? According to the German reports, some ground has already been lost in the eastern fringe of the province. There is another attack said to have been launched in the Narev-Bug- Vistula area. Success there would open to attack the southern marches of East Prussia and force another door in the direction of Berlin. Dare the Germans weaken there?
It can be seen, then, that the Russians have secured so many pieces that this difficult game is already biassed in their favour. It can, indeed, be realised that the threat on the eastern front alone is so formidable that the Germans may be hard put to it to effect another stabilisation of any duration ; and, at a certain point, there are possibilities of drawing in the Allied forces in Italy and the Balkans. But what about the western front? Is its influence destroyed for the critical period of the Russian offensive?
In this matter we touch upon a number of considerations that rest on facts that cannot be ascertained with as much accuracy as one could wish. Rundstedt is fast being moved back to his starting-point. When the First American Army began to attack at the shoulder of the salient, on the Malmedy-Stavelot sector, it threatened the root, and no longer the tip, of the salient. The idea of some fresh line in the neighbourhood of Houffalize has gone ; and the Allies are pressing the Germans steadily back. This is in itself immaterial. Indeed, in one way it secures nothing of any value to the Allies. While the salient remained, it could be made a death-trap for the forces stationed there ; and it would require greater numbers than had held the original position. But the pro- cess of pushing the Germans back provides the Allies with an oppor- tunity of taking a heavy toll, and the troops who are thus suffering are among the select of the present German Army. But the ques-
tion of relative loss is clearly vital. Mr. Stimson has stated that in the 23 days between December 15 and January 7 the Germans lost about 9o,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners, as against the American loss in the same period of about 40,00o.
If those losses should. be even approximately correct—and later information could hardly change them fundamentally—Rundstedt's gamble has proved very costly. It is true that in the region of the Saar and the Rhine about Strasbourg the Germans are still attack- ing. But there, again, they are paying heavily for gains of ground that, disconcerting at this moment, may be redeemed before long. How far will Rundstedt be able to disengage in the west? How far can he disregard the Allies on the northern part of the front, where a tentative local attack is now being delivered? It is clear that he has disturbed the Allies' preparations ; and has, therefore, thrown out of gear the simultaneous attack. But there are evi- dences that steps are being taken to repair the destruction ; and the Americans have a marked gift for swift action when the necessity has become obvious.
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