THE HOME GUARD
By LORD GORELL
T ORD CROFT, replying to a debate in the House of Lords 1. on July it th on the constitution and progress of the Local Defence Volunteer Corps, or the Home Guard, as the Prime Minister has renamed it, referred to it as a fairy story, one that would hardly have been possible in any other country. That is a perfectly accurate reference, but its accuracy is per- haps in two diametrically opposed directions, showing the British in a light that is both highly favourable and unfavour- able. Lord Denman was entirely justified in observing that, though remarkable progress had been made, much remained to be done.
In what now seem by contrast the easy, quiescent days of war between September last and May roth, first under Mr. Hore-Belisha and then under Mr. Oliver Stanley, the British Army prepared itself at a somewhat leisurely rate along well established lines. Nothing new at all events was done as to home defence. It was not until the advent of Mr. Churchill's Government coincided with the onslaught in the West that the huge resources both of man-power and patriotism latent in these islands were called upon specifically for that purpose. There is emulation in many a parish and township throughout the land for the distinction of being the first to send out a Local Defence patrol: who wins that may be in doubt, but, at any rate, I can assert that by May asst, within a few hours of enlist- ment—enrolment came later—I was myself out on patrol, armed and officially appointed to a rural command. So that, for better or worse, I have seen this movement from the beginning.
As has now been publicly stated, over a million L.D.V.s have now been enrolled and organised in zones, areas, and smaller localities; their duties have been officially declared to be com- munication, observation, and obstruction—that is to say, they are primarily to patrol as a defence against parachutists, air- borne troops, or traitors (a more precise word than Fifth Columnists) to report at once to the regulars and the police, and meanwhile deal with the situation as best they can—and in the event of an emergency they pass directly under the control of the regular formation of their area or locality.
So much in general everyone now knows. It is a fairy story of which we may be proud that in so short a time over a million men could be found willing to give up, as needed, their night's rest and serve their country under military law: the official age limits are 17 to 65, but they have been exceeded at either end. Boys have begged to be allowed to enrol as messengers, admirals, generals and others of high rank have been proud to serve as section-leaders or as simple volunteers. The Corps is very keen: within the necessary limits of men who are engaged all day in professional, agricultural, or other work they have undergone an appreciable amount of rapid training in musketry and drill ; and—again within the necessary limits of time, opportunity, and arms—they are a valuable adjunct to the fully trained and completely equipped regular forces.
But—and it is a word over which we should pause with a long, resolute breath—can we be proud that it was not until the middle of May that such a corps was even thought of Can we be in the least satisfied, even now, that its constitutio progress and equipment are all as efficient as the needs of perilous time demand? And if the answer is no, why, wh must Great Britain so continually be asked to prove her or deniable, incomparable genius for improvisation? That anomalies must exist in such a Corps, however full organised, is apparent: the conditions vary in every area But to have adjacent to one another a platoon of, say, 2,co men and one of 14o, the first in a populated area and second in a rural, both with duties of a similar character, d make for inequalities. Then again, though equipment coming along now so fast that there is no section that cann give a military account of itself, those sections or platoon which for one reason or another have attracted publicity hart been favoured beyond those which are defending threatenec areas. The ship, in short, is still on an uneven keel.
More general, but still vital in its bearing on efficiency, the relation of this Corps to the other home defence service, A.R.P. and A.F.S., for example, are elder brethren of man, months' seniority; in some populated areas there are me enough and to spare for all and each of the services, but in others, in an agricultural community, for instance, all the abk bodied, public-spirited men naturally joined either the A.R.P. or the A.F.S. when those started; and now have come along ti the recruiting-officers of the L.D.V., only to be told—officially- that members of the other two cannot enrol as L.D.V.s. In the more patriotic—or the more sensible—localities a workabt modus operandi has been found, in others inevitably jealousies and body-snatchings prevail. It is obvious to anyone that a home defence services are essentially one, and should be fused together under a single command—but in Great Britain at leas the obvious is so seldom achieved with quickness.
Finally—what of the future? It is all very well keeping watch and ward on the present basis through summer nights: these are warm and of six hours' duration. Men can patm from ten to four in July, as may be needed, and carry on their ordinary avocations as well: can they patrol from four in the afternoon to eight the next morning in December and be fit fa anything else? At present they are unpaid, part-time volun. teers ; and when not on duty are serving their country in fielc and factory and office, service which in the great majority of cases is essential to the sinews of war. If they are to become paid or whole-time military they must needs be withdrawn from industry—and that hardly seems possible without great and undesirable readjustments.
It is difficult to see a satisfactory solution, and in any case it for the Government and not for an individual to propound it: but at least let us not sit back contented, but insist on an assun ance that it is now being worked out, and that this, like se many of the past, is not one of the many problems of the war which is being left to the chances and changes of the future.
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