THE BATTLESHIP : TONNAGE AND GUNS
By ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND
IN the " Explanatory Memorandum " (Cmd. 5137) on the London Naval Conference it is stated that consultations will be initiated by the British Government in the last quarter of 1940, to consider the holding of another conference in 1941. "In the course of the con- sultation riews trill be exchanged to determine rchether, amongst other points, it may be passible to agree upon u redliction in- the calibre of gun and in the site of .flaum capital ships."
" That Monster Custom, who all sense cloth eat," has a very form hold on men's minds in this matter of the battleship. Prejudices and prepossessions take a singu- larly long time to dispel. Four years pass very quickly, and if consideration of the question whether the size of the future " Capital " ship (incidentally what ix the definition those who use this term so freely attach to it ?) can be reduced is to be deferred until a few months before the end of 1940. there is the strongest probability that the nations of the world will find them- selves permanently saddled with the cost of more, and more expensive, examples of the great ships which now bear so heavily on all our purses.
Let it be clear what the question is. It is not whether smaller ships can fight larger ones --there is but little dispute about that. It is whether there is an intrinsic necessity for ships of these great sizes : whether the ultimate object of navies—the security of communications at sea—is unattainable without these monster vessels; as well as whether it is attainable with them.
The experiences of the fifteen years which have passed since the Washington Conference deserve notice. Not least among them are the changes of opinion regarding size. At Washington the five principal maritime nations agreed to the principle of stopping that competition in size which had been the curse of the world for more than a generation. They agreed to adopt a maximum size beyond which none would go. The step which should have governed this common-sense agreement is obvious. A serious and strategically scientific endeavour should have been set on foot as soon as possible to ascertain how small a man-of-war could be. consistently with fulfilling the functions of a fighting ship in naval war.
Most unfortunately this was not done—probably there was not time—and it has not been attempted since. A size 35,000 tons—was adopted which had no relation whatever in the needs of strategy or tactics. " Science " was indeed asserted to be the foundation : but it was not strategical or tactical science. It was said—and I do not doubt it was correct—that it was impossible to mount a battery of 16 in. guns, with the requisite armour and other constructive elements. in a vessel of a lesser displacement. Observe the premiss-- that the so-called capital ship must earry guns of 16 in. calibre.
The answer to this pseudo-scientific claim was plain enough. Why must a battleship carry a 16 in. gun ? Is it impossible for one body of ships to fight another body of ships unless the guns of both are of that size ? The largest guns at that decisive battle, Tsushima, were 12' in., and there were not many of them. The largest guns at Jutland—a less decisive battle—were 15 in., but there were also guns of 13.5 in., 12 in. and 11 in. Wherein, then, did the necessity suddenly arise in 1921 for 16 in. guns ? What changes in naval warfare had occurred which rendered a lower limit impracticable?
There had been none. The necessity did not exist. It was a pure assumption. How little scientific thought had really been given to this problem is shown clearly enough in the subsequent phases of the discussions on size. Although in 1921 it had been said that 35,000 tons was indispensable (and, indeed. I was told not many years after that it was too little) we saw proposals made at later con- ferences for reductions. First, a ship of 130.000 tons was suggested, then one of 25.00o tons, and later again one of 22,000 or 20.000 tons ; the last-named being dependent on the gun being of 11 in. calibre.
Though none of these proposals proved acceptable to the "nited States the supposed intrinsic necessity for a 16 in. gun received. 1 hope. its quietus at the London Conference. There, 14 in. was adopted as the maximum for the gun. But here again. wherein does the necessity lie for a gun of 14111.1' What danger would result from the adoption of a gun of. say. 13i in. or of 12 in. or of 11 in. or of even smaller sizes ? Whether, indeed, the gun is a right criterion is highly questionable ; fur it' the size of the ship is determined, the size of the gum follows. That, however. is too technical a matter to discuss here.
Some clearer thinking is obviously needed. for many new theories, utterly unknown to our ancestors. have been recently invented. It is said that as the battleship may have to work in waters infested by submarines and aircraft she must he secure against their attacks. But why is she only considered ? Not she alone, but also her satellites, the cruiser and destroyer, have to operate in such waters. How. if' great size ix the only security, can we expect these lesser vessels to survive ? And if they are sunk, what can the battleships do by themselves, however immune they may he ? Anyone with a bowing acquaintance with the history of the past knows that a host of lesser vessels has always been needed to defend shipping. If' the theory is correct, that the great ship alone is safe, what follows is that shipping cannot be protected ; for none of us can possess a sufficient number.
Chaotic notions also exist concerning the fund' of the battleship. The usual reply to the question " what is her function " is, " to cover the lesser craft from attack lw battleships." The meaning of this strategical jargon, in ordinary English, is that the fleet of battleships shall lie in such a place that if an enemy fleet puts to sea it cannot reach any of these detached weak forces without grave risk of being inter- cepted and fought. The admirals in the past, Anson, Hawke, Cornwallis, St. Vincent and others did this by lying close by the port where the enemy fleet lay. That cannot be done today, however ",invulnerable " these cosily ships may 1w. ('an they, then, lie in a near-by harbour ? 'They can do so it' they can there be safe from attack. But whether the ship can lie in a harbour within reach of bombardment we do not know. The recent removal of the fleet from Malta shows doubts of this. One thing. however, is certain. A fleet at Alexandria or Gibraltar does not. " cover " shipping in the Western basin of the Mediterranean or the Malta Channel.
Enquiry, exhaustive, judicial. and scientific in the true sense of the term, is needed into this whole strategical question. It cannot be begun too soon, for it takes time, and it is not only this country which is affected by the question, but others as well. It is not a thing that can be done by the nations of the world in a rush in the last quarter of the last year before the anticipated conference in 1941.
Previous page
