Determining Tory policy

George Hutchinson Early next month, Edward Heath will be sixty years of age—for many, though not in politics and certainly not for him, the point of retirement. Retrospectively, he has much to celebrate. There are very few who attain the leadership of a great 'political party, fewer still who ever occupy the exalted office of Prime Minister. When the party is the Conservative Party, and finds a leader in someone of modest origin, without inherited influence or advantage, the achievement is all the more impressive, not to say startling. Mr Heath's election to the leadership in July 1965 was no less remarkable than his accession to the premiership five years later, in the summer of 1970.

But that is of the past. What of the future? What can Mr Heath look forward to? What are the prospects that he might reasonably mark or celebrate as he enters his sixty-first year, when his standing abroad is perhaps even higher than it is at home?

Given that he wishes to remain at Westminster rather than assume some lofty international role (and more than one appointment could be had for the asking), his fortunes are inevitably linked and related to those of his party and his successor, Margaret Thatcher. Sixteen months after being deposed by Mrs Thatcher, he is still at odds with her, however, both personally and politically. In the immediate aftermath of his defeat and her victory, she invited him to join the new Shadow Cabinet. He declined. Even now, there are no sure signs of an early reconciliation. Mr Heath remains detached —not from the party but from the leadership.

Yet Mrs Thatcher and the party will need his visible, energetic and ungrudging support if they are to have any hope of overthrowing Labour at the next election. The country would make very little of a party (already deprived of Mr Powell) that did not command the voice and influence of its recent leader. By dragging his feet, or standing aloof, he could wreck the Conservatives. But of course he will do nothing of the sort: Mr Heath is no renegade or deserter.

While he may not feel able to endorse every single aspect of Mrs Thatcher's policy, he can be counted upon to defend the overall —and fundamental—Conservative interest, and to do so with success. In the ultimate test, it is inconceivable that he would imperil the party for reasons of personal pride, pique

or prejudice. Indeed it would not be surpris

ing if his own election address to his constituents were to assume a much larger dimen sion, evolving into something rather in the nature of a personal manifesto of national character.

So much for Mr Heath and his part in the election, whenever it comes. He can be depended upon to uphold what he has always believed in—and that is not the furtherance of socialism or surrender to illiberal values.

What of Mrs Thatcher, her Shadow Cabinet, her front bench, her private advisers, and the party organisation ? Are they all prepared for an election? Hardly so.

The Opposition front bench remains impoverished, enlivened here and there by individual accomplishment and flair but collectively feeble. While Mrs Thatcher herself has done admirably well since becoming leader, the same cannot be said of all her colleagues. With perhaps half a dozen exceptions they are dull dogs of minor political consequence. This need not be so: the Conservative back benches are not devoid of talent. Mrs Thatcher should enrol it without further loss of time. After all, her repeated calls for an early election may be answered sooner than she thinks; and while she herself has the spirit to fight one the party still lacks the capacity.

It lacks the resounding organisational capacity, the somewhat formidable machinery, that has normally distinguished the Conservative Party. Above all it lacks the political capacity—the policies themselves and the ability to express them to arresting effect, in language calculated to stimulate the faithful and engage the wider public.

To many minds, a provisional statement of policy, comprehending the great issues of the day, is now overdue. This is not to suggest that everything should or can be cut and dried: there was too much of that (or too great an attempt) when the Tories were previously in opposition, and with office the disadvantages—the handicaps, the flaws and misconceptions—were quickly exposed. Overmuch planning is a dangerous game, as Mr Harold Macmillan (for one) has persistently pointed out.

Policies cannot sensibly be determined in all their exact detail until a party is actually holding the responsibility and power of office and its leaders are as fully informed as only a government can be. Nevertheless,

there is a middle way S(pife Mr Macmillan9 Jmr atcmuInaentw9:611 allow me the phrase). The Tories can and must acquaint the electorate with their essen' tial aims and specify at least some of the measures by which they hope to fulfil thenl. Conservatives (and not only Conserva' tives) are agreed that public expenditure, local and national, must be severely reduced and thereafter rigorously controlled if the economy is to be saved. But Mrs Thatcher and her colleagues are afraid to say how the would achieve this: they fear the electoral consequences of any explicit prescription—. yetth is is a sphere in which some exactitude must be forthcoming if party promises are re carry conviction. True, the Tories woll,ld alienate some prospective support by ells' closing their proposals, which—if they were to prove effective—could not be altogether painless. Any loss might well be balanced bY an accession of support elsewhere, however. Candour is usually preferable to conceal' ment, and tends to be more rewarding in rile

long run. Whatever the risk (which they Pr° bably exaggerate) the Tories will have t° speak out on public expenditure. They owe it to themselves and to the country and ealy not safely evade the duty much longer. Other great issues demanding similar earldour are immigration and devolution. the first of these, the Conservative record is no better than that of Labour. If the Conseil" vative leaders have any real instinct for Ob. lic sentiment, if they have the slightest affiri. ity with the national mood, they will fornin:c late and announce a rational and realistic policy without delay, not least for the sake die the immigrant community. This is also tres of devolution on which the party rernal,r1 divided, unsure and unconvincing. As to I; dustrial policy and relations with the rra.,. unions, no one knows what to make of such is the confusion. Applied to a great central, broadly-based; democratic party like the Conservatives, til terms 'right' and 'left' are seldom satisfac; tory. Even so (and for want of better) he have a certain utility. Thus we may reasolin't ably identify Mrs Thatcher with the rather than the left. Her instincts and irle nations are not those of the unduly iliber!ie or 'free-wheeling' or 'permissive' 00'4 would say 'wet') element. Hence, in part, ll‘e, dislike and mistrust of the Soviet reginl strongly expressed and well understood. Misgivings about the USSR and the en1P:, tiness of 'détente' will not win the electinnt however. It will be won, or alternatively 10,5 in the wide sphere of domestic policY. Callaghan understands this as well as any:, one, and he is no novice. The Tories are 1.:ivt against an experienced and skilful opP°r1° —an opponent, moreover, whose repure:lt 'moderation' and amiable aspect are without appeal to some of their own num g Unless the Conservative leaders, recognislao the dangers lying immediately ahead, c.c,re produce some compelling policies beT.,s long, we shall all remain at risk, those who prefer a freer society than Labour wordeli; allow with the benefit of a new and strong mandate.